Strategic and contemporary issues
Maritime Security
Sea lanes, piracy, terrorism from the sea, contested waters and the Hormuz crisis of 2026: India's maritime interests, the instruments it uses to protect them, and the legal order of the Law of the Sea it defends with qualifications of its own.
Overview
By official estimates about 95 per cent of India's trade by volume, and around 70 per cent by value, travels by sea, as does most of its imported energy. India has a long coastline, more than a thousand islands and an exclusive economic zone of about two million square kilometres. Its maritime security agenda therefore spans the protection of sea lanes and chokepoints, coastal and offshore security, the management of maritime resources, disaster response, and the strategic competition that has brought China's navy into the Indian Ocean.
Policy is set out in the navy's strategy Ensuring Secure Seas (2015), in the doctrine of SAGAR and MAHASAGAR, and in India's Indo-Pacific approach. This entry treats the issues those doctrines address.
01Interests and threats
India's sea lanes pass through three chokepoints it does not control: the Strait of Hormuz, the Bab-el-Mandeb at the mouth of the Red Sea, and the Strait of Malacca. Threats range from piracy, which peaked off Somalia between 2008 and 2012 and revived in 2023–24, to terrorism from the sea: the attackers who killed 166 people in Mumbai in November 2008 came by boat from Karachi. Illegal fishing, smuggling, oil spills and climate-driven disasters add non-traditional risks. The strategic concern is China's growing presence: anti-piracy task forces since 2008, a base at Djibouti since 2017, port investments around the ocean and frequent research and survey vessels.
02The legal order and India's position
India ratified the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1995 and presents itself as a defender of a rules-based maritime order. It accepted the 2014 arbitral award that settled its maritime boundary with Bangladesh in the Bay of Bengal, in which Bangladesh received the larger share of the disputed area, and it contrasts that acceptance with China's rejection of the 2016 award on the South China Sea. India also holds a position that some partners dispute: under its Maritime Zones Act of 1976 and its declaration on ratifying the Convention, foreign military exercises in its exclusive economic zone require its consent. When a US destroyer conducted a freedom-of-navigation operation near Lakshadweep in April 2021, India conveyed its concerns. Chairing a Security Council open debate on maritime security on 9 August 2021, Narendra Modi set out principles including the removal of barriers to legitimate trade and the peaceful settlement of disputes under international law.
03Instruments
After 2008 India rebuilt coastal security around the Coast Guard, a chain of coastal radars and a national command and control network. At sea, the navy has commissioned its first indigenous aircraft carrier, INS Vikrant (September 2022), keeps ships on mission-based deployments across the Indian Ocean, and runs Operation Sankalp to protect Indian shipping in the Gulf (since 2019). Maritime domain awareness is pooled through the Information Fusion Centre at Gurugram and through white-shipping agreements with partner states. Partnerships multiply reach: the Quad's maritime domain awareness initiative, the Colombo Security Conclave, exercises with ASEAN and African navies, and capacity building for island states.
04Red Sea and Hormuz, 2023–2026
From November 2023 Houthi attacks on shipping in the Red Sea, launched in the name of Gaza, diverted trade around the Cape of Good Hope. India did not join the US-led coalition but deployed more than ten warships in the Arabian Sea and Gulf of Aden; in March 2024 its navy recaptured the bulk carrier Ruen from Somali pirates. The war that began with US and Israeli strikes on Iran in February 2026 brought the crisis to the Strait of Hormuz, through which much of India's crude and gas passes. Traffic collapsed; India negotiated with Iran for safe passage of Indian-flagged ships, protested when two Indian tankers were fired upon, and took part in UK-led talks on freedom of navigation through the strait. The episode showed that India's maritime security depends on chokepoints far from its coast and on diplomacy with every side.
05Assessment
India's maritime posture has grown more capable and more cooperative, but three gaps remain. Capacity: the navy's budget share and India's shipbuilding industry are small beside China's. Coherence: maritime responsibilities are divided among the navy, the Coast Guard, several ministries and coastal states. Consistency: India's support for freedom of navigation sits awkwardly with its consent requirement in the exclusive economic zone, a position it shares, ironically, with China. The strategic choice is between building sea control in the Indian Ocean and investing in cooperative security; India's doctrine claims both.
06Reading it through IR theory
Realism reads India's maritime agenda through the distribution of naval power. China's growing presence, from anti-piracy task forces to the base at Djibouti, port investments and frequent survey vessels, is a shift in capabilities that realists expect India to answer with its own: carriers, submarines and bases at key points, as well as partnerships. Realism also warns of a security dilemma at sea, in which each side's preparations confirm the other's fears, which is one reason the debate between sea control and cooperative security never quite closes. Liberal institutionalism stresses the legal order. India's ratification of UNCLOS and its acceptance of the 2014 award, in which Bangladesh received the larger share of the disputed area, are what institutionalists expect of a state that gains from rules: compliance at some cost builds the reputation that lends weight to India's criticism of China's rejection of the 2016 award. Information-sharing through the Information Fusion Centre addresses the problem institutions are best placed to solve, uncertainty. Constructivism draws attention to how shared norms are interpreted. Freedom of navigation can mean different things to maritime powers and to coastal states, and India's requirement of consent for foreign military exercises in its exclusive economic zone reflects a coastal state's wariness of foreign military activity near its shores, a position it shares, awkwardly, with China. Each lens captures one strand of a posture that claims both sea control and cooperative security.
07India's options and the way forward
India's choices turn on the balance between capability and cooperation and on the coherence of its own position. Building sea control in the Indian Ocean, with more ships, submarines and island infrastructure, would strengthen deterrence but requires sustained budgets and a shipbuilding base that remains small beside China's. Cooperative security, through capacity building, information sharing and first response, earns influence with littoral states at lower cost, but cannot by itself secure chokepoints far from India's coast, as the Hormuz crisis showed. Institutionally, the division of maritime responsibilities among the navy, the Coast Guard, several ministries and coastal states argues for stronger coordination, whether through a single coordinating authority or better processes among existing bodies. Legally, India can maintain its consent requirement for military exercises in its exclusive economic zone, a position written into its law since 1976 and shared by several developing states, or soften it to strengthen its case against China's claims, at the cost of revising a long-held stance. Diplomatically, the 2026 crisis showed the value of being able to talk to every side to secure passage for Indian ships. On balance, the realistic path combines a capable navy focused on the Indian Ocean with partnerships and diplomacy for distant chokepoints that India cannot control alone.
Key points
- About 95 per cent of trade by volume and around 70 per cent by value moves by sea (official estimates).
- Chokepoints: Hormuz, Bab-el-Mandeb and Malacca, none under Indian control.
- India ratified UNCLOS in 1995 and accepted the 2014 Bay of Bengal award.
- India requires consent for foreign military exercises in its EEZ, a position some partners contest.
- Coastal security was rebuilt after the Mumbai attacks of November 2008.
- The Red Sea (2023–24) and Hormuz (2026) crises tested India's reach and diplomacy.
Debates
Should India prioritise sea control in the Indian Ocean or cooperative maritime security?
Sea control: China's navy is expanding fast; India needs carriers, submarines and bases at key points to deter coercion and protect its sea lanes in war.
Cooperative security: India cannot match Chinese shipbuilding; its comparative advantage lies in partnerships, information sharing and being the first responder, which earns influence with littoral states at lower cost.
Is India's position on military activities in the EEZ consistent with its support for freedom of navigation?
Consistent: India distinguishes navigation, which it supports, from military exercises and manoeuvres that may threaten a coastal state, and its view is shared by several developing states.
Inconsistent: the Convention does not give coastal states such a right; India's position resembles China's in the South China Sea and weakens its criticism of Chinese claims.
Was India right to stay out of the US-led maritime coalition in the Red Sea?
Yes: deploying more than ten warships independently protected Indian shipping and crews, earned credit through operations such as the recapture of the Ruen, and avoided association with a coalition operating amid the Gaza war, preserving India's ability to talk to all sides, which proved valuable when it negotiated with Iran for safe passage through Hormuz.
No: joining would have pooled intelligence and firepower, shown solidarity with partners whose cooperation India seeks in the Indo-Pacific, and given India a voice in shaping operations that protected its own trade.
The independent model suited an Indian Ocean power with ships close at hand. It may be harder to sustain in a larger crisis, which is why India took part in UK-led talks on freedom of navigation during the Hormuz crisis.
In the UPSC papers
Asked by UPSC
5 questions · 2024–2026
2026 · GS-II · Q9 · 10 marks
“IPMDA (Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness) bridges the gap between India’s SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) vision and the Quad’s collective Indo-Pacific strategy.” Make a critical assessment of the statement focusing on IPMDA.
2026 · PSIR II · Q4(c) · 15 marks
What is UNCLOS ? Explain its salient features.
2026 · PSIR II · Q6(b) · 15 marks
Critically evaluate the important factors of India-Maldives relations on the eve of sixty years of diplomatic ties between the two countries.
2026 · PSIR II · Q7(b) · 15 marks
The island of Kachchatheevu remains an intractable issue in India-Srilanka relations. Comment.
2024 · GS-II · Q20 · 15 marks
Discuss the geopolitical and geostrategic importance of Maldives for India with a focus on global trade and energy flows. Further also discuss how this relationship affects India’s maritime security and regional stability amidst international competition ?
Verbatim from the official UPSC Main papers, linked to Maritime Security in the PYQ dataset.PYQ Intelligence →
Practice questions
- Q1UPSC Mains style15 marks· 250 words
The security of India's sea lanes depends on chokepoints it does not control. Examine India's response with reference to the Red Sea and Hormuz crises.
How to approach it
Chokepoints; Sankalp and Red Sea deployments; 2026 diplomacy for passage; limits of naval reach.
- Q2UPSC Mains style15 marks· 250 words
Assess India's stance on the law of the sea, with reference to the Bay of Bengal award, the South China Sea and military activities in the EEZ.
How to approach it
Acceptance of 2014 award; support for the 2016 award since 2023; consent requirement; consistency debate.
- Q3UPSC Mains style10 marks· 150 words
How did the Mumbai attacks of 2008 change India's coastal security architecture?
How to approach it
Coast Guard role, coastal radars, command network, fishing-boat registration and coordination.
Practice questions are original to this platform and are not previous year questions. For questions actually set by UPSC, see PYQ Intelligence.
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Sources
- 01United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982)
- 02Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy (2015). Indian Navy
- 03Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary Arbitration between Bangladesh and India, Award. Permanent Court of Arbitration, 7 July 2014
- 04Territorial Waters, Continental Shelf, Exclusive Economic Zone and Other Maritime Zones Act, 1976 (opens in a new tab). Legislative Department
- 05West Asian War Daily Bulletin (Takshashila Institution tracker) (opens in a new tab). Takshashila Institution, 27 March 2026
- 06C. Raja Mohan, Samudra Manthan: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific (2012)