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International relations theory

Susan Strange

A founder of international political economy, who argued that the decisive power in the world economy lies less in winning bargains than in shaping the structures of security, production, finance and knowledge.

Thinker dossier

1923–1998

Key works
'International Economics and International Relations: A Case of Mutual Neglect' · 1970Sterling and British Policy · 1971'Cave! Hic Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis' · 1982
Key concepts
Structural power · The four structures · Casino capitalism

Start here:An introduction

1 min read

Susan Strange (1923–1998) was a British scholar who, after a career as a financial journalist, became one of the founders of international political economy, the study of how politics and economics shape each other across borders. She held the Montague Burton chair at the London School of Economics and later taught in Florence and at Warwick.

Her question was simple and pointed: in the world economy, who gets what, and why? She argued that International Relations had looked for power in the wrong places, in armies and diplomacy, while the most important power lay in shaping the structures within which everyone else must act: who provides security, what is produced and where, who controls credit, and who controls knowledge. A student should care because structural power is a standard tool for understanding globalisation, financial crises and the power of firms and markets, and because her warnings about casino capitalism read today as an anticipation of the financial crisis of 2008.

How to read this profile

The introduction is the first reading. The seventeen parts below are the full study of Susan Strange, in five movements, about 11 minutes in all. Parts marked Advanced analysis (5, 11 and 12) weigh and contest the arguments: read them once the rest is secure.

Parts 1–4

Movement I: Foundations

The thinker in time: the setting, the influences, the works and the principal arguments.

01Historical context

Strange wrote as the post-war monetary order broke down. The end of the dollar's convertibility into gold in 1971, the oil shocks and the rapid growth of international financial markets convinced her that economics and politics could not be studied apart, and that International Relations, preoccupied with war and diplomacy, was missing where much power now lay.

Life and intellectual formation

Born in Dorset on 9 June 1923, Strange graduated in economics from the London School of Economics in 1943 and worked as a financial journalist before turning to research at University College London and Chatham House. She held the Montague Burton Chair of International Relations at the LSE from 1978 to 1988, then taught at the European University Institute in Florence and, from 1993, at the University of Warwick. She helped found the British International Studies Association in 1975 and set up Britain's first graduate programme in international political economy. She died on 25 October 1998.

02Intellectual influences

Strange came to theory from journalism and from the study of money. Her years as a financial journalist taught her to ask who gains from an arrangement and to distrust abstraction, and her work at Chatham House on the history of sterling and of international monetary relations showed her how monetary orders are made by political decisions. Her structural power has affinities with Robert Cox's critical political economy and with Gramscian ideas of hegemony, though she kept her distance from any single school and from grand theory in general.

She reacted against International Relations' preoccupation with war, diplomacy and the state; against economists who ignored power; against American regime theory, which she thought fashionable, state-centred and biased towards order; and against the declinist thesis that American hegemony was ending, which she called a persistent myth.

03Major works

  1. 1970'International Economics and International Relations: A Case of Mutual Neglect'A manifesto for international political economy.
  2. 1971Sterling and British PolicyA political history of sterling's decline as an international currency.
  3. 1982'Cave! Hic Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis'
  4. 1986Casino CapitalismOn the instability of a financial system driven by speculation.
  5. 1988States and MarketsSets out structural power and the four structures.
  6. 1991Rival States, Rival Firms (with John Stopford)Triangular diplomacy among states and firms, based on studies of Brazil, Malaysia and Kenya.
  7. 1996The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World EconomyOn the shift of authority from states to markets and firms.
  8. 1998Mad MoneyHer final book, on financial globalisation.
  9. 1987'The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony'International Organization. Argues that American structural power remained formidable despite its falling share of world output.

04Principal arguments

Who benefits

Strange asked of every arrangement in the world economy the lawyer's question cui bono, who benefits, and argued that international political economy should study the political bargains and structures that decide how wealth, security, freedom and justice are distributed. Every political economy, she wrote in States and Markets, combines these four basic values in a particular mix, and the mix reflects the power of those who made the arrangements.

Relational and structural power

She distinguished two kinds of power. Relational power is the power of A to get B to do something it would not otherwise do. Structural power is the power to shape and determine the frameworks within which states, firms, institutions and people relate to one another: to decide how things shall be done. An actor with structural power can get its way without bargaining, because others must operate within frameworks it set, and the range of choices open to them has been shaped before any negotiation begins.

The four structures

Structural power runs through four interlocking primary structures. The security structure concerns who provides protection against violence, and on what terms. The production structure concerns what is produced, by whom, by what methods and on what terms of reward. The finance structure concerns who controls the creation and allocation of credit, which Strange thought the most important and least understood source of power in modern capitalism. The knowledge structure concerns what is believed, what is known, the channels by which it is communicated, and who controls access to it. No structure is primary in all circumstances; secondary structures, transport, trade, energy and welfare, rest on them.

The persistent myth of lost hegemony

Against theorists of American decline, Strange argued in 1987 that US structural power remained formidable even as its share of world output fell. The United States still controlled the security structure, dominated finance through the dollar and its capital markets, and led the knowledge structure in research and technology. The disorder of the world economy after 1971 came not from the loss of American power but from the irresponsible use of it.

Casino capitalism and the retreat of the state

Casino Capitalism (1986) and Mad Money (1998) described a financial system in which outcomes depend on speculation and chance, and in which volatility harms people who never placed a bet. Its roots were political decisions, above all by the United States and Britain, to deregulate finance. The Retreat of the State (1996) argued that authority over the world economy was leaking from states to markets and to non-state authorities: transnational corporations, telecommunications firms, insurers, the large accounting firms, cartels and even organised crime. With John Stopford she described a triangular diplomacy in which states bargain with states, states with firms, and firms with firms, so that diplomacy now includes competition for the location of production. The retreat was a political choice, and it left a gap in accountability that she thought no one was filling.

Parts 5–10

Movement II: Theory

What the thinker added to political theory, the concepts they defined, and their positions on the state, power, liberty, equality, justice and democracy.

05Major theoretical contributions

Advanced analysis

Strange helped found international political economy as a field. Her 1970 article on the mutual neglect of international economics and international relations argued that neither discipline could explain the world economy alone, and she built the institutions, associations and graduate programmes that made the new field possible in Britain.

Her most important theoretical contribution was the distinction between relational and structural power. By defining structural power as the power to shape the frameworks within which others act, she moved the analysis of power away from bargaining outcomes and capability counts towards the rules and structures that set the terms of every bargain.

She identified four primary structures, security, production, finance and knowledge, and insisted that none is always dominant. Her treatment of finance and knowledge as structures of power was new in a discipline focused on military and trade relations.

She offered an influential dissent on American decline, arguing that structural power, not shares of world output, measured hegemony, and that the instability after 1971 came from the irresponsible use of American power rather than its loss.

Finally, she analysed the diffusion of authority from states to markets, firms and other non-state authorities, developed the idea of triangular diplomacy among states and firms, and raised the problem of accountability in a globalised economy. Her question cui bono remains the starting point of critical political economy.

06Conceptual definitions

Structural power

The power to shape the frameworks within which others act, exercised through structures rather than particular bargains.

The four structures

Security (who provides protection), production (what is produced, where and on what terms), finance (who controls credit) and knowledge (what is believed, and who is believed).

Casino capitalism

A financial system in which outcomes depend on speculation and chance, creating volatility that harms people who never placed a bet.

07Theory of the State

The state remains central but has ceded authority to markets and firms; its retreat is a political choice with consequences for accountability. Strange denied that states are the only actors worth studying, but she insisted that the most powerful of them still shape the structures within which firms operate. The Retreat of the State (1996) argued that authority had shifted from states to markets and to non-state authorities, and that some responsibilities governments had given up were being exercised by no one at all. The deregulation of finance did not simply happen to states: it resulted from deliberate decisions, above all in Washington and London.

08Theory of Power

Power is both relational and structural, and structural power matters more because it sets the terms on which relational contests take place. It is exercised by states and by markets and firms, and it shows itself in outcomes, who gets what, rather than in formal authority. In States and Markets she described its holder as able to change the range of choices open to others without visibly pressing them to choose one way rather than another. Because it works through frameworks rather than bargains, it is easily missed by analysts who study only negotiations or measurable capabilities. Finance shows how it works: whoever controls the creation of credit shapes investment, growth and debt far beyond any negotiating table.

09Liberty and equality

Liberty

Freedom, or liberty of choice, is another of the four basic values in States and Markets, and every political economy trades it against wealth, security and justice. Market-oriented systems give priority to freedom of choice, but that freedom is enjoyed in proportion to purchasing power, and the structures decide whose freedom counts. Strange's analysis of finance shows the point: the freedom of capital to move across borders, created by political decisions to deregulate, narrowed the freedom of governments to choose their own economic policies and exposed workers and savers to losses they had not chosen.

10Justice and democracy

Justice

Justice is one of the four basic values, with wealth, security and freedom, that every political economy combines in some proportion. The question for analysis is whose preferred mix prevails, and Strange held that the structures of the world economy systematically favoured the security and wealth of the powerful over justice for the rest. Casino Capitalism and Mad Money showed how financial volatility shifts losses onto people who never took the risks, farmers, workers and indebted countries, while those who created the instability are often rescued. Justice therefore depends on political control of the structures, finance above all, not only on fairer outcomes in particular negotiations.

Democracy

The diffusion of authority to markets and firms creates power without accountability: those who now decide many outcomes are not elected and answer to no public. Strange thought the resulting democratic deficit was one of the defining problems of her time. The Retreat of the State examined non-state authorities, among them transnational firms, insurers, the large accounting firms, cartels and organised crime, and asked who holds them to account. National parliaments cannot control markets that operate globally, and international organisations answer chiefly to the governments of the strongest states, so the gap between where power lies and where accountability operates has widened.

Parts 11–12

Movement III: Critique

How the arguments have been attacked, and how scholars read them differently.

11Criticisms

Advanced analysis

  1. 01

    Structural power is hard to operationalise. If every outcome can be traced to a structure, the concept risks explaining everything and predicting little.

  2. 02

    Critics note a tension in her work: she both dethroned the state and relied on it, since the structures she described were shaped largely by US policy. Constructivists add that structures do not explain who built them or why they change.

  3. 03

    Institutionalists

    Defenders of regime analysis, Keohane among them, replied that her critique of regimes as fashion caricatured a research programme that had identified real mechanisms of cooperation, and that her own concept of structure was too loose to test.

12Scholarly debates

Advanced analysis

How scholars have read Susan Strange differently. An answer that names the reading it follows is stronger than one that treats the text as settled.

  1. Founder of a British school of international political economy

    Benjamin J. Cohen's International Political Economy: An Intellectual History (2008) distinguished a 'British school', associated with Strange and Robert Cox, from an 'American school' associated with Keohane, Krasner and Gilpin. The British school was interdisciplinary, normative and historically minded, and treated the state as one actor among many; the American school was positivist, state-centred and focused on cooperation and institutions. Critics of the classification say it overstates the difference, but it explains why Strange is often read as the founder of a broader, more critical political economy.

  2. Realist or critic of power

    Some readers place Strange close to realism: she took power seriously, distrusted liberal optimism about markets and institutions, and saw the United States as the dominant actor. Others read her as a critical theorist whose structures resemble Gramscian hegemony and whose concern was the unaccountable power of markets. The two readings agree that she refused the division between economics and politics; they differ on whether her deepest concern was the distribution of power among states or the subordination of states and societies to markets.

  3. Structural power after Strange

    Later work has developed her finance and knowledge structures. Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman's 'Weaponized Interdependence' (2019) shows how states that control the hubs of global networks, payment systems, undersea cables and cloud services, can monitor others and cut them off, a form of structural power she anticipated. Scholars of technology and platforms apply her knowledge structure to the control of data and semiconductors. Whether these developments confirm her view of persistent American structural power or show it being contested by China is a live debate.

Parts 13–15

Movement IV: Legacy

Why the thinker matters now, whom they connect with, and the arguments applied in India and beyond.

13Contemporary relevance

Strange supplies the IB's structural power and the vocabulary for analysing finance, technology and supply chains, from payment systems and sanctions to export controls on chip-making equipment. In PSIR she is a key reference on the evolution of the international economic system after Bretton Woods, on globalisation and on non-state actors in the world economy. Her question who benefits remains the most useful first question about any international economic arrangement.

14Connections with other thinkers

Each connection recorded in this profile, by relation: who shaped Susan Strange, whom Susan Strange shaped, and who argued with or against them.

In dialogue with

  • Antonio Gramsci1891

    Her knowledge structure overlaps with Gramscian hegemony: power that works by shaping what is believed.

In contrast with

  • Joseph S. Nye Jr.1937

    Nye concentrated on relational and soft power; Strange on the structures that decide the terms of relations.

  • Immanuel Wallerstein1930

    Both stress structure, but Strange left more room for bargaining by states and firms than world-systems theory allows.

  • Steven Lukes1941

    Both look beyond observable bargaining, but Lukes ties power to agents who could act otherwise, while Strange locates it in impersonal structures as well as in the states and firms that shape them.

Critic of

  • Robert O. Keohane1941

    Her 1982 critique of regime analysis rejected the institutionalist focus on regimes as fashionable and too state-centred.

Also recorded on other profiles

Connections that other profiles in the Atlas make to Susan Strange, read from Susan Strange’s side. Their notes are on those profiles.

In dialogue with
E. H. Carr

15Indian and international applications

In India

Debates about the international use of the rupee, links between India's Unified Payments Interface and foreign payment systems, and dependence on imported semiconductors concern her finance and production structures.

In the world

Exclusion of banks from international payment networks, control of advanced chip-making equipment and the influence of credit-rating agencies all show structural power exercised without a single order being given.

Parts 16–17

Movement V: Examination

Where the thinker sits in the syllabus, and what UPSC has asked.

16Exact syllabus mapping

  1. PSIR Optional

    Paper II · Part A · Comparative Politics and International Relations

    Globalisation

    Globalisation: Responses from developed and developing societies.

    Official wording · 2 official questions on this line in the PYQ dataset, 2024–26

    In the Syllabus NavigatorWhere it is taught
  2. PSIR Optional

    Paper II · Part A · Comparative Politics and International Relations

    Key Concepts in International Relations

    Key concepts in International Relations: National interest, security and power; Balance of power and deterrence; Transnational actors and collective security; World capitalist economy and globalisation.

    Official wording · 10 official questions on this line in the PYQ dataset, 2024–26

    In the Syllabus NavigatorWhere it is taught
  3. PSIR Optional

    Paper II · Part A · Comparative Politics and International Relations

    Evolution of the International Economic System

    Evolution of the International Economic System: From Brettonwoods to WTO; Socialist economies and the CMEA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance); Third World demand for new international economic order; Globalisation of the world economy.

    Official wording · 6 official questions on this line in the PYQ dataset, 2024–26

    In the Syllabus NavigatorWhere it is taught
  4. IB Global Politics

    Core topics

    Power in global politics

    Definitions and ways of understanding power; classifications of power: hard, soft and smart; structural and relational; economic, political, social and cultural; power to, power over and power with.

    Paraphrase of the prescribed topic (this platform)

    In the course outlineWhere it is taught
  5. IB Global Politics

    Core topics

    Interdependence in global politics

    Global governance and international law; the UN (structure, roles and functions, the Charter, General Assembly and Security Council; achievements and limitations); IGOs and non-state actors in global governance; cooperation and competition; global interactions and networks.

    Paraphrase of the prescribed topic (this platform)

    In the course outlineWhere it is taught

The syllabus lines this profile of Susan Strange serves. Progress is kept on this device and gathered on your dashboard.

Beyond the optional: General Studies

GS Papers II and III: the international financial architecture, sanctions, supply chains and technology dependence.

17Related PYQs (official wording)

No linked question yet

None of the questions in the PYQ dataset is linked to Susan Strange, so none is shown here. The practice questions further down are original to this platform, not previous year questions.

Dataset searched: Nine official papers, 228 questions: GS Paper II, PSIR Paper I, PSIR Paper II, 2024–2026.

Browse every question in PYQ Intelligence

Using Strange in an answer

Strange is a key reference for the Paper II units on the evolution of the international economic system, on globalisation and on the world capitalist economy, and she supplies IB Global Politics with structural power and much of its vocabulary for interdependence. GS answers on sanctions and supply chains also use her framework.

Lead with her distinction between relational power, getting another to do what it would not otherwise do, and structural power, the power to shape the frameworks within which others act, narrowing choices before bargaining begins. Then set out the four structures, security, production, finance and knowledge, stressing finance, which she thought the most important and least understood. Her question of who benefits is the best opening for any answer on an international economic arrangement. Contrast her with Nye, who concentrated on relational and soft power, with Keohane, whose regime analysis she dismissed as state-centred, and with Wallerstein, whose structures leave less room for bargaining; Lukes insists on agents where she sees impersonal structures. Applications include exclusion from payment networks, control of chip-making equipment, and Indian debates on the international use of the rupee and dependence on imported semiconductors.

Evaluate by asking whether structural power explains too much to predict anything, and by noting the tension that she dethroned the state while relying on American policy to explain the structures. Avoid filing her simply as a realist, since readers divide on that question, and do not reduce structural power to economic power: security and knowledge are structures too.

Practice questions (original)

  1. Q1Discussion

    Is the most powerful actor in a negotiation the one that wins it, or the one that set its terms?

    How to approach it

    Contrast relational and structural power with a case such as a trade negotiation or a sanctions regime, and consider whether structural advantages can be eroded by bargaining over time.

  2. Q2PSIR style15 marks· 200 words

    Explain Susan Strange's concept of structural power with reference to the four structures. Is it useful for understanding the international economic system?

    How to approach it

    Relational and structural power; security, production, finance and knowledge; the persistent myth of lost hegemony; application to the dollar, sanctions or technology controls; the operationalisation problem.

Practice questions are original to this platform and are not previous year questions. For questions actually set by UPSC, see PYQ Intelligence.

Explore further

Sources and further reading

  1. 01Susan Strange, 'International Economics and International Relations: A Case of Mutual Neglect', International Affairs 46:2 (1970)
  2. 02Susan Strange, 'Cave! Hic Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis', International Organization 36:2 (1982)
  3. 03Susan Strange, States and Markets (Pinter, 1988)
  4. 04Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State (Cambridge University Press, 1996)
  5. 05London School of Economics, 'LSE Leading Women: Susan Strange' (opens in a new tab)
  6. 06Susan Strange, Casino Capitalism (1986) and Mad Money (1998)
  7. 07John Stopford and Susan Strange, Rival States, Rival Firms: Competition for World Market Shares (1991)
  8. 08Benjamin J. Cohen, International Political Economy: An Intellectual History (2008)
  9. 09Henry Farrell and Abraham L. Newman, 'Weaponized Interdependence', International Security 44:1 (2019)
  10. 10Susan Strange, 'The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony', International Organization 41:4 (1987)