Skip to content

India's foreign policy · Doctrine

SAGAR and MAHASAGAR

India's Indian Ocean doctrine: SAGAR, 'Security and Growth for All in the Region', announced in Mauritius in March 2015, and its extension a decade later as MAHASAGAR, carrying the vision from the ocean to the Global South.

Overview

SAGAR was announced by Narendra Modi at Port Louis on 12 March 2015, at the commissioning of the patrol vessel Barracuda that India had built for Mauritius. The address set out five elements: India would safeguard its mainland, islands and interests; deepen economic and security cooperation with maritime neighbours and build their capacities; promote collective action against threats such as piracy and natural disasters; pursue sustainable development of the ocean's resources; and hold that primary responsibility for peace and prosperity in the Indian Ocean lies with those who live in the region.

Ten years later, again in Mauritius, on 12 March 2025, Modi announced MAHASAGAR, "Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions". The new acronym widened SAGAR's geography and purpose, linking India's maritime role to development partnership with the Global South through trade, capacity building, technology sharing and concessional finance.

01Context: an ocean becoming crowded

SAGAR answered a strategic change. Chinese submarines docked at Colombo in 2014; China's naval presence in the Indian Ocean grew after anti-piracy deployments began in 2008, and in 2017 it opened its first overseas base, at Djibouti. Ports financed by Chinese loans rose at Hambantota, Gwadar and Kyaukphyu. For India, whose trade and energy imports cross the Indian Ocean, the doctrine asserted that littoral states, led by the region's largest, should manage its security. The Indian Navy's strategy Ensuring Secure Seas (2015) gave the military expression of the same idea. The notion of India as a net security provider, used by Manmohan Singh in May 2013, prepared the ground.

02Instruments

SAGAR has been implemented mainly through capacity building and presence. India has supplied patrol vessels, aircraft and coastal radar systems to Mauritius, Seychelles, the Maldives and Sri Lanka; conducted hydrographic surveys and joint surveillance of exclusive economic zones; and, since 2018, shared maritime information through the Information Fusion Centre–Indian Ocean Region at Gurugram. It has developed an airstrip and jetty on Mauritius's Agaléga islands, inaugurated in February 2024. It has responded first to disasters and emergencies, from supplying drinking water to Malé in December 2014 to cyclone relief across the region. The Colombo Security Conclave, a grouping of India with Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Mauritius and Bangladesh with a secretariat in Colombo, gives the doctrine a minilateral form.

03From SAGAR to MAHASAGAR

MAHASAGAR changes the doctrine's scope in two ways. Geographically, "across regions" extends India's offer beyond the Indian Ocean littoral to the wider developing world, including Africa and the Pacific. Substantively, it places development, trade and technology alongside security, consistent with India's Global South diplomacy since its G20 presidency. Its timing linked it to India's chairship of the Indian Ocean Rim Association from November 2025 and to the transfer of sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago from Britain to Mauritius under the treaty of May 2025, a claim India had supported at the UN.

04Constraints

The doctrine is limited by politics and capacity. In island states, Indian projects can become domestic issues: an agreement to develop facilities on Seychelles's Assumption Island stalled in its parliament, and the Maldives elected a President in 2023 on a campaign against Indian military personnel, who were replaced by civilian technicians in 2024. India's naval and shipbuilding capacity is modest beside China's, and its financing cannot match Chinese loans. Credibility therefore rests on delivery, responsiveness in crises and respect for small states' sensitivities.

05Doctrine and interpretation

The official texts describe cooperative security: shared prosperity, collective action and respect for sovereignty. Scholars read them in more than one way. Some see an Indian version of regional primacy, a soft "Monroe doctrine" that seeks to keep extra-regional powers out of the Indian Ocean; others see an attempt to build a cooperative regional order through public goods, in which India leads by providing rather than excluding. The principle that primary responsibility lies with resident states can be read either way, which is part of its diplomatic usefulness.

06Reading it through IR theory

Realism reads SAGAR as a claim to regional primacy. Mearsheimer's offensive realism holds that states that dominate their region seek to keep other great powers out of it, and the principle that primary responsibility for the Indian Ocean lies with resident states, together with India's response to Chinese submarine visits, the base at Djibouti and Chinese-financed ports, fits that pattern; hence the label of a soft Monroe doctrine. Realism cannot easily explain, however, why India pursues influence mainly by building other states' capacities rather than by excluding or coercing anyone. Liberal institutionalism fills that gap. On the logic of hegemonic stability theory transposed to a region, a leading state earns influence by providing public goods: maritime information through the Information Fusion Centre, hydrographic surveys, patrol vessels and disaster relief. The Colombo Security Conclave gives the doctrine a minilateral form in which partners have a seat, though island-state politics show that public goods do not guarantee consent. Constructivism focuses on identity and perception. The idea of India as a net security provider and first responder is a role that must be performed repeatedly to be believed, and the campaign against Indian military personnel in the Maldives showed how quickly a partner's public can reinterpret assistance as presence. A postcolonial reading adds that India's support for Mauritius's claim to the Chagos Archipelago aligns its maritime role with anti-colonial solidarity, a source of legitimacy that capability alone cannot supply.

07India's options and the way forward

India's choices concern scope, resources and method. On scope, MAHASAGAR's extension across regions widens India's offer to Africa, the Pacific and the wider Global South, but invites comparison with China's far larger finance; a realistic approach concentrates on low-cost instruments such as training, technology sharing, trade facilitation and disaster response, which play to India's strengths. On resources, credibility in the Indian Ocean depends on naval and shipbuilding capacity that remains modest beside China's, so investment in delivery matters more than new initiatives. On method, India can emphasise cooperative security, through capacity building, information sharing and minilateral formats such as the Colombo Security Conclave, or take a more exclusive stance towards navies from outside the region; the first sustains consent among small states, while the second may provoke resistance of the kind seen over Assumption Island and in the Maldives. Institutionally, the chairship of IORA offers a platform to give the doctrine a broader regional base. Throughout, respect for small states' sensitivities and responsiveness in crises are the doctrine's real currency. On balance, SAGAR and MAHASAGAR are most effective as frameworks for steady, cooperative delivery, and their credibility will rest on what India provides rather than on what it excludes.

Key points

  • SAGAR announced at Port Louis, Mauritius, on 12 March 2015, with five elements.
  • MAHASAGAR announced in Mauritius on 12 March 2025, widening scope to development 'across regions'.
  • Instruments: patrol vessels, radars, hydrography, IFC-IOR (2018), Agaléga, disaster response, the Colombo Security Conclave.
  • Responds to China's growing naval and port presence in the Indian Ocean.
  • Constrained by island-state politics and by India's financing and shipbuilding capacity.

Debates

Is SAGAR a doctrine of cooperative security or of regional primacy?

Cooperative security: the doctrine's language, its emphasis on capacity building and its record in disaster response present India as a provider of public goods that strengthens small states' own capabilities.

Primacy: the principle that resident states bear primary responsibility, together with India's resistance to Chinese facilities near its coasts, expresses a claim to a sphere of influence, however benign its methods.

Does MAHASAGAR stretch India's commitments beyond its capacity?

Yes: India struggles to deliver promised projects in its own neighbourhood; extending the offer to the Global South invites comparison with China's far larger finance.

No: MAHASAGAR is a framework for selective, low-cost cooperation, training, technology sharing and trade facilitation, that plays to India's strengths rather than competing with Chinese loans.

Should India try to match China's port financing in the Indian Ocean?

Yes: Chinese-financed ports at Hambantota, Gwadar and Kyaukphyu give China footholds around the Indian Ocean; without credible alternatives, littoral and island states will keep turning to Chinese loans, and the airstrip and jetty at Agaléga show that India can build strategic infrastructure when it chooses.

No: India's financing cannot match Chinese loans, so competing on scale plays to China's strength; India's comparative advantage lies in capacity building, hydrography, information sharing and disaster response, and its credibility rests on delivery and on respect for small states' sensitivities, which large, debt-financed projects can strain.

The realistic course is selective: building at a few points of high strategic value, as at Agaléga, while leading with services and capacity rather than loans.

In the UPSC papers

Asked by UPSC

3 questions · 2024–2026

  1. 2026 · GS-II · Q9 · 10 marks

    “IPMDA (Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness) bridges the gap between India’s SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) vision and the Quad’s collective Indo-Pacific strategy.” Make a critical assessment of the statement focusing on IPMDA.

  2. 2026 · PSIR II · Q6(b) · 15 marks

    Critically evaluate the important factors of India-Maldives relations on the eve of sixty years of diplomatic ties between the two countries.

  3. 2024 · GS-II · Q20 · 15 marks

    Discuss the geopolitical and geostrategic importance of Maldives for India with a focus on global trade and energy flows. Further also discuss how this relationship affects India’s maritime security and regional stability amidst international competition ?

Verbatim from the official UPSC Main papers, linked to SAGAR and MAHASAGAR in the PYQ dataset.PYQ Intelligence →

Practice questions

  1. Q1UPSC Mains style15 marks· 250 words

    Examine the evolution from SAGAR to MAHASAGAR in India's maritime policy.

    How to approach it

    2015 context and five elements; instruments; 2025 extension; links to IORA and the Global South.

  2. Q2UPSC Mains style15 marks· 250 words

    India aspires to be a net security provider in the Indian Ocean. Assess its capacity and credibility.

    How to approach it

    Origin of the phrase; capacity building and HADR record; naval capacity; island-state politics.

  3. Q3UPSC Mains style10 marks· 150 words

    Discuss the significance of the Colombo Security Conclave for India.

    How to approach it

    Membership, secretariat, pillars of cooperation; minilateralism in the neighbourhood.

Practice questions are original to this platform and are not previous year questions. For questions actually set by UPSC, see PYQ Intelligence.

Explore further

Sources

  1. 01Prime Minister's remarks at the commissioning of the Barracuda, Port Louis (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 12 March 2015
  2. 02Prime Minister's announcement of MAHASAGAR during the state visit to Mauritius (opens in a new tab). Press Information Bureau, Government of India, 12 March 2025
  3. 03Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy (2015). Indian Navy
  4. 04David Brewster, India's Ocean: The Story of India's Bid for Regional Leadership (2014)