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India's foreign policy · Doctrine

From Look East to Act East

India's turn to South-East and East Asia: an economic opening begun in the early 1990s, recast in 2014 as a strategic policy, and still limited by weak overland connectivity and reluctance to integrate into regional trade.

Overview

The Look East policy began under P. V. Narasimha Rao in the early 1990s, when the Soviet collapse and India's balance-of-payments crisis pushed New Delhi to seek markets, investment and partners among the dynamic economies of South-East Asia. India became an ASEAN sectoral dialogue partner in 1992 and a full dialogue partner in 1995. A second phase from the early 2000s widened the focus to Japan, South Korea, China and Australia and added security cooperation.

The Act East Policy was announced by Narendra Modi at the ASEAN–India and East Asia summits in Nay Pyi Taw in November 2014. The change of verb signalled impatience with a policy long on summits and short on delivery. The Ministry of External Affairs summarises its aims as culture, commerce and connectivity, with an expanded strategic and security dimension and a link to the development of India's North-East.

01Look East, 1991–2014

The first phase was economic and institutional. India joined the ASEAN Regional Forum (1996), held its first summit with ASEAN (2002), acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (2003), joined the East Asia Summit at its creation (2005) and signed the ASEAN–India goods agreement (2009). It launched the Mekong–Ganga Cooperation with five mainland South-East Asian states in 2000. Relations with Japan were raised to a global partnership in 2000 and later a strategic one. By 2014 India was embedded in the region's institutions, but trade remained modest and India was seen as a reliable but slow partner.

02Act East since 2014

Act East added security and wider geography. India concluded comprehensive strategic partnerships with Vietnam (2016), Indonesia (2018), Australia (2020), Malaysia and Singapore (2024), and raised ties with Japan to a Special Strategic and Global Partnership (2014) and with South Korea to a Special Strategic Partnership (2015). Defence cooperation became central: naval exercises, maritime domain awareness, and the sale of BrahMos missiles to the Philippines (contract January 2022). The policy reached the Pacific Islands through the Forum for India–Pacific Islands Cooperation, launched in 2014. ASEAN relations became a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2022 (see ASEAN).

03The North-East dimension

Act East is also domestic policy. India's North-East is linked to the rest of the country by the narrow Siliguri corridor, and its development depends on routes through Bangladesh and Myanmar. Progress has come mainly through Bangladesh: transit and transshipment arrangements and the Agartala–Akhaura rail link, opened in November 2023. The routes through Myanmar, the Kaladan project and the India–Myanmar–Thailand Trilateral Highway, have been stalled by Myanmar's civil war since the 2021 coup (see connectivity corridors). Ethnic violence in Manipur since May 2023 and India's decision in 2024 to end the free movement regime and fence the Myanmar border show how security concerns now shape the eastern frontier.

04The missing economic pillar

Economics remains the weakest pillar. The 2009 goods agreement widened India's deficit with ASEAN, and its review was still under negotiation in 2026. In November 2019 India withdrew from the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, fearing a surge of Chinese imports through the region and damage to farmers and small industry. It joined the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework in 2022 but stayed out of its trade pillar. Since 2020 India has sought to attract supply chains diversifying from China, with success in electronics assembly, but South-East Asian economies still integrate more deeply with China, Japan and Korea than with India.

05Assessment

Act East has been more successful strategically than economically. India is now a security partner for several South-East Asian states, a participant in every regional forum and a supporter of ASEAN centrality in the Indo-Pacific. Yet its trade weight is limited, its land connections are unfinished and its exit from RCEP is still cited in the region as evidence of protectionism. The policy has also been partly absorbed into the broader Indo-Pacific frame, which raises the question whether South-East Asia is valued for itself or as a theatre of competition with China.

06Reading it through IR theory

Realism reads the move from Look East to Act East as balancing. On Waltz's structural account, states respond to a shift in the distribution of capabilities by building strength and combining with others, and the comprehensive strategic partnerships, naval exercises and the sale of BrahMos missiles to the Philippines fit a pattern of soft balancing against China. What realism leaves out is why the balancing is so restrained: India avoids framing the policy against any country, in line with its support for ASEAN centrality. Liberal institutionalism explains the first phase better. From the ASEAN Regional Forum to the East Asia Summit, India sought membership of institutions that reduce uncertainty and give a latecomer a seat at the table, and Keohane's argument that institutions make cooperation cheaper explains why India values ASEAN centrality. The same lens exposes the policy's gap, since institutional presence without trade integration, visible in the exit from RCEP, produces little interdependence and therefore limited influence. Constructivism draws attention to identity and narrative. The emphasis on culture alongside commerce and connectivity, appeals to civilisational and diaspora ties, and the change of verb from look to act are efforts to present India as an Asian insider rather than an outside power. Constructivism is weaker on material constraints, such as the stalled routes through Myanmar and the deficit with ASEAN, that no change of narrative removes. Taken together, the lenses suggest that Act East's security gains rest on shared threat perceptions, while its economic weakness reflects domestic interests that systemic theories capture poorly.

07India's options and the way forward

India's realistic choices lie along three lines. On trade, reconsidering RCEP is unlikely while fears of a surge of Chinese imports remain politically sensitive; the more plausible course is to conclude the review of the ASEAN goods agreement and deepen bilateral and supply-chain arrangements with individual South-East Asian states, accepting slower and narrower integration than membership would bring. On connectivity, India can keep investing in the routes through Myanmar in the hope of eventual stability, or concentrate on the Bangladesh corridors that have actually delivered; the first preserves a strategic land bridge but ties resources to a civil war, while the second depends on continued cooperation from Bangladesh. On security, defence exports, maritime domain awareness and exercises offer quicker returns, but leaning on them too heavily would confirm the impression that South-East Asia matters to India mainly as a theatre of competition with China. The North-East adds a domestic constraint, since violence in Manipur and the fencing of the Myanmar border pull policy towards security rather than openness. On balance, Act East has built a strategic foundation that only economic integration and completed land links can make durable, and India's choices about trade protection at home are likely to decide its weight in the region more than further summits.

Key points

  • Look East began in the early 1990s; India became an ASEAN dialogue partner in 1992 (sectoral) and 1995 (full).
  • Act East was announced at the ASEAN–India and East Asia summits in November 2014.
  • Act East added security partnerships, defence exports and the Pacific Islands.
  • The North-East's development depends on routes through Bangladesh and an unstable Myanmar.
  • Economic integration lags: the 2009 goods agreement under review and India outside RCEP.

Debates

Did India's exit from RCEP undermine Act East?

Yes: trade is the currency of influence in East Asia; by staying out, India excluded itself from the region's supply chains and confirmed doubts about its commitment to economic integration.

No: RCEP would have deepened India's deficit with China at a time of strategic rivalry; India has pursued bilateral agreements and supply-chain partnerships instead, and its security role has grown regardless.

Is Act East primarily about China?

Yes: the policy's strategic turn coincided with China's rise and assertiveness; partnerships with Vietnam, the Philippines and Indonesia and naval cooperation are forms of soft balancing.

No: the policy predates China's assertiveness, is driven by economics, diaspora and civilisational ties as well as security, and India has avoided framing it against any country, in line with its support for ASEAN centrality.

Is India's North-East a gateway to South-East Asia or a security frontier?

Gateway: Act East's founding logic links the North-East's development to markets beyond the border, and the Agartala–Akhaura rail link and the transit and transshipment arrangements with Bangladesh show that connectivity can deliver; treating the region as a bridge also gives its people a stake in the policy.

Frontier: the stalled Kaladan project and Trilateral Highway, ethnic violence in Manipur and the decision to end the free movement regime and fence the Myanmar border show security concerns overriding openness, and a fenced border cannot function as a gateway.

The tension is real but uneven. The North-East can become a gateway only where the neighbouring state is stable, so the policy is likely to open towards Bangladesh while remaining guarded towards Myanmar.

In the UPSC papers

Asked by UPSC

2 questions · 2024

  1. 2024 · PSIR II · Q7(a) · 20 marks

    Discuss the future of SAARC in the light of India’s increased focus on other regional groupings like ASEAN and BIMSTEC.

  2. 2024 · PSIR II · Q8(b) · 15 marks

    Discuss the implications of the scrapping of the Free Movement Regime with Myanmar by the Indian Government on the complex ethno-political dynamics of the north-eastern region.

Verbatim from the official UPSC Main papers, linked to From Look East to Act East in the PYQ dataset.PYQ Intelligence →

Practice questions

  1. Q1UPSC Mains style15 marks· 250 words

    Act East has succeeded more as a strategic policy than as an economic one. Critically examine.

    How to approach it

    Partnerships, defence sales and institutions against trade deficits, RCEP and the review of the goods agreement.

  2. Q2UPSC Mains style10 marks· 150 words

    Examine the link between the Act East Policy and the development of India's North-East.

    How to approach it

    Siliguri corridor; Bangladesh routes; Kaladan and the Trilateral Highway; Myanmar and Manipur.

  3. Q3PSIR style15 marks· 250 words

    Trace the evolution from India's Look East policy to the Act East Policy.

    How to approach it

    1991–92 origins; second phase; 2014 announcement; expansion of geography and security content.

Practice questions are original to this platform and are not previous year questions. For questions actually set by UPSC, see PYQ Intelligence.

Explore further

Sources

  1. 01Act East Policy (brief) (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India
  2. 02Chairman's Statement of the 12th ASEAN–India Summit, Nay Pyi Taw, 12 November 2014
  3. 03Frédéric Grare, India Turns East: International Engagement and US–China Rivalry (2017)
  4. 04Rajiv Sikri, Challenge and Strategy: Rethinking India's Foreign Policy (2009)