Contemporary political theory
Steven Lukes
British political and social theorist whose Power: A Radical View proposed a three-dimensional view of power that includes the shaping of people's very wants.
Thinker dossier
born 1941
- Key works
- Émile Durkheim: His Life and Work · 1973Individualism · 1973Power: A Radical View · 1974; 2nd edn 2005; 3rd edn 2021
- Key concepts
- Three dimensions of power · Non-decision-making · Latent conflict · Real interests · Essential contestability
- In UPSC papers
- 1 question, 2024
Start here:An introduction
1 min read
Steven Lukes (born 1941) is a British political and social theorist who taught for many years at Oxford and later at the European University Institute and New York University, where he is a professor of sociology. In 1974 he published Power: A Radical View, a short book that became one of the most cited works in the social sciences.
His question was how to recognise power, especially when it works without visible conflict. Political scientists had studied power by asking who wins open disputes, or who keeps issues off the agenda. Lukes argued that the most effective power prevents disputes from arising at all, by shaping what people believe and want, so that they accept arrangements that harm them. A student should care because his three dimensions of power are the standard framework for answers on power, hegemony, ideology and legitimacy, and because they raise a hard question: on what grounds can we say that people's real interests differ from what they say they want?
How to read this profile
The introduction is the first reading. The seventeen parts below are the full study of Steven Lukes, in five movements, about 13 minutes in all. Parts marked Advanced analysis (5, 11 and 12) weigh and contest the arguments: read them once the rest is secure.
Contents · 17 parts
Movement I: Foundations
The thinker in time: the setting, the influences, the works and the principal arguments.
01Historical context
Lukes intervened in the 'community power' debate of American political science, in which pluralists such as Robert Dahl and their critics Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz disagreed about how to study power. He brought to it the concerns of European social theory, especially Marxist and Gramscian questions about ideology and consent, at a moment when the British left was rediscovering Gramsci and asking why working-class people in stable democracies so often accepted arrangements that disadvantaged them. Power: A Radical View, a short book of 1974, became a standard reference across the social sciences.
The second edition (2005) appeared in a different intellectual world, shaped by Foucault's account of power as constitutive of subjects, by feminist work on internalised subordination, and by debates on adaptive preferences in development economics. Lukes used it to revise and defend his view, and a third edition followed in 2021.
Life and intellectual formation
Lukes was educated at Oxford and was for many years a fellow of Balliol College. He later taught at the European University Institute in Florence, the University of Siena and the London School of Economics, and became a professor of sociology at New York University. A leading scholar of Durkheim, he has written on individualism, Marxism and morality, and moral relativism, and published a satirical novel of ideas, The Curious Enlightenment of Professor Caritat (1995).
02Intellectual influences
Lukes's first intellectual commitment was to Émile Durkheim, on whom he wrote his doctorate and his first major book, and from whom he took a sociologist's attention to the ways social facts constrain individuals. The power debate supplied his immediate targets: Dahl's 'The Concept of Power' (1957) and Who Governs? (1961), and Bachrach and Baratz's 'Two Faces of Power' (1962) and 'Decisions and Nondecisions' (1963), which borrowed E. E. Schattschneider's idea of the 'mobilisation of bias'. Antonio Gramsci's account of hegemony and consent, newly available in English through the Selections from the Prison Notebooks (1971), and the Marxist debate about false consciousness shaped the third dimension. W. B. Gallie's 'Essentially Contested Concepts' (1956) gave him his account of why disputes about power cannot be settled, and Matthew Crenson's The Un-Politics of Air Pollution (1971), a study of why some American cities never seriously debated pollution, supplied his main empirical illustration. The second edition engages Michel Foucault, and draws on Amartya Sen and on feminist analyses of how subordinate groups come to accept their condition.
He reacted against behavioural political science's insistence that only observable conflict counts as evidence of power, and later against the Foucauldian claim that, because power constitutes subjects, there is no standpoint outside it from which domination can be criticised.
03Major works
- 1973Émile Durkheim: His Life and Work
- 1973Individualism
- 1974; 2nd edn 2005; 3rd edn 2021Power: A Radical ViewThe three-dimensional view; the second edition adds a long essay revising and extending it, and the third a further reply to critics.
- 1985Marxism and Morality
- 2008Moral Relativism
04Principal arguments
Three views of power
Lukes begins from a common core: A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B's interests. The views differ in what they count as such an effect and how they would detect it.
The one-dimensional view, Dahl's, studies decision-making on issues over which there is observable conflict of subjective interests, understood as expressed policy preferences. Power is revealed by who prevails. The two-dimensional view, Bachrach and Baratz's, adds non-decision-making: the power to confine decision-making to safe issues by keeping grievances off the agenda, through the mobilisation of bias in institutions, procedures and rules. It still requires observable conflict, overt or covert, since a non-decision must suppress a grievance that someone has.
The three-dimensional view drops that requirement. The most effective and insidious use of power, Lukes argues, is to prevent conflict from arising at all, by shaping people's perceptions, cognitions and preferences so that they accept their role in the existing order, because they can see or imagine no alternative, see it as natural and unchangeable, or value it as divinely ordained or beneficial. Here conflict is latent: it lies between the interests of those exercising power and the real interests of those they exclude, which the latter would recognise if they could choose under conditions of relative autonomy.
Evidence and responsibility
How can a power that prevents grievances be studied? Lukes argued that the third dimension is empirically tractable if we can identify a relevant counterfactual: what B would have wanted or done in the absence of A's power. Crenson's study of Gary, Indiana, where a dominant steel company never had to act for the city to avoid regulating air pollution, served as his illustration, and John Gaventa's Power and Powerlessness (1980) applied the framework to an Appalachian coal valley. Lukes also tied power to responsibility. To identify an exercise of power is to locate an agent who could have acted otherwise, which distinguishes power from structural determination, though it also exposes his view to the objection that much domination has no identifiable author.
Essential contestability
Power, Lukes argued, is an essentially contested concept in Gallie's sense. Each view rests on a different conception of interests, liberal for the first, reformist for the second and radical for the third, and so on value commitments that empirical evidence cannot settle. To choose a definition of power is already to take a political position.
The second edition: domination and willing compliance
The 2005 edition conceded several faults. Defining power as its exercise committed the 'exercise fallacy': power is a capacity, which may not be used. Equating power with power over others ignored power to, the capacity to act, and not all power over others is domination, since parents, teachers and doctors exercise power in their charges' interests. Lukes therefore narrowed his concern to domination: power over others that imposes constraints contrary to their interests, and especially the securing of willing compliance to such domination. He defended the third dimension against James C. Scott's argument that subordinate groups rarely internalise their subordination, and against Foucault's dissolution of the standpoint of critique, by appealing to accounts of human interests and capabilities, such as Sen's, that do not depend on the preferences domination itself produces.
Movement II: Theory
What the thinker added to political theory, the concepts they defined, and their positions on the state, power, liberty, equality, justice and democracy.
05Major theoretical contributions
Advanced analysis
Lukes's central contribution is the three-dimensional view of power. By setting Dahl's decision-making view and Bachrach and Baratz's agenda-setting view side by side and adding a third dimension, the shaping of perceptions, cognitions and preferences so that grievances never form, he turned a narrow methodological debate in American political science into a general framework for analysing power across the social sciences.
He introduced the idea of latent conflict between the interests of the powerful and the real interests of those they affect, and argued that such power can be studied empirically through counterfactuals. This brought Marxist and Gramscian questions about ideology and consent into mainstream political analysis.
He showed that power is an essentially contested concept: each definition rests on a conception of interests, liberal, reformist or radical, so choosing a definition of power is already a political and moral position.
In the second edition he refined the theory: power as a capacity rather than its exercise, power to as well as power over, and domination as the securing of the willing compliance of those it disadvantages. He defended the possibility of critique against Foucault's view that power constitutes subjects through and through.
Beyond power, Marxism and Morality (1985) offered an influential diagnosis of why Marxism lacked an adequate account of justice and rights, and his work on Durkheim and on moral relativism made him a leading figure in social theory.
06Conceptual definitions
- Three dimensions of power
Decision-making, agenda-setting and preference-shaping: three increasingly hidden ways in which A can affect B contrary to B's interests.
- Non-decision-making
Confining political decisions to safe issues through the mobilisation of bias, so that some grievances never reach the agenda.
- Latent conflict
A contradiction between the interests of the powerful and the real interests of those they exclude, which never becomes an open dispute.
- Real interests
The interests people would recognise if they could choose under conditions of relative autonomy; the standard against which latent conflict is identified.
- Essential contestability
Following W. B. Gallie, the claim that disputes about the meaning of power cannot be settled by evidence because they rest on competing values.
- Domination and willing compliance
The focus of the 2005 edition: power that constrains people contrary to their interests while securing their consent to it.
08Theory of Power
Power includes the capacity to shape wants and beliefs, not only to prevail in decisions or control agendas. In the revised view it is a capacity rather than its exercise, the narrower concern of a critical theory is domination, and the deepest form of domination is the one that secures the willing compliance of those it disadvantages. Lukes's view stands in a line that runs through Marx on ideology and Gramsci on hegemony, and it differs from Foucault's in holding that domination can be identified only against a standard of interests that power has not itself constructed. He accepts that the bias of a system is sustained by structured, culturally patterned practices, but keeps the link between power and responsibility.
09Liberty and equality
Liberty
Freedom requires more than the absence of interference with preferences people already hold, since those preferences may themselves be products of power. Lukes's 'real interests' are interests formed under conditions of relative autonomy, which makes autonomy, not mere choice, the measure of freedom. The point joins the debate on power to the debate on freedom: if wants can be shaped by those who benefit from them, the liberal test of whether people can do what they want is not enough. Lukes also guards against the opposite danger of paternalism, which is why he ties real interests to what people would choose under relative autonomy and, in the second edition, to an account of human capabilities.
10Justice and democracy
Justice
Lukes's clearest position on justice comes from Marxism and Morality (1985). Marxism, he argued, treated the morality of Recht, justice and rights, as ideological and anachronistic, a feature of class society that a communist society of abundance and harmony would leave behind. Lukes rejected that expectation: any society, socialist ones included, will face conflicts of interest and the scarcity that make justice necessary, and will need rights to protect individuals against power. By dismissing justice and rights as bourgeois, Marxism left its adherents without the moral resources to recognise or resist the injustices committed in its name.
Democracy
Democratic procedures that register expressed preferences can coexist with deep domination if the agenda is controlled and preferences are shaped. A democratic theory that studies only voting and decision-making will therefore mistake acquiescence for consent. The studies Lukes relied on, Crenson's account of a city whose dominant steel company never had to act to keep air pollution off the agenda, and Gaventa's of an Appalachian coal valley, show formally democratic communities leaving the interests of the less powerful unrepresented. The three-dimensional view implies that democratic theory must also examine how agendas are set, which issues never arise and how public opinion is formed.
Movement III: Critique
How the arguments have been attacked, and how scholars read them differently.
11Criticisms
Advanced analysis
- 01
Liberal critics
Attributing 'real interests' that people do not themselves recognise risks paternalism: the theorist claims to know others' interests better than they do, and the claim can license those who would rule in the name of people's true wants.
- 02
Methodological critics
The third dimension is hard to observe or falsify, since evidence of acceptance can always be read as evidence of power. Pluralists such as Nelson Polsby argued that the counterfactual of what people would want without power cannot be established.
- 03
James C. Scott
Domination and the Arts of Resistance (1990) argued that subordinate groups seldom internalise their subordination. Their public compliance conceals a 'hidden transcript' of criticism and resistance, so the thick version of the third dimension mistakes strategic deference for false consciousness.
- 04
Peter Morriss
Power: A Philosophical Analysis (1987) argued that power is a dispositional capacity, not an event, and that Lukes's original definition confused having power with exercising it. Lukes accepted the point in 2005.
- 05
Foucauldian critics
If power constitutes subjects themselves, there is no power-free standpoint from which to define real interests. Peter Digeser's 'fourth face of power' (1992) and Clarissa Rile Hayward's De-Facing Power (2000) recast power as the production of subjects and fields of action rather than as the relation of an A to a B.
12Scholarly debates
Advanced analysis
How scholars have read Steven Lukes differently. An answer that names the reading it follows is stronger than one that treats the text as settled.
A theory of false consciousness?
Many readers took the third dimension as a sociological restatement of the Marxist idea of false consciousness, and Ted Benton's 'Objective Interests and the Sociology of Power' (1981) argued that it faces a paradox of emancipation: if the dominated cannot see their real interests, their liberation must come from outside, which contradicts the autonomy the theory values. Lukes's second edition distanced the view from false consciousness, arguing that domination works through partial and mixed effects, through limiting what people can imagine as well as what they believe, and that its identification rests on substantive accounts of interests and capabilities rather than on a privileged theory of history.
Agents or structures
Lukes insists that power implies responsibility, so an exercise of power requires an agent who could have acted otherwise. Structuralists, from Nicos Poulantzas, whose position Lukes rejected in 1974, to later theorists of structural power such as Susan Strange and Clarissa Hayward, locate the most important constraints in markets, institutions and norms that no one controls. Lukes's defenders reply that the attribution of responsibility is what makes power a critical concept, and that without it every disadvantage becomes mere fate.
Three dimensions or more
Peter Digeser's 'The Fourth Face of Power' (1992) added a Foucauldian dimension in which power constitutes the very subjects who might then be said to have interests, and Mark Haugaard has developed a four-dimensional framework that includes the social construction of agents and the possibility of empowerment as well as domination. These readings treat Lukes's scheme as an open series rather than a completed typology.
Movement IV: Legacy
Why the thinker matters now, whom they connect with, and the arguments applied in India and beyond.
13Contemporary relevance
Lukes is the pivot of the PSIR unit on Power, Hegemony, Ideology and Legitimacy, because his framework connects behavioural political science to Gramsci and Foucault. He is named among the thinkers the IB guide suggests for definitions of power. His framework is now routinely used to analyse media and advertising, the framing of climate and public health debates, gender norms and the influence of large firms over what governments even consider.
14Connections with other thinkers
Each connection recorded in this profile, by relation: who shaped Steven Lukes, whom Steven Lukes shaped, and who argued with or against them.
Influenced by
Antonio Gramsci1891
The third dimension draws on Gramsci's account of consent and common sense.
Influenced
Nye's third face of power, shaping preferences through attraction, draws on Lukes' third dimension. Lukes replied in 'Power and the Battle for Hearts and Minds: On the Bluntness of Soft Power' (2007) that the concept is too blunt to separate attraction that respects people's judgement from attraction that manipulates it.
In dialogue with
Michel Foucault1926
The 2005 edition engages Foucault, accepting that power shapes subjects but defending the possibility of critique.
In contrast with
Susan Strange1923
Strange's structural power locates power in the frameworks within which actors operate; Lukes insists that power implies an agent who could have acted otherwise.
Critic of
Robert A. Dahl1915
Lukes labelled Dahl's approach one-dimensional and built his own view as a critique of behavioural pluralism.
Karl Marx1818
Marxism and Morality (1985) argues that Marxism's dismissal of rights and justice as bourgeois left it unable to resist the abuses committed in its name.
Also recorded on other profiles
Connections that other profiles in the Atlas make to Steven Lukes, read from Steven Lukes’s side. Their notes are on those profiles.
- Influenced by
- Hanna Fenichel Pitkin
- In contrast with
- bell hooks, Eric Liu
Compare side by side
The written comparisons that involve Steven Lukes, and pairings to open in the Comparison Lab, chosen from the connections above.
Open in the Comparison Lab
- In contrast withSteven Lukes and Susan StrangeSide by side on power, justice, liberty and democracy.Compare
- Critic ofSteven Lukes and Karl MarxSide by side on power, justice, liberty and democracy.Compare
- Critic ofSteven Lukes and Robert A. DahlSide by side on power, liberty and democracy.Compare
- Your own comparisonSteven Lukes and a thinker of your choiceChoose up to two more thinkers in the Comparison Lab and read their positions question by question.Open the Comparison Lab
15Indian and international applications
In India
The third dimension illuminates caste and gender hierarchies that are reproduced through internalised norms rather than open coercion, the phenomenon Ambedkar analysed as graded inequality. The second dimension directs attention to which issues never reach legislative agendas.
In the world
John Gaventa's study of Appalachian mining communities (1980) applied the framework empirically, and it is widely used to analyse media power, advertising and the framing of policy debates such as climate change.
Movement V: Examination
Where the thinker sits in the syllabus, and what UPSC has asked.
16Exact syllabus mapping
PSIR Optional
Paper I · Part A · Political Theory and Politics
Concept of power
Concept of power: hegemony, ideology and legitimacy.
Official wording · 5 official questions on this line in the PYQ dataset, 2024–26
IB Global Politics
Core topics
Power in global politics
Definitions and ways of understanding power; classifications of power: hard, soft and smart; structural and relational; economic, political, social and cultural; power to, power over and power with.
Paraphrase of the prescribed topic (this platform)
The syllabus lines this profile of Steven Lukes serves. Progress is kept on this device and gathered on your dashboard.
17Related PYQs (official wording)
Official wording · verbatim
1 question · 2024
2024PSIR IQ1(e)10 marks
Linkage between Power and Hegemony
The official paper (opens in a new tab)
Transcribed from the official UPSC papers and linked to Steven Lukes in the PYQ dataset (nine official papers, 228 questions: GS Paper II, PSIR Paper I, PSIR Paper II, 2024–2026).PYQ Intelligence →
Using Lukes in an answer
Lukes is the pivot of the Concept of power unit in Paper I, linking behavioural political science to hegemony, ideology and legitimacy; the IB guide names him among the thinkers suggested for definitions of power. UPSC set a short note on the linkage between power and hegemony in 2024 (PSIR Paper I), for which his third dimension, drawing on Gramsci's account of consent, is the natural bridge.
Lead with the three dimensions: the one-dimensional view of Dahl, which studies observable decisions; the two-dimensional view of Bachrach and Baratz, which adds non-decision-making and the mobilisation of bias; and his own third dimension, the shaping of perceptions and preferences so that conflict never arises. Explain latent conflict and real interests, those people would recognise under conditions of relative autonomy, and his insistence that power implies an agent who could have acted otherwise. Pair him with Gramsci for hegemony, and contrast him with Foucault, for whom power constitutes subjects, and with Strange, who locates power in impersonal structures. Indian applications are strong: caste and gender hierarchies reproduced through internalised norms, and issues that never reach the legislative agenda.
Evaluate through the liberal charge of paternalism in attributing real interests, the methodological objection that the third dimension is hard to falsify, and Scott's evidence that subordinate groups seldom internalise their subordination. Avoid equating the third dimension with brainwashing, and do not treat the three dimensions as rival definitions: they share a common core and differ in what they count as its effect.
Practice questions (original)
- Q1PSIR style15 marks· 200 words
Explain Lukes' three-dimensional view of power. Can "real interests" be identified without paternalism?
How to approach it
Set out the three dimensions in sequence; explain latent conflict; weigh the paternalism objection and Lukes' 2005 replies; give an Indian example.
- Q2IB Paper 2 style15 marks
To what extent can power be exercised without the awareness of those subject to it?
How to approach it
Use Lukes' third dimension, Gramsci and Foucault; apply to a case of media, culture or social norms; consider counterclaims about agency and resistance.
Practice questions are original to this platform and are not previous year questions. For questions actually set by UPSC, see PYQ Intelligence.
Explore further
PSIR Optional
Resource
Sources and further reading
- 01Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View (1974; 2nd edn 2005)
- 02Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, 'Two Faces of Power', American Political Science Review (1962)
- 03John Gaventa, Power and Powerlessness (1980)
- 04Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, 'Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework', American Political Science Review (1963)
- 05Matthew A. Crenson, The Un-Politics of Air Pollution: A Study of Non-Decisionmaking in the Cities (1971)
- 06James C. Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (1990)
- 07Peter Morriss, Power: A Philosophical Analysis (1987; 2nd edn 2002)
- 08Peter Digeser, 'The Fourth Face of Power', Journal of Politics (1992)
- 09Steven Lukes, Marxism and Morality (1985)
- 10Steven Lukes, 'Power and the Battle for Hearts and Minds: On the Bluntness of Soft Power', in Felix Berenskoetter and M. J. Williams (eds), Power in World Politics (Routledge, 2007)