Strategic and contemporary issues
Cybersecurity and Cyber Diplomacy
India's cyber diplomacy between sovereignty and openness: national institutions from CERT-In to the Defence Cyber Agency, a contested UN process on norms, a new UN cybercrime convention, and the protection of digital public infrastructure.
Overview
India is among the world's largest digital societies, with identity, payments and public services built on national digital platforms. That makes cybersecurity a question of foreign policy as well as of policing: intrusions into power grids, hospitals and government networks are often traced to foreign state-linked groups, critical technologies come from abroad, and the rules for state behaviour in cyberspace are negotiated at the United Nations.
India's approach combines two commitments that can pull apart. It supports an "open, secure, stable, accessible and peaceful" cyberspace governed by international law, and it asserts digital sovereignty: the state's right to regulate data, platforms and networks within its jurisdiction.
01The threat landscape
Threats range from espionage and sabotage to crime. A ransomware attack crippled the All India Institute of Medical Sciences in New Delhi in November 2022; reports by private security firms have linked intrusions into Indian power-sector networks to China-linked groups; and financial fraud and data breaches affect millions of citizens. During military crises, most recently with Pakistan in May 2025, hacktivist and state-linked campaigns accompany kinetic operations. Digital public infrastructure, from identity to payments, is both India's strength and a target.
02National architecture
The Information Technology Act, 2000 provides the legal base. The Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In), operational since 2004 and given statutory functions in 2008, coordinates incident response; its directions of April 2022 required organisations to report incidents within six hours. The National Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Centre (2014) protects critical sectors, a National Cyber Security Coordinator sits in the National Security Council Secretariat, and the armed forces created a Defence Cyber Agency in 2019. The National Cyber Security Policy of 2013 has not been replaced by the strategy drafted in 2020. The Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, with rules notified in 2025, governs personal data.
03Global norms: the UN tracks
States have negotiated rules for cyberspace in two UN formats. Groups of Governmental Experts agreed in 2013 that international law applies to cyberspace, and in 2015 on eleven voluntary norms of responsible state behaviour, such as not attacking critical infrastructure in peacetime. An Open-Ended Working Group, open to all members, met from 2021 to 2025 and recommended a permanent mechanism to continue the work from 2026. India has supported the applicability of international law and the norms, emphasised capacity building for developing countries and the protection of critical infrastructure, and resisted proposals that would constrain states' regulatory sovereignty.
04Cybercrime, data and jurisdiction
India is not a party to the Council of Europe's Budapest Convention (2001), which it regards as drafted without developing countries and as intrusive on sovereignty. It took part in negotiating the first UN treaty on the subject, the UN Convention against Cybercrime, adopted by the General Assembly on 24 December 2024 and opened for signature at Hanoi in October 2025; human-rights groups criticised its breadth. Data governance is a parallel debate: India has required local storage of payment data since 2018 and seeks faster access to data held by foreign platforms in criminal investigations.
05Partnerships
Bilateral cyber dialogues with the United States, the EU, Japan, the United Kingdom, Australia, Israel and others cover incident sharing, capacity building and standards; the Quad runs a cybersecurity partnership on critical infrastructure and secure software. Trusted-source rules for telecommunications equipment, introduced in 2021, effectively exclude Chinese vendors from India's core networks, a decision that links cyber policy to technology partnerships and supply chains.
06Dilemmas
Three tensions run through Indian policy. Security and rights: the controversy over the alleged use of Pegasus spyware led the Supreme Court to appoint a technical committee in 2021, and India records some of the highest numbers of internet shutdowns among democracies. Openness and sovereignty: data localisation and platform regulation protect citizens and the state but raise costs and invite reciprocal restrictions. Attribution and response: India rarely names state attackers publicly, preferring quiet diplomacy, which limits deterrence.
07Reading it through IR theory
Realism treats cyberspace as a new domain of self-help. Where attribution is difficult and offensive and defensive tools are hard to tell apart, the security dilemma sharpens, and the Defence Cyber Agency, trusted-source rules that exclude Chinese vendors from core networks and India's quiet handling of attribution reflect a state preparing for rivals it cannot easily deter. Realism has less to say about the criminals, hacktivists and private firms that crowd the domain. Liberal institutionalism explains the effort to build rules. The UN reports affirming that international law applies to cyberspace, the eleven voluntary norms and a permanent mechanism to continue the work are attempts to create a regime that reduces uncertainty, and Keohane and Nye's distinction between sensitivity and vulnerability fits a digital society whose identity and payments platforms make disruption costly. The lens also shows the regime's weakness: voluntary norms lack enforcement, and states choose between rival instruments such as the Budapest Convention and the UN cybercrime treaty. Constructivism focuses on contested meanings. India's insistence on digital sovereignty alongside an open and peaceful cyberspace shows that sovereignty in cyberspace is being redefined through practice rather than inherited. The Copenhagen School's idea of securitisation adds a critical point: once an issue is framed as an existential threat, emergency measures such as shutdowns and surveillance can escape normal scrutiny, which is the root of the tension between security and rights.
08India's options and the way forward
India's choices concern institutions at home and alignments abroad. Domestically, the clearest gap is the absence of an updated national strategy since the policy of 2013; adopting one would clarify the roles of CERT-In, the critical infrastructure centre, the national coordinator and the Defence Cyber Agency, though coordination across ministries and states would remain demanding. On cybercrime, India can rely on the UN convention it helped negotiate or reconsider the Budapest framework for faster evidence-sharing with the democracies that host most platforms; the first protects sovereignty and solidarity with developing countries, while the second speeds investigations at the cost of accepting provisions India has regarded as intrusive. On norms, India can use the permanent UN mechanism to press for capacity building and the protection of critical infrastructure, issues it has already championed. Attribution is a further choice: naming state attackers more often could strengthen deterrence, but risks diplomatic escalation and depends on confidence in evidence. Throughout, digital sovereignty has to be balanced against rights and openness, since shutdowns and surveillance controversies weaken India's standing as a democratic model. On balance, India's interest lies in combining national capacity with active norm-building, so that sovereignty is exercised under accountable rules.
Key points
- CERT-In (2004), NCIIPC (2014) and the Defence Cyber Agency (2019) anchor the national architecture.
- CERT-In's April 2022 directions require incident reporting within six hours.
- UN norms: GGE reports of 2013 and 2015; the OEWG (2021–25) recommended a permanent mechanism.
- India is not party to the Budapest Convention; the UN Convention against Cybercrime was adopted on 24 December 2024.
- Trusted-source telecom rules (2021) tie cyber policy to the China question.
- Tensions between security and rights, and openness and sovereignty, persist.
Debates
Should India join the Budapest Convention or rely on the UN cybercrime treaty?
Join Budapest: it is the established framework for cross-border evidence-sharing with the democracies that host most platforms; staying out slows Indian investigations.
Rely on the UN treaty: it was negotiated by all states, gives developing countries a voice, and does not require accepting provisions India sees as intrusive; Budapest's membership is largely Western.
Does cyber sovereignty protect citizens or the state?
Citizens: national rules on data protection, localisation and platform accountability protect citizens from foreign surveillance and corporate abuse that global markets would not.
The state: sovereignty arguments also justify shutdowns, surveillance and pressure on platforms; without independent oversight, cyber sovereignty can become control.
Should India publicly attribute cyberattacks to state actors?
Yes: public attribution imposes reputational costs, signals capability and allows coordinated responses with partners through bilateral dialogues and the Quad; quiet diplomacy, India's current preference, limits deterrence and leaves attackers confident that intrusions into power-sector networks carry little price.
No: attribution can expose intelligence methods, invites denial and counter-accusation, and risks escalation during military crises such as that with Pakistan in May 2025; without a credible follow-up response, naming an attacker achieves little.
A middle course is selective attribution, coordinated with partners and reserved for attacks on critical infrastructure, where the norms India supports at the UN give public naming the greatest legitimacy.
Practice questions
- Q1UPSC Mains style15 marks· 250 words
Examine India's approach to the international governance of cyberspace.
How to approach it
GGE and OEWG; norms and international law; Budapest and the UN treaty; sovereignty and capacity building.
- Q2UPSC Mains style10 marks· 150 words
Assess the adequacy of India's institutional framework for cybersecurity.
How to approach it
CERT-In, NCIIPC, DCA, coordinator; missing strategy; DPDP Act; capacity.
- Q3UPSC Mains style15 marks· 250 words
Cyberspace has made sovereignty both more important and harder to exercise. Discuss with reference to India.
How to approach it
Data localisation, platform rules, trusted sources; jurisdiction over foreign data; rights concerns.
Practice questions are original to this platform and are not previous year questions. For questions actually set by UPSC, see PYQ Intelligence.
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Sources
- 01Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In) (opens in a new tab). Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology
- 02National Cyber Security Policy, 2013 (opens in a new tab). Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology
- 03Final report of the Open-Ended Working Group on security of and in the use of ICTs (2021–2025). United Nations, July 2025
- 04United Nations Convention against Cybercrime. United Nations, 24 December 2024
- 05Lucas Kello, The Virtual Weapon and International Order (2017)
- 06Arun Mohan Sukumar, Midnight's Machines: A Political History of Technology in India (2019)