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Who taxes the ground beneath? Parliament curbs the States' mineral levies

Two years after a nine-judge Bench held that the States may tax mineral rights and mineral-bearing land, Parliament amended the mining law in August 2026 to bar such levies except on conditions set by the Union, and to cancel arrears the States had not yet collected. The amendment reopens one of the most contested questions in India's fiscal federalism.

Event: Published: By Arjun Agrawal

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13 August 2026 · 20 November 2026
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01Executive summary Facts

The Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Bill, 2026 was introduced in the Lok Sabha on 10 August 2026 and passed by the Lok Sabha on 12 August and the Rajya Sabha on 13 August. It extends the Union's declared control under the 1957 Act from mines and minerals to 'mineral bearing lands', bars any State tax, cess or levy on mineral rights or mineral-bearing land except on conditions or restrictions the central government prescribes, and deems levies not paid or recovered before the amendment commences 'invalid at all material times', while barring refunds of sums already paid. The Bill does not name it, but it operates on the consequences of Mineral Area Development Authority v Steel Authority of India (2024), in which the Supreme Court held by eight to one that royalty is not a tax, that the States may tax mineral rights unless Parliament limits that power, and that Parliament's power to limit does not reach the States' tax on land. PRS Legislative Research has questioned Parliament's competence over taxes on land, the retrospective cancellation of arrears the Court had allowed, the unequal treatment of those who paid and those who did not, and the breadth of the power left to rules. The amendment comes into force on a date the central government notifies.

02Background Facts

The Constitution divides mineral powers between the Union and the States. Entry 54 of the Union List gives Parliament the regulation of mines and mineral development to the extent it declares by law that Union control is expedient in the public interest; entry 23 of the State List gives the States the same subject subject to that declaration. Taxation is listed separately: entry 50 of the State List allows the States to tax mineral rights 'subject to any limitations imposed by Parliament by law relating to mineral development', and entry 49 allows them to tax lands and buildings. Under the 1957 Act the Union fixes royalty rates, which the States collect from mining lessees.

For three decades a single sentence unsettled the scheme. In India Cement v State of Tamil Nadu (1989) seven judges described royalty as a tax, which implied that the States, having been displaced by the Union law, could not levy more; in 2004 a five-judge Bench treated the description as a typographical error. The conflict was referred to nine judges.

On 25 July 2024, in Mineral Area Development Authority v Steel Authority of India, the Court held by eight to one, in an opinion by Chief Justice D.Y. Chandrachud, that royalty is a contractual payment and not a tax. The power to tax mineral rights belongs to the States; Parliament cannot tax them under its general power over mines in entry 54, or under its residuary power. Entry 50 lets Parliament impose 'any limitations', a phrase wide enough to include a prohibition, but the 1957 Act imposed none. Mineral-bearing land is 'land' under entry 49, its yield in minerals or the royalty can be the measure of a tax on it, and the limitations Parliament may impose under entry 50 'do not operate on Entry 49'. Justice B.V. Nagarathna dissented, holding that royalty is in the nature of a tax and warning that State levies would produce unhealthy competition and harm the national market.

On 14 August 2024 the Court declined to make its ruling purely prospective. The States could recover taxes due from 1 April 2005, in instalments spread over twelve years beginning on 1 April 2026, with interest and penalties for the period before 25 July 2024 waived. The repayment schedule had thus begun to run when the amendment was introduced, and the amendment's second sub-section operates on precisely those arrears.

03Political actors Facts

Union government and the Ministry of Mines
Sponsored the Bill; the Minister, G. Kishan Reddy, signed its Statement of Objects and Reasons, which argues for a uniform, stable and predictable fiscal regime in the national interest.
Mineral-bearing States
The governments whose power to tax mineral rights and mineral-bearing land the 2024 judgment confirmed, and whose uncollected arrears the amendment deems invalid; many have large Scheduled Tribe populations in mining districts.
Mining lessees, public and private
The taxpayers affected: those who had not paid State levies before commencement are relieved of them, while those who had paid cannot claim refunds.
Supreme Court
Its nine-judge Bench in 2024 defined the competence the amendment now tests; its order of 14 August 2024 set the arrears schedule the amendment overrides.
Parliament
Passed the Bill three days after its introduction, at the end of a session in which, according to PRS, the Lok Sabha functioned for 15 per cent of its scheduled time.
PRS Legislative Research
An independent research organisation whose analysis of the Bill identified questions of legislative competence, retrospectivity, equality and delegation.

04Timeline Facts

  1. 1957

    The Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act declares Union control over the regulation of mines and the development of minerals.

  2. 1989

    In India Cement v State of Tamil Nadu seven judges describe royalty as a tax.

  3. 2004

    A five-judge Bench treats that description as a typographical error, deepening the uncertainty.

  4. 25 July 2024

    A nine-judge Bench holds, eight to one, that royalty is not a tax and that the States may tax mineral rights and mineral-bearing land.

  5. 14 August 2024

    The Court allows the States to recover taxes due since 1 April 2005, in instalments over twelve years from 1 April 2026.

  6. 1 April 2026

    The twelve-year instalment period for arrears begins under the Court's order.

  7. 10 August 2026

    The MMDR Amendment Bill, 2026 is introduced in the Lok Sabha.

  8. 12 August 2026

    The Lok Sabha passes the Bill.

  9. 13 August 2026

    The Rajya Sabha passes the Bill on the last day of the Monsoon Session.

05Main developments

What happened Facts

On 10 August 2026 the Ministry of Mines introduced the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Bill, 2026 (Bill No. 154 of 2026) in the Lok Sabha. Its Statement of Objects and Reasons was signed by the Minister, G. Kishan Reddy, on 7 August. The Lok Sabha passed it on 12 August and the Rajya Sabha on 13 August, the last day of a Monsoon Session that had begun on 20 July.

The Bill is short. It amends section 2 of the 1957 Act, in which Parliament declares it expedient in the public interest that the Union take under its control the regulation of mines and the development of minerals, so that the declaration also covers 'mineral bearing lands', defined as land whose mineral content meets parameters the central government prescribes. It inserts a new section 9D. Under its first sub-section, no tax, cess or other levy 'by whatever name called' may be imposed by a State government on mineral rights, or on mineral-bearing lands 'either based on mineral quantity or mineral value or royalty payable or otherwise', except in accordance with conditions or restrictions prescribed by the central government. Under the second, 'notwithstanding anything contained in any other law ... or in any judgment, decree or order of any court', any such levy not deposited with or recovered by a State before the amendment commences 'shall be deemed to be invalid at all material times'; a proviso adds that sums already deposited or recovered are not to be refunded. A consequential amendment to section 13 lets the central government make rules setting the conditions and restrictions.

The Statement of Objects and Reasons justifies the change by the geopolitical importance of minerals and their concentration in a few States. It lists the problems it attributes to uneven State levies: a heavy tax burden, unpredictable levies introduced after mining has begun, multiple levies on production or dispatch, non-uniform rates and retrospective impositions. It argues that excessive and unpredictable taxation makes mining unviable, raises the cost of goods and can push industry towards imports, and that a 'uniform and balanced fiscal framework' will give the sector certainty in the service of Atmanirbhar Bharat and Viksit Bharat 2047. It does not mention the Supreme Court's judgment of 2024.

What changed Facts

  1. Union control extended to land. The declaration of Union control in section 2 now covers 'mineral bearing lands', defined by parameters the central government prescribes.
  2. State levies made conditional. Any State tax, cess or levy on mineral rights or mineral-bearing land, however measured, is barred except on conditions or restrictions prescribed by central rules.
  3. Arrears cancelled, payments kept. Levies not paid or recovered before commencement are deemed invalid at all times, notwithstanding any judgment; sums already paid are not refundable.
  4. Policy left to rules. The Act states no criteria for the conditions and restrictions; they are to be prescribed by the central government under section 13.
  5. Commencement by notification. The amendment takes effect from a date the central government notifies.

Why it matters Analysis

The amendment is the Union's answer to a judgment that strengthened the States' fiscal hand. The majority in 2024 had pointed to Parliament as the proper source of any limit on the States' power to tax mineral rights, and entry 50 expressly invites such a law. To that extent the amendment takes up the route the Court described. But it goes further in two respects, and those are where its constitutional difficulty lies.

First, it reaches mineral-bearing land, which the Court placed under entry 49, where Parliament has no power to impose limitations. The Bill tries to bridge the gap by extending the Union's regulatory declaration to such land, but the Court had held that entry 54 is a general regulatory power that cannot be used to tax, and that Parliament's power to limit State taxes under entry 50 does not operate on taxes on land under entry 49. As PRS observes, land is a State subject and taxes on land a State power. Second, it cancels arrears that the Court's order of August 2024 allowed the States to recover. The Court has long held, in cases such as State of Haryana v Karnal Co-operative Farmers' Society (1993), that a legislature may change the law retrospectively and so remove the basis of a judgment, but may not simply declare a judgment ineffective. Whether a provision that deems unpaid levies invalid 'notwithstanding' any judgment changes the basis of the 2024 decision or merely overrides its result is the question a court would have to decide.

The amendment also changes the method of fiscal coordination. The Goods and Services Tax pooled the Union's and the States' indirect tax powers under a council in which both vote. Mineral taxation is now to be coordinated by central rules, without a forum in which the States take part, on a subject the Constitution assigns to them. For mineral-bearing States, many of them among the poorer States with large tribal populations in mining districts, the change is not only legal but distributive: it moves value from State treasuries to mining companies, including those that had delayed payment.

06India’s interests Analysis

India needs more domestic mining, of coal and iron ore as well as of the critical minerals on which batteries, electronics and renewable energy depend, and investors in exploration and mining need a predictable fiscal regime. The amendment serves that interest by promising uniformity and ending uncertainty over retrospective levies.

India also needs the cooperation of the States in whose territory the minerals lie: they grant leases, acquire land, police mining and live with its consequences. A settlement imposed by central rules, and contested in court for years, could delay exactly the investment the amendment seeks. The durable interest lies in a negotiated framework, with predictable State levies within agreed limits and compensation for revenue the States forgo, of the kind the GST Council made possible for indirect taxes.

07Institutional analysis

Institutional implications Analysis

Several institutions meet in the amendment. Parliament acts under entry 54 of the Union List and the limitation clause of entry 50 of the State List; the central government is to prescribe the conditions on State levies by rules under section 13, laid before Parliament but not debated as a Bill; the States lose a power that the 2024 judgment had confirmed; and the courts are the likely forum for the dispute. A State may sue the Union in the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction under Article 131, and affected parties may petition the Court or the High Courts.

The contrast with the GST Council is instructive. When India pooled the Union's and the States' indirect taxes in 2017, it created a constitutional council in which the States hold two-thirds of the voting weight. Mineral levies have no comparable body. The Inter-State Council under Article 263 and the Finance Commission, which recommends the sharing of Union taxes, could in principle carry part of the negotiation, for instance over compensation for revenue the States lose, but the amendment provides for neither.

The mining statute already contains instruments that reflect the States' and mining communities' claims, such as the District Mineral Foundations created in 2015 to direct a share of mining revenue to affected districts. The amendment leaves those untouched, but it narrows the States' own fiscal room at a time when the Union is pressing for faster exploration and auction of critical minerals.

Constitutional provisions Facts

Entry 54 of List I (regulation of mines and mineral development to the extent declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest), entry 23 of List II (the States' regulatory power, subject to that declaration), entry 49 of List II (taxes on lands and buildings) and entry 50 of List II (taxes on mineral rights subject to limitations imposed by Parliament by law relating to mineral development) are allocated under Article 246. In the 2024 judgment the Court held that Parliament cannot use entry 54 or its residuary power under Article 248 to tax mineral rights, that 'any limitations' under entry 50 can include a prohibition, and that such limitations do not operate on entry 49.

Article 265 requires that no tax be levied or collected except by authority of law, which is why the validity of each State levy depends on the competence of the State law that imposes it. Retrospective legislation that alters the basis of a judgment is permitted, but a law that merely declares a judgment ineffective encroaches on the judicial function; and a classification that relieves those who did not pay while denying relief to those who did must be justified under Article 14.

08Theoretical perspectives Analysis

Fiscal federalism offers two competing intuitions. Wallace Oates's decentralisation theorem (Fiscal Federalism, 1972) holds that decisions are best taken at the lowest level that internalises their costs and benefits, which supports State taxation of an activity whose local costs, in land, water and displacement, fall on the State. Barry Weingast's idea of market-preserving federalism (1995) emphasises the opposite risk: sub-national units must not be able to fragment the national market, which is the concern Justice Nagarathna voiced in dissent and the Bill's Statement of Objects and Reasons repeats. The amendment chooses the second intuition over the first.

William Riker described federations as bargains between a centre and its units (Federalism, 1964). The 2024 judgment read the Indian bargain over minerals in the States' favour and invited Parliament to renegotiate it by law; the amendment renegotiates it, but by a central law and central rules rather than by agreement. Whether that strengthens or weakens federalism depends on whether one sees the Indian federation as a partnership of co-equal units or, as its critics have long argued, as a union in which the centre may adjust the terms.

The question is also an old one about sovereignty and revenue. Kautilya treated mines as a source of the treasury, and the treasury as the basis of the army and of the state's power. Modern States make the same calculation about critical minerals, and the contest between the Union and the States over who taxes them is a contest over who shares in the development those minerals finance.

How the different sides read it

The Union government and the mining industry

Minerals are national assets on which manufacturing, infrastructure and the energy transition depend. A patchwork of State levies, some imposed after leases were auctioned and some retrospectively, raises costs, deters investment and pushes buyers towards imports. Entry 50 exists precisely so that Parliament can secure a uniform regime, and the Court itself said that Parliament could limit or even prohibit State taxes on mineral rights.

Mineral-bearing States

The States bear the costs of mining, in displacement, environmental damage and the depletion of a finite resource, and the 2024 judgment confirmed their right to tax it. Cancelling arrears the Court allowed them to recover transfers revenue from some of the poorer States to mining companies, and leaving the conditions on their taxes to central rules turns a constitutional power into an administrative permission.

Constitutional analysts

PRS's analysis identifies four questions: whether Parliament can restrict taxes on land under entry 49 at all; whether deeming unpaid levies invalid overrides the Court's directions without changing their legal basis; whether relieving defaulters while denying refunds to those who paid violates Article 14; and whether leaving the conditions to rules without guiding principles is excessive delegation under the standard set in In re Delhi Laws Act (1951).

Comparative federalism

Federations allocate resource revenue differently. In Canada the provinces own most natural resources and, since 1982, have had express power to tax them; in Australia the states own minerals and levy the royalties. India's Constitution splits the subject between a Union power to regulate and a State power to tax, so its disputes concern the boundary between regulation and taxation rather than ownership.

09Critical evaluation Analysis

The amendment settles the Union's policy choice: mineral taxation is to be uniform and centrally conditioned, and the uncertainty created by arrears dating back to 2005 is to be ended in favour of the lessees who had not paid. It also shows that the 2024 judgment did not end the dispute; it moved it from the meaning of royalty to the limits of Parliament's power to respond.

It does not settle its own validity. The extension to mineral-bearing land sits uneasily with the Court's holding that entry 50 limitations do not reach entry 49; the cancellation of arrears must survive the rule against legislative override of judgments; the treatment of payers and defaulters must survive Article 14; and the conditions themselves are left to rules not yet seen in the sources consulted. Nor do those sources show when the amendment will be brought into force.

The strongest objection is that the amendment does by executive rule what the Constitution allows Parliament to do only by law relating to mineral development, extends it to a tax Parliament cannot limit, and rewards non-payment. The strongest reply is that entry 50 expressly invites Parliament to impose limitations, including prohibition, that a fragmented mineral tax regime harms a national market the Constitution also protects, and that the Court itself told Parliament that the remedy lay in its hands.

10What could happen next Analysis

Analysis, not fact · scenarios and signposts, not predictions

The amendment's effect depends on when it is brought into force, what the rules say and how the courts read it.

  • If the central government notifies the amendment and frames rules that allow moderate, uniform State levies within set limits, then the change could become the basis of a negotiated settlement rather than a prohibition, and some States may accept it in exchange for predictability.
  • If mineral-bearing States challenge the amendment, by suit under Article 131 or through writ petitions, then the Supreme Court will have to decide whether Parliament may restrict taxes on mineral-bearing land at all and whether the cancellation of arrears changes the basis of the 2024 judgment or merely overrides it; a ruling against section 9D(2) would revive the arrears.
  • If the Union offers compensation for lost revenue, through royalty revisions, a share of auction proceeds or a Finance Commission mechanism, then the dispute could move from the courts to fiscal negotiation, as the GST transition did.
  • If none of these happens, then Union–State friction over mining is likely to slow the leasing, land acquisition and clearances on which new mining, including of critical minerals, depends.

Indicators to watch: the notification bringing the amendment into force; draft rules under section 13; suits or petitions by State governments; revisions of royalty rates; statements by mineral-bearing States and by mining companies with outstanding State dues; and any proposal for an inter-governmental forum on mineral taxation.

11Concepts and thinkers

12UPSC GS-II connection Syllabus

13PSIR Paper I connection Syllabus

14IB Global Politics connection Syllabus

15Potential examination questions

  1. Q1UPSC Mains style15 marks· 250 words

    The Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Bill, 2026 takes up the remedy the Supreme Court pointed to in 2024 but goes beyond it. Examine.

    How to approach it

    Explain entries 49, 50 and 54 and the 2024 holdings; show where the amendment uses the entry 50 limitation and where it extends to land and to arrears; assess the constitutional questions of competence, retrospectivity and Article 14; conclude on what a durable settlement would need.

  2. Q2UPSC Mains style10 marks· 150 words

    Distinguish between Parliament's power to regulate mines and the States' power to tax mineral rights and land. Why does the distinction matter for fiscal federalism?

    How to approach it

    Contrast the general regulatory entry with the specific taxing entries; use the 2024 judgment's holding that a regulatory entry cannot displace a taxing entry; link to the States' revenue autonomy.

  3. Q3PSIR style15 marks

    Critically assess the trend towards fiscal centralisation in Indian federalism, with reference to the mineral levies dispute.

    How to approach it

    Set the 2026 amendment beside the GST and the Finance Commission system; use Oates, Weingast and Riker; weigh the case for a national market against the case for State fiscal autonomy and cooperative mechanisms.

  4. Q4Discussion

    Who should benefit from a country's natural resources: the national government, the region where they are found, or the communities who live on the land?

    How to approach it

    Use India's mineral levies dispute and one other federation, such as Canada or Australia; distinguish ownership, regulation and taxation; consider the claims of mining-affected and indigenous communities.

Practice questions are original to this platform and are not previous year questions. For questions actually set by UPSC, see PYQ Intelligence.

16Sources

Primary and official documents first. Every factual claim was checked against these on 20 November 2026.

Primary and official sources

Supporting sources

  1. 01BookWallace E. Oates, Fiscal Federalism. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972
  2. 02ScholarshipBarry R. Weingast, 'The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 11(1), 1995
  3. 03OtherThe Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Bill, 2026: bill track, key features and issues for consideration (opens in a new tab). PRS Legislative Research, August 2026 · consulted 20 November 2026
  4. 04OtherMonthly Policy Review, August 2026 (Parliament passes amendments to the MMDR Act, 1957; Monsoon Session statistics) (opens in a new tab). PRS Legislative Research, August 2026 · consulted 20 November 2026

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