Skip to content

Section A · Constitutional Foundations

The Basic Structure Doctrine

How the Supreme Court came to hold that Parliament may amend any part of the Constitution but may not destroy its identity, what the doctrine protects, and whether it is a safeguard or a usurpation.

Overview

The basic structure doctrine holds that Parliament's power under Article 368 to amend the Constitution does not extend to altering its basic structure or framework. The text says nothing of the kind. The doctrine was announced by a 7:6 majority in Kesavananda Bharati (1973), after two decades of conflict between Parliament and the Court over property, land reform and the reach of the amending power.

It has since been used to strike down amendments on elections, judicial review and judicial appointments, and it now organises most of Indian constitutional law. It is also persistently contested, because it gives unelected judges the last word over the constituent power exercised by elected representatives.

Constitutional and legal provisions

Article 13(2) and 13(4)
Laws abridging fundamental rights are void; clause (4), added by the 24th Amendment, excludes amendments made under Article 368.
Article 368
Parliament's constituent power to amend; clauses (4) and (5), added by the 42nd Amendment, were struck down in Minerva Mills.
Article 31B and the Ninth Schedule
Protection of listed laws from fundamental-rights challenge; laws added after 24 April 1973 remain open to basic-structure review.
Article 31C
Laws giving effect to Article 39(b) and (c); its clause excluding judicial review was struck down in Kesavananda.

Prelude: property and the amending power, 1951–1967

The First Amendment (1951) protected land reform laws through Articles 31A and 31B and the Ninth Schedule. In Shankari Prasad (1951) the Court held that a constitutional amendment is not "law" under Article 13, so Parliament could amend fundamental rights. Sajjan Singh (1965) followed it, but Justices Hidayatullah and Mudholkar doubted whether Parliament could change the Constitution's "basic features".

In Golaknath (1967) an eleven-judge bench held by 6:5 that amendments are "law" under Article 13 and cannot abridge fundamental rights, applying the ruling prospectively. Parliament replied with the 24th Amendment (1971), which made amendments immune from Article 13 and the President's assent to amendment Bills obligatory, and the 25th, which inserted Article 31C.

Kesavananda Bharati, 1973

In Kesavananda Bharati a bench of thirteen judges heard challenges to the 24th, 25th and 29th Amendments. On 24 April 1973 it overruled Golaknath and upheld the 24th Amendment: Parliament can amend any provision, including fundamental rights. But by 7:6 it held that the power to "amend" does not include the power to alter the basic structure. Justice H.R. Khanna's opinion was decisive: an amendment presupposes that the Constitution survives with its identity intact, so the power cannot be used to abrogate it.

The Court upheld the first part of Article 31C but struck down the clause that barred courts from asking whether a law actually gave effect to the directive principles. Chief Justice Sikri listed as illustrations the supremacy of the Constitution, the republican and democratic form of government, its secular character, the separation of powers and its federal character.

Consolidation, 1975–2007

In Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975) the Court struck down the 39th Amendment's attempt to place the Prime Minister's election beyond judicial scrutiny, invoking free and fair elections and the rule of law. The 42nd Amendment (1976) responded by declaring the amending power unlimited and amendments immune from challenge. Minerva Mills (1980) struck down those clauses, holding that limited amending power is itself a basic feature, and invalidated the extension of Article 31C to all the directive principles, because harmony between Parts III and IV is part of the structure.

Waman Rao (1981) fixed 24 April 1973 as the date after which Ninth Schedule laws could be tested for basic structure. I.R. Coelho (2007), a nine-judge bench, held that such laws must be examined for their effect on the essence of the rights in Articles 14, 19 and 21.

What the basic structure contains

There is no exhaustive list, by design. Features the Court has recognised include the supremacy of the Constitution; the sovereign, democratic and republican structure; secularism and federalism (S.R. Bommai, 1994); separation of powers; judicial review (L. Chandra Kumar, 1997); judicial independence; the rule of law; free and fair elections; limited amending power; the balance between rights and directive principles; parliamentary democracy; and the essential content of the equality code (M. Nagaraj, 2006).

The method matters more than the list. The Court asks whether an amendment, judged by its effect rather than its form, damages an essential feature so as to change the Constitution's identity. Ordinary laws are tested against specific provisions rather than against the basic structure directly, as the Court held in Raj Narain and in Kuldip Nayar (2006).

Recent applications and the restraint in practice

In Kihoto Hollohan (1992) the Court struck down paragraph 7 of the Tenth Schedule, which barred judicial review of disqualification decisions, for want of State ratification, and treated judicial review as basic. In the NJAC case (2015) it struck down the 99th Amendment by 4:1, holding that judicial primacy in appointments is part of judicial independence. In Janhit Abhiyan (2022) it upheld the 103rd Amendment on reservations for economically weaker sections by 3:2, the minority holding that excluding SC, ST and OBC poor families from the new category violated the equality code.

The record shows a doctrine used sparingly: only a handful of amendments, or parts of them, have been struck down, while most challenged amendments have survived.

Safeguard or usurpation

The critique begins with Alexander Bickel's counter-majoritarian difficulty: judges who answer to no electorate override the most deliberate expression of democratic will, a constitutional amendment. The doctrine's content is indeterminate, and in the NJAC case it protected the judiciary's own power over appointments. Senior constitutional office-holders have questioned it publicly in recent years.

The defence rests on constitutional identity and experience. The 39th and 42nd Amendments showed how a parliamentary majority could use the amending power to entrench itself, and a special majority in a whipped House is not the same as the people's constituent power. The doctrine has travelled, to Bangladesh (Anwar Hossain Chowdhury, 1989) and into a wider comparative literature on unconstitutional constitutional amendments, which suggests it answers a general problem of constitutional democracy rather than an Indian peculiarity.

Debates

Does the basic structure doctrine strengthen or weaken Indian democracy?

It strengthens democracy, on one view, by protecting the conditions of democratic politics (free elections, judicial review, federalism, rights) against a temporary majority, as the Emergency amendments showed was necessary.

It weakens democracy, on the other, by transferring final constitutional authority from elected representatives to a court that chooses its own members and defines the doctrine's content case by case. A middle position accepts the doctrine but asks for restraint: use it only against amendments that attack the democratic process itself.

Should the content of the basic structure be codified?

Codification would add certainty and democratic authorship, and might reduce the charge that judges invent limits as they go. Against it, any codified list could itself be amended, freezing features in one generation's terms would rob the doctrine of its point, and the open method allows the Court to respond to new threats. The Court has consistently declined to give an exhaustive list.

Prelims points

  • Shankari Prasad (1951) and Sajjan Singh (1965): Parliament may amend fundamental rights.
  • Golaknath (1967): 11 judges, 6:5; amendments are "law" under Article 13; prospective overruling.
  • 24th Amendment (1971): Article 13(4); President's assent to amendment Bills made obligatory.
  • Kesavananda Bharati (24 April 1973): 13 judges, 7:6; Golaknath overruled; basic structure cannot be amended.
  • Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975): part of the 39th Amendment struck down.
  • Minerva Mills (1980): Article 368(4) and (5) struck down; limited amending power is basic.
  • Waman Rao (1981): Ninth Schedule laws added after 24 April 1973 are open to basic-structure review.
  • I.R. Coelho (2007): 9 judges; review of Ninth Schedule laws for their effect on Articles 14, 19 and 21.
  • S.R. Bommai (1994): secularism and federalism are basic features.
  • NJAC case (2015): 99th Amendment struck down 4:1; Janhit Abhiyan (2022): 103rd Amendment upheld 3:2.

In the UPSC papers

Asked by UPSC

2 questions · 2025

  1. 2025 · GS-II · Q12 · 15 marks

    Indian Constitution has conferred the amending power on the ordinary legislative institutions with a few procedural hurdles. In view of this statement, examine the procedural and substantive limitations on the amending power of the Parliament to change the Constitution.

  2. 2025 · PSIR I · Q5(c) · 10 marks

    Land reforms programmes led to some constitutional amendments. Comment.

Verbatim from the official UPSC Main papers, linked to The Basic Structure Doctrine in the PYQ dataset.PYQ Intelligence →

Practice questions

  1. Q1UPSC Mains style15 marks· 250 words

    The basic structure doctrine is the judiciary's answer to the question of who guards the Constitution against its own amendment. Evaluate its democratic legitimacy.

    How to approach it

    Set out the counter-majoritarian critique, then the defence from constitutional identity and the Emergency amendments; use NJAC and Janhit Abhiyan to show both the risks and the restraint.

  2. Q2UPSC Mains style15 marks· 250 words

    Trace the Supreme Court's view of Parliament's power to amend fundamental rights from Shankari Prasad to Kesavananda Bharati.

    How to approach it

    Move through Shankari Prasad, Sajjan Singh (and the doubts in it), Golaknath, the 24th and 25th Amendments and Kesavananda, explaining the reasoning at each step.

  3. Q3UPSC Mains style10 marks· 150 words

    Explain the significance of I.R. Coelho (2007) for the Ninth Schedule.

    How to approach it

    Cover Article 31B, Waman Rao's cut-off, the "effect" or rights test, and the result that no law is beyond review merely by being scheduled.

Practice questions are original to this platform and are not previous year questions. For questions actually set by UPSC, see PYQ Intelligence.

Explore further

Thinker

Dictionary

Sources

  1. 01The Constitution of India (as amended) (opens in a new tab). Legislative Department, Ministry of Law and Justice
  2. 02Judgments of the Supreme Court of India (opens in a new tab). Supreme Court of India
  3. 03Granville Austin, Working a Democratic Constitution: The Indian Experience (1999). Oxford University Press
  4. 04H.M. Seervai, Constitutional Law of India (4th edn). Universal Law Publishing
  5. 05Yaniv Roznai, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments: The Limits of Amendment Powers (2017). Oxford University Press
  6. 06Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (1962)