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Section E · Judiciary

Judicial Review

The constitutional basis of judicial review, what courts review and by what standards, the Ninth Schedule, and the argument over its democratic legitimacy.

Overview

Judicial review is the power of courts to examine whether laws, executive action and constitutional amendments conform to the Constitution, and to strike down what does not. The phrase does not appear in the Constitution, but the power is written into it: Article 13 declares inconsistent laws void, Articles 32 and 226 provide remedies, and the federal provisions require someone to decide when a legislature has exceeded its field.

Indian review is unusually broad. It extends to constitutional amendments, to the exercise of the President's and Governors' discretionary powers, and to decisions of the presiding officers of legislatures. Its breadth is the source both of the judiciary's authority and of the persistent charge that unelected judges decide questions that belong to democratic politics.

Constitutional and legal provisions

Article 13
Pre-constitutional and post-constitutional laws inconsistent with fundamental rights are void to the extent of the inconsistency.
Articles 32 and 226
Writ jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and High Courts.
Articles 131–136
Original and appellate jurisdiction, including federal disputes.
Articles 245, 246, 251, 254
Limits of legislative competence and resolution of conflicts between Union and State laws.
Article 31B
Ninth Schedule protection for listed laws, subject since 1973 to basic-structure review.

Constitutional basis

In the United States judicial review was asserted by the Supreme Court in Marbury v. Madison (1803). In India it was designed: a written constitution, a federal division of power and a justiciable bill of rights together required an arbiter, and the framers gave the courts that role expressly. The judiciary inherited the Federal Court's experience of reviewing provincial and central laws for competence under the 1935 Act.

The power has been entrenched by the courts themselves. Kesavananda Bharati (1973) and later L. Chandra Kumar (1997) held judicial review, including the writ jurisdiction of High Courts, to be part of the basic structure, beyond the reach of amendment.

What courts review

Legislation is reviewed for competence (whether the subject falls within the legislature's List) and for consistency with fundamental rights and other constitutional limits. Executive action is reviewed on the grounds of administrative law: illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety, a classification Indian courts adopted from English law, joined to Article 14's guarantee against arbitrariness. Constitutional amendments are reviewed against the basic structure.

Review also reaches powers that look political. Proclamations of President's Rule are reviewable (S.R. Bommai, 1994), as are pardons on limited grounds, the Speaker's decisions under the Tenth Schedule (Kihoto Hollohan, 1992), ordinances, and Governors' actions in summoning and dissolving assemblies (Nabam Rebia, 2016). Indian courts have largely rejected a "political question" doctrine, preferring to adjust the intensity of review.

Standards of review

Laws are presumed constitutional, and courts read them down where possible rather than strike them. Under Article 14 the test has moved from reasonable classification to non-arbitrariness and, for legislation, manifest arbitrariness (Shayara Bano, 2017). Restrictions on rights are increasingly tested for proportionality: legitimate aim, rational connection, necessity and balance, adopted in Modern Dental College (2016) and K.S. Puttaswamy (2017).

Intensity varies. Courts give economic legislation and policy wide latitude (the disinvestment decision in BALCO, 2002, was held a matter of policy), and are often deferential on national security; they review more strictly where liberty, equality or the democratic process is at stake.

The Ninth Schedule

The First Amendment (1951) created Article 31B and the Ninth Schedule to shield land reform laws from challenge under Part III. The schedule grew to include laws far removed from land reform, among them Tamil Nadu's 69 per cent reservation law, added by the 76th Amendment (1994). Waman Rao (1981) held that laws added after 24 April 1973, the date of Kesavananda, could be tested against the basic structure, and I.R. Coelho (2007) held that such laws must be examined for their effect on the essence of the rights in Articles 14, 19 and 21. The Ninth Schedule no longer offers complete immunity.

Review in recent practice

Recent decisions show both the assertive and the deferential faces of review. In the electoral bonds case (2024) a unanimous Constitution Bench struck down the scheme and the amendments to company, tax and election law that enabled anonymous and unlimited corporate donations, holding that voters have a right to information about political funding. In Government of NCT of Delhi (2023) it enforced a federal reading of Delhi's powers over services.

In the Article 370 case (2023) it upheld the abrogation of Jammu and Kashmir's special status, and in Supriyo Chakraborty (2023) it declined to recognise a right of same-sex couples to marry, leaving the question to Parliament. Several of these decisions came years after the challenges were filed, which raised a separate concern: delay in deciding politically significant cases can itself determine the outcome.

Legitimacy and dialogue

Alexander Bickel's "counter-majoritarian difficulty" frames the objection: courts that override legislatures act against the will of the people's representatives. Jeremy Waldron argues that in a society with working democratic institutions, disagreement about rights should be settled by legislatures. Ronald Dworkin's reply is that a constitution of principle requires judges to give its moral provisions their best reading. Comparative practice offers weaker forms: the United Kingdom's courts may only declare primary legislation incompatible with Convention rights, and Canada's legislatures may override some rulings under section 33 of the Charter.

India has strong-form review, but legislatures do respond. They may remove the basis of a judgment by changing the law, though they may not simply overrule it; Parliament did this after the Delhi services judgment (2023) and the Election Commission appointments judgment (2023), and earlier after the tribunals cases. Whether this is constitutional dialogue or defiance depends on whether the response engages the court's reasons or merely reverses its result.

Debates

Is strong-form judicial review compatible with democracy?

The democratic objection holds that rights are contested, that judges are no better placed than legislators to resolve disagreement about them, and that a court which can strike down even constitutional amendments has the last word in a way no elected body does.

The reply is that Indian democracy needs an institution that protects the conditions of democratic politics, the franchise, free speech, federalism and minority rights, from the majorities that benefit from eroding them, and that India's experience in 1975–77 shows the danger is real. Representation-reinforcing theories, associated with John Hart Ely, suggest a middle path: intensive review where the democratic process is at stake, deference elsewhere.

When Parliament legislates in response to a judgment, is that dialogue or defiance?

Legislative responses can improve on judicial remedies: after Vishaka the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace Act, 2013 built a statutory scheme on judicial guidelines. Other responses re-enact what was struck down with minor changes, as the Court found in the tribunals litigation, or narrow a judgment's effect, as with the 2023 Act that replaced the Chief Justice with a Union minister on the panel selecting Election Commissioners. The constitutional line is that a legislature may change the law that underlies a decision but cannot declare the decision itself void.

Prelims points

  • The phrase "judicial review" does not appear in the Constitution; the power rests on Articles 13, 32, 226 and the federal provisions.
  • Marbury v. Madison (1803) established judicial review in the United States.
  • L. Chandra Kumar (1997): judicial review is part of the basic structure.
  • Article 31B and the Ninth Schedule were added by the First Amendment (1951).
  • Waman Rao (1981) and I.R. Coelho (2007): Ninth Schedule laws added after 24 April 1973 can be reviewed.
  • S.R. Bommai (1994): a proclamation under Article 356 is subject to judicial review.
  • Electoral bonds case (2024): the scheme was struck down by a unanimous five-judge bench.
  • Proportionality test adopted in Modern Dental College (2016) and K.S. Puttaswamy (2017).
  • A legislature may remove the basis of a judgment by changing the law, but cannot simply overrule it.

In the UPSC papers

Asked by UPSC

1 question · 2026

  1. 2026 · PSIR I · Q7(b) · 15 marks

    Highlight any five constitutional provisions that restrain the powers of the executive, and evaluate their effectiveness in current times.

Verbatim from the official UPSC Main papers, linked to Judicial Review in the PYQ dataset.PYQ Intelligence →

Practice questions

  1. Q1UPSC Mains style15 marks· 250 words

    Judicial review in India is broader than in most democracies. Explain why and assess the consequences.

    How to approach it

    Explain textual and historical reasons (written, federal, rights-based constitution; the Emergency; basic structure), give examples of breadth, then assess benefits and costs including delay and legitimacy.

  2. Q2UPSC Mains style10 marks· 150 words

    Distinguish judicial review of legislation, of executive action and of constitutional amendments, with examples.

    How to approach it

    Set out the grounds and standard for each, with one case each (for example Shreya Singhal, Bommai, Kesavananda or NJAC).

  3. Q3UPSC Mains style15 marks· 250 words

    When Parliament legislates to undo a judgment, is it engaging in dialogue or defiance? Discuss.

    How to approach it

    State the constitutional rule on validating laws, contrast responsive and evasive examples, and apply a test of whether the legislature engaged the court's reasons.

Practice questions are original to this platform and are not previous year questions. For questions actually set by UPSC, see PYQ Intelligence.

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Sources

  1. 01The Constitution of India (as amended) (opens in a new tab). Legislative Department, Ministry of Law and Justice
  2. 02Judgments of the Supreme Court of India (opens in a new tab). Supreme Court of India
  3. 03H.M. Seervai, Constitutional Law of India (4th edn). Universal Law Publishing
  4. 04Sujit Choudhry, Madhav Khosla and Pratap Bhanu Mehta (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Indian Constitution (2016). Oxford University Press
  5. 05Jeremy Waldron, "The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review", Yale Law Journal 115 (2006)
  6. 06Ronald Dworkin, Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution (1996). Harvard University Press
  7. 07Pratap Bhanu Mehta, "The Rise of Judicial Sovereignty", Journal of Democracy 18(2) (2007)