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Landmark judgment · 2017

Shayara Bano (triple talaq)

By three to two the Court set aside instant triple talaq (talaq-e-biddat), though the majority divided on its reasons: two judges held it manifestly arbitrary under Article 14, a third held it contrary to the Quran.

Shayara Bano v. Union of India
Court
Supreme Court of India
Decided
22 August 2017
Bench
5-judge Constitution Bench
Citation
(2017) 9 SCC 1
Doctrine
Manifest arbitrariness

01The constitutional issue

Shayara Bano, divorced by her husband through instant triple talaq, petitioned the Court in 2016, challenging talaq-e-biddat, polygamy and nikah halala. The Court confined itself to talaq-e-biddat: a divorce pronounced in one sitting, immediately irrevocable.

The questions were whether the practice is protected by Article 25 as an essential part of religion, whether it is "law in force" subject to Part III by virtue of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937, and whether it violates Article 14.

02The decision

Nariman J, with Lalit J, held that the 1937 Act recognised and enforced triple talaq, making it a statutory law subject to Article 13. A form of divorce that is instant and irrevocable, leaving no room for reconciliation, is manifestly arbitrary and violates Article 14. Section 2 of the Act, to the extent it recognises and enforces triple talaq, is void. Nariman J thus held that legislation may be struck down for manifest arbitrariness, departing from McDowell (1996).

Kurian Joseph J reached the same result by a different route. Triple talaq, he held, is contrary to the Quran and therefore has no sanction in Islamic law; what is bad in theology cannot be good in law. He did not join the Article 14 reasoning.

Khehar CJ and Nazeer J dissented. Talaq-e-biddat, they held, has been part of the personal law of Sunni Muslims of the Hanafi school for centuries, is protected by Article 25 and is not subject to challenge as state action. They would have restrained its use for six months and asked Parliament to legislate.

03Significance

The case matters as much for its fragmentation as for its outcome: there was no majority reasoning. Its most durable legacy is doctrinal — the revival of manifest arbitrariness as a ground for invalidating legislation, used again in Navtej Singh Johar and Joseph Shine.

The debate it reflects is real. A liberal-egalitarian reading sees an overdue extension of equality to Muslim women. Others, including some Muslim women's groups that supported the outcome, warned that framing the issue through the State's criminal and constitutional power risks treating a minority's personal law as uniquely in need of correction, and preferred reform from within the community.

04What happened afterwards

The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019 declared talaq-e-biddat void and made its pronouncement an offence punishable with up to three years' imprisonment; challenges to the Act are pending. The older question whether uncodified personal law is "law" under Article 13, answered in the negative by the Bombay High Court in Narasu Appa Mali (1952), remains unresolved.

Why it matters for UPSC

Prelims: 3:2, 22 August 2017; the 2019 Act. In Mains, use it on personal law and Fundamental Rights, the essential religious practices test, gender justice and the Directive Principle of a uniform civil code under Article 44.

Explore further

Sources

  1. 01Supreme Court of India, judgment of 22 August 2017. Supreme Court of India
  2. 02Flavia Agnes, Law and Gender Inequality: The Politics of Women's Rights in India (Oxford University Press, 1999)