| LiberalismPSIR syllabus | Liberals see individuals as rational, self-interested and capable of choosing and revising their own ends, which is why they can be trusted with liberty. The tradition divides over how fixed these traits are. Classical liberals, from Locke to the utilitarians, treated people as largely pre-social bearers of natural rights or calculators of pleasure and pain, and Adam Smith relied on self-interest channelled by markets. Mill and the social liberals saw human beings as developmental, capable of growth through education, participation and experiment, and shaped by social conditions that politics can improve. Communitarian critics reply that both versions abstract an 'unencumbered' self from the communities that form it. | The state is a necessary evil or, at best, a trustee: an artificial creation of individuals, authorised by their consent to protect rights, and dangerous because it monopolises force. Locke's government holds power on trust and may be resisted if it breaks that trust. Classical liberals wanted a limited, night-watchman state bound by a constitution, the rule of law and the separation of powers, and Nozick revived the minimal state as the only one compatible with rights. Social liberals, from T. H. Green to Keynes and Beveridge, accepted an enabling state that provides education, health and social insurance so that citizens can use their freedoms. Rawlsian liberals ask the state to remain neutral among rival conceptions of the good life. | Liberty is the central value and the default: restrictions on it must be justified, not liberty itself. Classical liberals understand it negatively, as freedom from interference, protected by civil rights and by Mill's harm principle, which allows coercion only to prevent harm to others; Mill also prized individuality, the free development of each person's character. T. H. Green's positive freedom, a real capacity to do things worth doing, justified state action against poverty and ignorance. Isaiah Berlin's 'Two Concepts of Liberty' (1958) warned that positive liberty can be turned into coercion in the name of a person's 'real' self. Republican theorists such as Philip Pettit add a third idea, freedom as non-domination. | Liberals affirm equal moral worth, equal rights before the law and equality of opportunity, but not equality of outcome. The classical ideal is meritocratic: careers open to talent, with unequal rewards for unequal effort and ability. Liberal egalitarians argue that formal equality is not enough. Rawls's difference principle permits inequalities only if they benefit the least advantaged, and fair equality of opportunity requires public education and limits on inherited advantage. Libertarians such as Nozick reject redistribution as a violation of self-ownership. Liberal debates on affirmative action turn on whether it corrects past and structural disadvantage, the usual justification of Indian reservations, or departs from the equal treatment of individuals. | Justice is 'the first virtue of social institutions', in Rawls's phrase, and for liberals it is a matter of rights and fair rules rather than of a shared idea of the good. Rawls's justice as fairness, chosen behind a veil of ignorance, gives priority to equal basic liberties and then requires fair equality of opportunity and the difference principle. Nozick's entitlement theory holds that any distribution arising from just acquisition and voluntary transfer is just, whatever its pattern, and Hayek dismissed 'social justice' as a mirage in a market order. Amartya Sen's The Idea of Justice (2009) turns from designing ideal institutions to comparing the real lives and capabilities people can achieve. | Liberalism and democracy are allies but not identical. Early liberals feared majority tyranny and rule by the propertyless: Mill defended representative government yet proposed plural votes for the educated, and Madison and Tocqueville designed or analysed checks on popular majorities. Liberal democracy combines universal suffrage and competitive elections with constitutional limits, protected rights, an independent judiciary and a free press. Within the tradition, Robert Dahl's pluralism describes democracy as competition among many groups, or polyarchy; Schumpeter reduced it to competition for leadership; Rawls and Habermas add public reason and deliberation. The contemporary debate concerns 'illiberal democracy', in which elected governments erode the liberal half of the combination. | Liberals locate the main danger in concentrated political power, above all the state's, and their answer is to divide and check it: constitutionalism, the separation of powers, federalism, judicial review, rights and free elections. Lord Acton's warning in 1887 that power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely, condenses the tradition's instinct. Pluralists such as Dahl argued that power in liberal democracies is dispersed among competing groups, and markets were defended as dispersing economic power. Critics reply that liberals underrate private power, of corporations, employers and husbands. Social liberals and republicans have accordingly extended liberal suspicion to monopolies, money in politics and domination outside the state. | Private property and markets are defended as both efficient and protective of liberty, because they disperse economic power and give individuals an independent livelihood. Adam Smith's invisible hand and the case for free trade made classical liberalism the economics of the commercial and industrial middle classes. Social liberals accepted Keynesian demand management, progressive taxation and a welfare state to correct market failure and secure real opportunity. From the late 1970s neoliberals, drawing on Hayek and Friedman, revived privatisation, deregulation, independent central banks and free capital flows, the agenda later summed up as the Washington Consensus. The financial crisis of 2008 reopened the internal debate over inequality, the regulation of finance and the limits of globalisation. | Change should come through reform: law, elections, education, free discussion and markets, under the rule of law and with respect for rights. Liberals believe in progress, the capacity of reason and experience to improve institutions and people, which separates them from conservatives. They defended revolutions against tyranny, as in 1688 and 1776, and Locke allowed a right of resistance when government breaks its trust. But they distrust utopian projects that sacrifice present individuals to a future ideal; Karl Popper's The Open Society and Its Enemies (1945) defended 'piecemeal social engineering' instead. Neoliberals and social liberals dispute the direction of change more than its method, and both prefer constitutional channels. |
|---|
| Conservatism | Conservatives hold an imperfect view of human nature. Traditional conservatives see human beings as limited and dependent creatures who seek security, familiarity and belonging more than abstract freedom; some, drawing on original sin or on Hobbes, stress a capacity for selfishness and disorder that only institutions restrain. Most important is intellectual imperfection: the social world is too complex for any individual's reason to grasp, so Burke preferred the 'latent wisdom' of prejudice and inherited practice to speculative reason, and Oakeshott contrasted practical knowledge with the rationalist's technique. The New Right's liberal wing breaks with this, treating individuals as rational, self-interested market actors, while its neoconservative wing keeps the older pessimism about moral order. | Conservatives defend a state strong enough to secure order and authority, but usually limited in its ambitions. For Burke the state is a partnership across generations, between the living, the dead and those yet to be born, which no single generation may dissolve at will. Traditional conservatives accept authority as natural and hierarchical, and authoritarian strands, from Maistre to the continental defenders of throne and altar, exalt it. One-nation conservatives from Disraeli to the post-war Tory reformers accepted a paternalist state that relieves poverty in order to preserve social cohesion. The New Right sought what Andrew Gamble called the free economy and the strong state: less economic intervention, combined with firm law, order and defence. | Conservatives value liberty, but as an inheritance rather than an abstract right. Burke defended the liberties of Englishmen as an 'entailed inheritance', grounded in prescription and the constitution, against the French Revolution's rights of man, which he thought would dissolve all restraint. For most conservatives freedom is ordered liberty: it presupposes authority, law, morality and the willing acceptance of duties, and is secured by institutions such as the family, the church and private property. Libertarian conservatives and the New Right's liberal wing give priority to economic freedom, while traditionalists and neoconservatives defend restrictions on personal conduct in the name of social order. The two strands coexist uneasily. | Conservatives regard inequality as natural and, within limits, beneficial. Societies are organic hierarchies in which people have different talents, roles and stations, and attempts to impose equality of outcome are seen as utopian and coercive. Paternalist conservatives join hierarchy to obligation: privilege brings duties towards the less fortunate, as in noblesse oblige and Disraeli's warning against two nations. The New Right accepts legal equality and equality of opportunity but defends the inequalities markets produce as rewards for effort and incentives for enterprise. Corey Robin and other critics argue that conservatism is at bottom a defence of hierarchy against movements of subordinate groups; conservatives reply that they defend institutions, not privilege. | Conservatives are sceptical of social justice understood as a pattern of distribution designed by the state. Justice means giving people their due according to law, desert, custom and settled expectations, and protecting property and inheritance against confiscation. Burke defended prescription, title grounded in long possession, against the abstract rights of revolutionaries, and Oakeshott saw the rule of law as a framework of non-instrumental rules rather than a plan for redistribution. Paternalist and Christian Democratic conservatives accept a duty to relieve need and speak of social justice in the language of charity, solidarity and subsidiarity. New Right conservatives follow Hayek in treating market outcomes as neither just nor unjust. | Conservatives have accepted representative democracy, but with reservations about popular majorities and abstract rights. Burke told the electors of Bristol in 1774 that a representative owes them his judgement, not obedience to their instructions, and conservatives prefer a mixed constitution in which tradition, property, a second chamber, courts and established churches temper the popular will. They fear that democracy unchecked becomes demagoguery or majority tyranny, and that politicians will buy votes with public money. Yet conservative parties became some of the most successful democratic parties of the twentieth century. Populist conservatives now appeal directly to 'the people' against judges, experts and liberal elites, a turn traditionalists often view with suspicion. | Conservatives accept power and authority as natural and necessary, because without them social order dissolves. They are not indifferent to its abuse: Burke condemned the arbitrary power of the East India Company and pursued the impeachment of Warren Hastings, and conservatives prize the inherited institutions, monarchy, church, aristocracy, local communities and the common law, that diffuse and restrain it. Power exercised through tradition is trusted more than power claimed in the name of abstract reason or the general will. Critics such as Corey Robin argue that conservatism is chiefly a defence of private power, of masters over servants, owners over workers and husbands over wives, against challenges from below. | Conservatives have no single economic doctrine, and the tradition's internal debate is sharpest here. Burke defended property and inheritance as foundations of a stable society, but also accepted commerce. Paternalist and one-nation conservatives, from Disraeli to the post-war consensus and continental Christian Democracy's social market economy, accepted regulation, welfare and a mixed economy as the price of social cohesion. The New Right of Thatcher and Reagan embraced free markets, privatisation, tax cuts and trade-union reform, borrowing from liberals such as Hayek, who himself refused the conservative label. Since the 2010s national-conservatives have turned again towards protection, industrial policy and scepticism of free trade, reopening the old debate. | Conservatives favour change that is gradual, organic and continuous with what exists. Burke wrote that 'a state without the means of some change is without the means of its conservation': reform is the way to preserve, which is why he could sympathise with the American colonists while condemning the French Revolution's attempt to rebuild society from first principles. Oakeshott preferred small, slow changes that pursue the 'intimations' of an existing tradition. Huntington argued in 1957 that conservatism is positional, defending existing institutions whenever they are fundamentally challenged, whatever their content. The New Right complicates the picture: Thatcherism was radical, setting out to reverse the post-war consensus rather than conserve it. |
|---|
| SocialismPSIR syllabus | Socialists see human beings as social creatures whose character is shaped by circumstances rather than fixed by nature. Robert Owen argued that changing the environment, through education and cooperative work, would change people, and Marx held that human nature itself develops historically through labour. Competitive selfishness is therefore read as a product of capitalism, not a permanent trait, and cooperation, solidarity and fraternity as capacities that a different economic order could release. Democratic socialists hold this view more cautiously. Ethical socialists such as R. H. Tawney grounded equality in the equal moral worth of persons, and revisionists accepted that incentives and self-interest will persist under any feasible economy. | Socialists divide most sharply over the state. Marxists see the existing state as an instrument of class rule to be captured, transformed and finally allowed to wither away; anarchist socialists reject it altogether as a source of domination in its own right. Democratic socialists and social democrats treat the democratic state as the main agent of equality, through public ownership of key industries, planning, progressive taxation and universal welfare services. Fabians trusted expert administration from above, while guild socialists and later advocates of workers' control preferred decentralised, self-governing institutions. Post-colonial socialists added the developmental state, which plans investment and builds industry in a poor economy, as in Nehru's India. | Freedom means the real capacity to live a full life, which requires freedom from want, insecurity and exploitation, not merely from legal interference. Liberal freedom is formal for those without property: the worker is free to sell labour or to starve. The socialist case for public services, social insurance and shorter working hours is therefore a case for positive liberty, and Tawney warned that freedom for the pike is death for the minnows. Democratic socialists insist that civil and political liberties must be preserved and extended into the workplace, against the record of authoritarian communism; libertarian socialists put self-management and freedom from bureaucracy at the centre. | Equality is socialism's defining value, and it means substantive social and economic equality, not only equal rights or opportunities. Large inequalities of wealth produce unequal power, unequal access to education and culture, and a divided society. Tawney's Equality (1931) argued that a common culture requires narrowing differences of income and status, while accepting differences that serve a social function. Social democrats pursue greater equality through progressive taxation and universal services; more radical socialists aim at distribution according to need. In India, Ram Manohar Lohia and Ambedkar insisted that equality must reach caste and gender as well as class, or it would remain partial. | Socialists equate justice with social justice: a fair distribution of resources, burdens and opportunities, judged by need and the equal worth of persons rather than by market outcomes. Capitalism is unjust because it rewards ownership rather than contribution or need, and because inherited wealth and class decide life chances. The formula popularised by Louis Blanc and later used by Marx, from each according to ability, to each according to needs, expresses the radical ideal; Fabians and social democrats sought justice through progressive taxation, universal welfare and labour rights. G. A. Cohen's Why Not Socialism? (2009) defends a socialist equality of opportunity that neutralises unchosen disadvantage, tempered by a principle of community. | Democratic socialists want to extend democracy from politics into the economy and society, through industrial democracy, workers' participation, cooperatives and public control of capital; without economic equality, they argue, political equality is hollow. Social democrats committed themselves to parliamentary democracy and built welfare states by winning elections. Revolutionary socialists dismissed parliamentary democracy as bourgeois, and Leninist states replaced it with the rule of a vanguard party claiming to represent the working class. Guild socialists and council communists proposed democracy through workplace and local councils. Whether socialism can be achieved, and then kept, through elections divided the movement throughout the twentieth century. | Socialists locate decisive power in the ownership and control of economic resources. Those who own capital shape investment, employment and the media and, through money and lobbying, influence the state, so that political equality coexists with economic oligarchy. The remedy is to democratise economic power: public ownership, trade unions as a countervailing power, collective bargaining, planning and workers' participation in management. Democratic socialists use the existing state to do this; revolutionary socialists believe the state must first be captured or replaced; anarchist socialists warn that state ownership merely transfers power to bureaucrats, the 'new class' that Milovan Djilas later described in communist states (1957). | The economy should serve need rather than profit. Socialists propose very different means to that end: full common ownership and central planning; nationalisation of the 'commanding heights' alongside a private sector, as in post-war Britain and Nehruvian India; cooperatives and workers' self-management, as in Yugoslavia; and market socialism, which keeps markets but socialises capital. Social democrats came to accept the mixed economy and the market as the engine of growth, and sought equality through taxation, public services and collective bargaining; the 'Third Way' of the 1990s moved further towards markets. Eco-socialists now argue that production must also be planned within ecological limits. | Socialists divide between revolution and reform. Marxists and Leninists expect a revolutionary break, because ruling classes will not surrender power peacefully. The Fabians spoke of the 'inevitability of gradualness' and worked through research, persuasion and legislation; Eduard Bernstein held that the movement towards socialism mattered more than any final goal and could advance through democratic reform; post-war social democrats changed society through elections, legislation and the welfare state. Utopian socialists hoped to persuade by the example of model communities. In India, socialists combined parliamentary work with mass action, from the Congress Socialists' part in the Quit India movement of 1942 to Lohia's civil disobedience and JP's 'total revolution'. |
|---|
| MarxismPSIR syllabus | For Marx there is no fixed human essence outside history: human nature is social and is made and remade through labour. The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 describe species-being, the capacity for free, conscious and creative production, which capitalism turns into alienation from the product, from the activity of work, from fellow workers and from the species itself. Needs, characters and ideas change with the mode of production, and the sixth thesis on Feuerbach (1845) calls the human essence, in its reality, the ensemble of social relations. Marxists disagree about the early writings: Althusser saw an epistemological break between them and the mature 'science', while Lukács, the Frankfurt School and humanist Marxists placed alienation and emancipation at the centre. | The state is an organ of class rule. The Manifesto calls the executive of the modern state a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie, while Marx's writings on Bonapartism allow the state some autonomy when classes are evenly balanced. Twentieth-century Marxists debated the point: Ralph Miliband stressed the class ties of state personnel, Nicos Poulantzas argued that the state is structurally bound to reproduce capitalism whoever staffs it. After revolution a proletarian state, modelled on the Paris Commune, would suppress the old ruling class and then wither away. Leninist practice produced instead a one-party state that grew rather than withered, which Marxist critics from Luxemburg to Trotsky attacked. | Freedom is emancipation, not merely the absence of restraint. In On the Jewish Question (1843) Marx distinguished political emancipation, the grant of equal rights in the state, from human emancipation, which requires overcoming the egoism and domination of civil society. Liberal rights of property and contract protect the bourgeois individual and conceal the economic compulsion of wage labour. Real freedom is collective control over the conditions of life and the reduction of necessary labour: the 'realm of freedom' begins, Capital says, only where labour determined by necessity ends. In practice Marxist–Leninist regimes curtailed civil and political liberties severely, a record that Luxemburg, Western Marxists and Eurocommunists criticised. | Marxism aims not at equal shares of income but at the abolition of classes, the root of inequality. In the Critique of the Gotha Programme (1875) Marx argued that even an equal right to the product of one's labour remains a 'bourgeois right', a right of inequality, because people differ in ability and in needs. The first phase of communism would distribute according to work; the higher phase, beyond scarcity, according to need. Marx was dismissive of abstract equality as a political slogan, but later Marxists, notably G. A. Cohen, reconstructed the tradition as a theory of egalitarian justice. Ambedkar and Indian Marxists debated whether class analysis can explain caste inequality. | Whether Marx thought capitalism unjust is a famous dispute. Allen Wood argued in 1972 that Marx treated justice as a juridical standard internal to each mode of production, so that the wage relation is not unjust by capitalism's own standards; Marx himself mocked appeals to 'fair distribution' in the Critique of the Gotha Programme. Others, surveyed by Norman Geras in 1985, reply that Marx's language of robbery and exploitation implies a standard of justice that transcends any one mode of production. Analytical Marxists recast exploitation as the unjust appropriation of unpaid labour. Many Marxists still prefer the language of emancipation, holding that justice belongs to the era of scarcity that communism would end. | Liberal democracy is a form of bourgeois rule: formal political equality coexists with economic domination, and elections leave the ownership of the means of production untouched. Yet Marx saw in the Paris Commune of 1871, with its elected, recallable officials paid workers' wages, the political form at last discovered for the emancipation of labour. Lenin's democratic centralism concentrated power in the party, and Soviet 'people's democracy' became one-party rule. Rosa Luxemburg warned that freedom only for the government's supporters is no freedom at all. Later Marxists divided between Eurocommunists, who accepted pluralist democracy, and critics who believed the parliamentary road absorbed the working class into capitalism. | Power is class power, rooted in the relations of production: the class that owns the means of production also dominates politics and ideas, since the ruling ideas of each age are those of its ruling class. The state is the organised expression of that power, though Marxists debate whether it is an instrument of capitalists, as Miliband argued, or a structure that serves capital whoever runs it, as Poulantzas argued. Gramsci's hegemony explains how rule rests on consent organised in civil society as well as on coercion, which helps explain why revolution failed in the West. Power is to be transformed rather than checked: through revolution, the dictatorship of the proletariat and finally the abolition of classes. | Capitalism is a historically specific mode of production in which workers, separated from the means of production, sell their labour power, and capital appropriates the surplus value they create. It is dynamic and productive, but prone to crises of overproduction, to a falling rate of profit, to concentration and to the periodic destruction of capital, and it is therefore transitional. It is to be replaced by social ownership of the means of production and conscious planning for need: distribution according to work in the first phase of communism, according to need in the higher phase. Soviet central planning was the main historical form; China since 1978 combines Communist Party rule with extensive markets, which Marxists dispute as socialism. | History moves through contradictions between the productive forces and the relations of production, fought out in class struggle; when the relations become fetters on the forces, Marx wrote in the 1859 Preface, an epoch of social revolution begins. Revolution, not reform, is the decisive moment, followed by a transitional dictatorship of the proletariat. Marxists divide on agency and timing. Kautsky's orthodoxy waited for capitalism to mature; Lenin's vanguard seized power in a backward country; Mao relied on the peasantry and protracted war; Gramsci argued that in the West a long 'war of position' for hegemony must precede any 'war of manoeuvre'. Determinist and voluntarist readings remain in tension. |
|---|
| Anarchism | Anarchists are often accused of utopian optimism, but their views of human nature vary. Social anarchists such as Peter Kropotkin argued in Mutual Aid (1902) that cooperation is as much a factor in evolution as competition, so that human beings are naturally sociable and capable of order without command. Godwin trusted reason to lead people to justice through discussion. Individualist anarchists, from Stirner to the anarcho-capitalists, start instead from the sovereign, self-owning individual. What unites them is a claim about corruption: power and authority deform both rulers and ruled, so that the selfishness used to justify the state is largely a product of the state and of unequal property. | Anarchism is defined by its rejection of the state, understood as a compulsory, sovereign institution claiming what Weber called a monopoly of legitimate force. Anarchists deny that this claim can be justified. Proudhon catalogued the indignities of being governed, Bakunin saw every state as the rule of a minority, and Robert Paul Wolff argued in 1970 that individual autonomy is incompatible with any general duty to obey. The state is not the remedy for disorder but a source of it, sustaining privilege, war and property. Philosophical anarchists may tolerate existing institutions while denying their legitimacy; political anarchists seek to replace them with voluntary associations, federations and mutual aid. | Liberty is the supreme value and is incompatible with authority imposed from outside. Bakunin held that he was truly free only when all others were equally free, so that liberty is social rather than merely individual. Social anarchists see freedom realised in voluntary cooperation, free association and the absence of exploitation; individualist anarchists such as Stirner and Benjamin Tucker stress the sovereignty of the individual and the freedom to own and exchange. Anarchists reject the liberal bargain in which liberty is protected by a state that also threatens it, and they extend the critique of domination beyond the state to the church, the patriarchal family, capitalism and, for green anarchists, industrial technology. | Anarchists treat equality and liberty as inseparable: there can be no real freedom where some command and others obey, or where some own and others must work for them. Social anarchists seek economic as well as political equality, through common ownership and distribution according to need, and reject hierarchies of gender, race and religion as forms of authority. Anarchist practice builds equality into organisation itself, through consensus decision-making, the rotation of tasks and the refusal of permanent leaders, so that means prefigure ends. Individualist anarchists accept unequal outcomes from free exchange; social anarchists reply that such inequality recreates domination and would need something like a state to defend it. | Anarchists see the state and capitalist property as the chief sources of injustice, so that justice cannot be delivered by the institutions that cause it. Godwin's Enquiry Concerning Political Justice (1793) argued that impartial reason, not law, should guide conduct, and that property belongs to whoever needs it most. Proudhon called property theft when it lets owners live off the labour of others. Kropotkin's anarcho-communism distributes according to need, and anarchists favour restorative, community-based responses to harm over prisons and punishment. Anarcho-capitalists, by contrast, define justice as respect for self-ownership and voluntary contract: the libertarian principle carried to its limit, without a state to enforce it. | Anarchists reject representative democracy as rule by a minority that claims to speak for all: elections periodically choose masters but do not abolish mastery, and majority rule still coerces minorities. In its place they propose direct democracy and federalism from below: face-to-face assemblies, councils, consensus decision-making and recallable delegates, joined in wider federations by free agreement. Anarchist practice has influenced democratic theory through prefigurative politics, the effort to embody the desired society in the way a movement organises itself, visible in the Spanish collectives of 1936, the alter-globalisation movement and Occupy (2011). Critics ask how such assemblies could coordinate large and complex societies. | Anarchists regard power exercised as command, whether by state, church, capital or patriarch, as the root of social evil, and they distrust its concentration in any hands, revolutionary ones included. Bakunin predicted that a workers' state would produce a new ruling class, a prophecy anarchists saw confirmed when the Bolsheviks crushed the Kronstadt rising in 1921. Anarchists do not reject every form of power: they distinguish domination from the collective power of people acting together, and from authority based on knowledge that one may freely accept, Bakunin's example being the bootmaker's authority over boots. Post-anarchists draw on Foucault to argue that power is diffuse, so resistance must be too. | Anarchists differ most over the economy. Proudhon's mutualism favoured small property, cooperatives and free credit; Bakunin's collectivism and Kropotkin's anarcho-communism called for common ownership and distribution according to need; anarcho-syndicalists made trade unions the organs of production, as in the collectivised industries and farms of Catalonia and Aragon in 1936–37. Individualist anarchists defended private property and markets without the state, and anarcho-capitalists such as Murray Rothbard and David Friedman would privatise even law and defence. Social anarchists reject this as a contradiction, because capitalist property is for them itself a form of domination that depends on coercion. Most anarchists favour decentralised, self-managed production. | Anarchists reject the conquest of state power as a means of change, because means shape ends: a revolution that builds a new state will reproduce domination. Strategies vary. Insurrectionary anarchists of the late nineteenth century pursued 'propaganda by the deed', including the assassinations of a French president, an Italian king and an American president between 1894 and 1901, which isolated the movement. Anarcho-syndicalists relied on the general strike and union organisation; pacifist anarchists such as Tolstoy on non-violent refusal; educators such as Francisco Ferrer on free schools. Most contemporary anarchists favour prefigurative politics, building cooperatives, mutual aid networks and assemblies now, forming, in the old syndicalist phrase, the new society within the shell of the old. |
|---|
| Nationalism | Nationalists treat human beings as culturally embedded creatures who become fully human within a particular community of language, memory and custom. Herder held that each people has its own distinctive spirit, and that belonging to it is a basic human need rather than a prejudice to be outgrown. This sets nationalism against liberal and Marxist universalism, though liberal nationalists such as Yael Tamir and David Miller argue that identity and choice are compatible: people choose within cultures they did not choose. Modernist scholars reply that national identity is not natural but made, by industrialisation, print and mass education, and integral and racial nationalisms turned the need to belong into a doctrine of exclusion. | Nationalism's central political claim concerns the state: each nation should govern itself, ideally in a state of its own, which Ernest Gellner summarised as the congruence of the national and the political unit. Liberal nationalists such as Mazzini treated the nation-state as the natural vehicle of popular sovereignty and constitutional government. Conservative nationalists value the state as the guardian of a historic community; integral nationalists exalt it above individuals, and in fascism the nation-state became an object of worship. Anti-colonial nationalists sought the state as the instrument of freedom and development. Multinational democracies complicate the principle: India, Spain and Canada house several nations in one state through federalism and asymmetry. | Nationalism understands freedom primarily as collective self-determination: a people's right to govern itself, free of foreign rule. Liberal nationalists, from Mazzini and Mill to Tamir, join this to individual liberty, arguing that free institutions and personal autonomy flourish best in a self-governing nation with a shared public culture. Anti-colonial nationalism made national freedom the precondition of every other freedom. But national liberty can conflict with individual liberty, as when minorities, dissenters or 'anti-national' critics are treated as threats, and conservative and integral nationalists readily subordinate personal freedom to unity. Tagore warned that the nation, as an organisation of power, could become a machine that crushed the freedom of the spirit. | Nationalism asserts the equality of nations: each people, large or small, has an equal right to self-determination, a principle that anti-colonial movements and the UN Charter turned against empire. Within the nation it offers equality of membership, the dignity of being a full citizen of a sovereign people, which helped dissolve older hierarchies of estate and subjecthood. But national equality is bounded. Ethnic, religious and racial nationalisms rank insiders above outsiders and minorities, and even civic nationalism can treat newcomers as conditional members. Liberal nationalists argue that national solidarity sustains welfare and redistribution among compatriots; cosmopolitans reply that it privileges compatriots arbitrarily over the global poor. | Nationalism locates justice first in the claims of nations: the injustice of alien rule, of divided or dispossessed peoples, and of humiliations to be redressed. Self-determination is its central demand of justice. Within the nation, liberal nationalists such as David Miller argue that social justice is a national project, because the trust and solidarity that redistribution requires are strongest among compatriots, and that duties to fellow nationals legitimately exceed duties to outsiders. Cosmopolitan critics reply that nationality is morally arbitrary, like class or caste. Nationalism also generates rival claims of justice: one nation's restoration of historic rights can be another people's dispossession, as many territorial conflicts show. | Nationalism and democracy grew up together: the French Revolution made the nation the sovereign people, and popular sovereignty presupposes an answer to the question of who the people are. Liberal nationalists argue that democracy needs a demos bound by shared identity, language and trust, as Mill suggested in 1861. But nationalism can also undermine democracy by defining the demos against minorities, treating dissent as disloyalty or concentrating power in leaders who claim to embody the nation. Multinational democracies, of which India is the most significant, show that democracy can work across nations through federalism and minority rights, an arrangement that Alfred Stepan, Juan Linz and Yogendra Yadav call a 'state-nation'. | Nationalism treats the nation as the rightful source of sovereign power and judges every regime by whether it expresses the nation's will. It has been a formidable instrument of mobilisation, able to unite classes and regions against empires and to legitimate new states. Gellner, John Breuilly and Eric Hobsbawm emphasise the role of elites and states in making nations from above, and Michael Billig's Banal Nationalism (1995) shows how flags, maps and everyday language keep national power unnoticed. Because nationalists claim to speak for an indivisible people, they can delegitimise opposition and minorities, and in its integral forms nationalism concentrates power in leaders who claim to embody the nation. | Nationalism has no fixed economics, but it subordinates the economy to national power, unity or self-reliance. Friedrich List's National System of Political Economy (1841) defended tariffs to protect infant industries against British free trade, as Alexander Hamilton had argued for the United States. Anti-colonial nationalists, from Dadabhai Naoroji's drain theory to the swadeshi movement, linked economic exploitation to foreign rule and sought economic independence, often through planning and import substitution. Liberal nationalists can accept free trade among nation-states. Since the 2010s economic nationalism has returned in tariffs, reshoring and industrial policy, justified as protecting national security, jobs and supply chains against the effects of globalisation. | Nationalism has pursued change by every method: constitutional agitation and petition, mass movements and civil disobedience, armed insurrection, wars of unification or liberation, and secession through referendums. Its narrative is typically one of awakening and rebirth, in which a people discovers or recovers its identity and claims statehood. Liberal nationalists favour peaceful self-determination and the redrawing of borders by consent; integral and expansionist nationalists justify war and the absorption of territory. Modernist scholars observe that nationalism often creates the nations it claims to awaken, through schools, armies, maps and media. Once states exist, nationalism tends to turn conservative, defending existing borders and the territorial status quo. |
|---|
| FascismPSIR syllabus | Fascist doctrine treated human beings as creatures of will, instinct and emotion rather than reason, who find meaning only by merging into the nation or race. It drew on currents hostile to the Enlightenment: Sorel's myths, social Darwinism, racial theory and the belief that struggle, not discussion, reveals human worth. Inequality between individuals and between peoples was held to be natural. Italian Fascism promised to forge a 'new man', disciplined, heroic and devoted to the collective, through schooling, youth organisations and militarised ritual; Nazism made biology decisive and classified human beings by race, with genocidal consequences. Arendt read totalitarianism as an attempt to destroy human plurality and spontaneity. | Italian Fascism made the state an ethical absolute in Giovanni Gentile's sense: the state creates the nation's will and gives the individual moral reality, summed up in Mussolini's formula of everything within the state, nothing outside the state and nothing against the state. Nazism inverted the order, placing the racial community above the state, which became a tool of the movement. Both regimes concentrated authority in a leader and a single party, abolished the separation of powers and subordinated courts, unions and local government. In practice the Italian state shared power with the monarchy, the Church and industrialists, while the Nazi state fragmented into competing agencies loyal to Hitler. | Fascism rejected individual liberty as selfish, decadent and the product of liberal individualism. Gentile and Mussolini redefined freedom as the individual's fulfilment through service to the nation and the state: the individual is free only as part of the collective will that the state embodies. Nazism made membership of the racial community the condition of any rights at all. Civil liberties, free speech, a free press, independent trade unions and opposition parties were suppressed through decree, censorship, secret police and camps. Scholars treat this redefinition as the sharpest contrast with liberalism: what liberals called freedom, fascists called disorder, and what fascists called freedom, their critics called total subordination. | Fascism affirmed hierarchy as natural and desirable: between leader and led, elite and masses, men and women and, in Nazism, between races. It offered equality only of belonging within the national community, a solidarity of comrades defined by excluding enemies, minorities and those deemed racially or biologically inferior. Fascist rhetoric attacked class privilege and promised a people's community above class, but hierarchies of property largely survived, and women were assigned to motherhood and the home. Under Nazism legal inequality became a principle of the state: the Nuremberg Laws of 1935 stripped Jews of citizenship and marked a stage in the progressive exclusion that led to persecution and genocide. | Fascism rejected justice as impartial rules protecting individuals equally. Law was to serve the nation or race, and its content was whatever the leader and the movement judged necessary for the national community. After the political murders of the Night of the Long Knives in 1934, the jurist Carl Schmitt defended them in an essay titled 'The Führer Protects the Law', presenting the leader as supreme judge. Ernst Fraenkel's The Dual State (1941) described a Nazi 'normative state' that still applied ordinary law alongside a 'prerogative state' of arbitrary measures, which prevailed whenever the two clashed. Italian Fascism spoke of social justice in its Labour Charter, but subordinated it to production and order. | Fascists despised parliamentary democracy as weak, divisive and captured by special interests, yet they came to power partly through elections and through alliances with conservative elites who expected to control them. Once in power they abolished competitive elections, parties and a free press, and ruled through plebiscites, mass rallies, youth movements and propaganda that mobilised the people while denying them any real choice. Fascist theorists claimed that the leader embodied the nation's will more truly than any vote, so that acclamation replaced election. Contemporary scholars debate how far today's radical right, which competes in elections rather than seeking to abolish them, should be analysed through this history. | Fascism sought total power, concentrated in a leader, a single party and its militia, and justified it as the expression of the nation's will. It used terror, propaganda, mass ritual and, in Nazi Germany, the 'coordination' (Gleichschaltung) of every institution to eliminate independent centres of power. Historians stress that the reality was less monolithic. Mussolini shared power with the monarchy, the Church and industrialists, and the king dismissed him in July 1943. Nazi rule was a 'polycracy' of rival agencies, and Ian Kershaw's account of officials 'working towards the Führer' (1993), drawing on Weber's idea of charismatic authority, explains how radicalisation came from below as subordinates anticipated Hitler's wishes. | Fascism rejected both laissez-faire liberalism and socialist class struggle, claiming a third way that would subordinate economic life to national power. Italian corporatism organised employers and workers into state-supervised syndicates and, from 1934, corporations, under principles set out in the Labour Charter of 1927; strikes and independent unions were banned, the corporations had little real power and industrialists kept considerable autonomy. Nazi Germany pursued rearmament and autarky through the Four-Year Plan of 1936, plundered occupied Europe and expropriated Jewish property. Private ownership largely survived, on condition that it served the regime's goals. Historians debate whether this was a distinct economic system or a militarised capitalism directed by the state. | Fascism presented itself as revolutionary: a violent break with liberal decadence and a national rebirth to be achieved through will, myth and action rather than programme or debate. Roger Griffin's concept of palingenesis captures this promise of regeneration, and squads, street violence and the cult of struggle were central to the method rather than incidental. In practice fascists reached power through crises, electoral gains and bargains with conservative elites, not by overthrowing the state from outside, and once in power they combined radical rhetoric with accommodation to big business, the army and the Church. Robert Paxton's stages, from movement to regime to radicalisation or entropy, describe this trajectory. |
|---|
| GandhismPSIR syllabus | Gandhism holds that human beings are essentially moral and spiritual, and that the capacity for truth exists in everyone, opponents included. People are capable of self-discipline and of being moved by suffering voluntarily borne, which is why satyagraha seeks conversion rather than coercion. Gandhi was not naively optimistic: he acknowledged the brute in man and saw moral life as a continuing struggle, writing in 'The Doctrine of the Sword' (1920) that non-violence is the law of the human species as violence is the law of the brute. Because no one possesses the whole truth, humility and openness to the opponent are moral requirements. Critics such as Orwell thought this anthropology underestimated opponents who could not be shamed. | Gandhi described the state as violence in a concentrated and organised form, a soulless machine that could never be weaned from the force to which it owed its existence. Gandhism therefore aims to minimise and decentralise it. The ideal is an 'enlightened anarchy' in which each person rules themselves and no coercive state is needed; the practical aim is gram swaraj, a federation of self-governing village republics arranged as an 'oceanic circle' rather than a pyramid. Gandhi nevertheless accepted a constitutional state for free India, and his heirs divided: Vinoba Bhave and Jayaprakash Narayan pursued decentralised, partyless democracy, while Nehru built a strong developmental state. | Freedom is swaraj, which Gandhi used in a double sense: the independence of the nation, and self-rule over one's own desires, without which political independence would be hollow. It includes the individual's right, indeed duty, to disobey unjust laws in conscience, openly and non-violently, accepting the penalty, and independence from domination by the state, the market and machines. Freedom is therefore bound up with self-discipline and with duties: Gandhi held that rights worth having flow from duties well performed. Ambedkar objected that this moral conception gave too little weight to legal rights, and that freeing Dalits from social domination required state power rather than conversion. | All human beings share the same spiritual essence and deserve equal respect; all religions merit equal regard; and all labour, the scavenger's or the lawyer's, has equal dignity. Untouchability was for Gandhi a sin, and economic equality the master key to non-violent independence, as the Constructive Programme (1941) put it. But Gandhian equality works through moral conversion and voluntary sacrifice rather than rights enforced by the state. His long defence of varna as a division of labour without hierarchy is its most contested element: Ambedkar saw it as a defence of caste, while those who see Gandhi's views evolving cite his later support for inter-caste marriage. | Justice for Gandhi is sarvodaya, the welfare of all, the title of his 1908 Gujarati paraphrase of Ruskin's Unto This Last, from which he took the lessons that the good of the individual is contained in the good of all and that a barber's work has the same value as a lawyer's. The test of any policy, in the 'talisman' found among his last notes, is its effect on the poorest and weakest person. Justice is to be achieved through truth and non-violence, by converting the unjust through satyagraha and by voluntary trusteeship, not by coercive expropriation. Ambedkar replied that justice for Dalits required constitutional rights and the annihilation of caste, not a change of heart among the privileged. | Democracy must be built from below. Gandhi's ideal was gram swaraj, a federation of self-governing villages in which power flows outward from the village to wider circles, so that the weakest have the same opportunity as the strongest. Democracy cannot rest on violence; it requires decentralisation, consensus where possible and respect for individual conscience, since in matters of conscience, Gandhi held, the law of the majority has no place. In January 1948 he proposed that the Congress dissolve itself into a Lok Sevak Sangh, a society of public servants. Jayaprakash Narayan's partyless democracy and the panchayati raj of the 73rd Amendment are its later echoes. | Gandhi located power in the cooperation of the governed. In Hind Swaraj (1909) he argued that the English had not taken India but that Indians had given it to them and kept them there, so that withdrawing cooperation could end any regime. Satyagraha is a form of power, 'soul force', that coerces no one but converts through self-suffering, and Gandhi contrasted it with 'brute force'. Power should be decentralised to villages so that it cannot be monopolised. Gene Sharp later systematised this consent theory of power into a strategy of non-violent action (1973), and Hannah Arendt's distinction between power, which arises from people acting together, and violence echoes the same insight. | Gandhian economics subordinates production to ethics. Swadeshi asks people to serve their immediate neighbours first and rely on local production; khadi and village industries were meant to give work to the rural poor and break dependence on imported manufactures. Production should meet needs rather than multiply wants, and machinery is acceptable only where it does not displace labour or concentrate wealth. Bread labour, the duty of everyone to do some physical work, joins economics to morality. Trusteeship asks owners to hold wealth for the good of society, voluntarily or, as Gandhi later accepted, under legal regulation. J. C. Kumarappa's 'economy of permanence' gave these ideas an ecological dimension. | Change comes through satyagraha and the constructive programme. Satyagraha resists injustice by non-cooperation, civil disobedience, fasting and self-suffering, seeking to convert opponents rather than defeat them; the constructive programme of khadi, village industries, basic education, communal unity and the removal of untouchability builds the new society within the old. Means and ends are inseparable, Gandhi argued in Hind Swaraj, as a seed is to a tree, so violent means cannot produce a non-violent society. Change must also begin with the self, since changing oneself changes the world around one. Critics, from revolutionaries to Ambedkar, argued that this method was too slow or that it spared the privileged. |
|---|
| FeminismPSIR syllabus | Feminists reject the claim that women's subordination follows from their nature. Liberal feminists from Wollstonecraft onwards assert a common rational humanity and attribute apparent differences to education and socialisation; Simone de Beauvoir's dictum that one is not born but becomes a woman made gender a social construction. The tradition then divides. Difference feminists, following Carol Gilligan's In a Different Voice (1982), value distinct experiences such as an ethic of care, and some radical feminists and ecofeminists celebrate women's embodied capacities. Poststructuralists such as Judith Butler question any fixed gender identity, treating gender as performative, and intersectional theorists insist that womanhood is always lived through race, class and caste. | Feminists ask whether the state is neutral or gendered. Liberal feminists treat it as a potentially neutral instrument, captured by men, that can be reformed through equal rights, anti-discrimination law and women's representation. Radical feminists see it as patriarchal: Catharine MacKinnon argued that the state is male in its very conception of objectivity, and Carole Pateman read the social contract as resting on a prior sexual contract of male right. Socialist feminists see a capitalist-patriarchal state that regulates social reproduction, and Pateman exposed the welfare state's male-breadwinner model. Poststructuralists treat the state as plural and inconsistent, a site of struggle that can protect and police women at once. | Freedom includes bodily autonomy, reproductive choice and freedom from violence and harassment, in private as well as public life. Feminists argue that liberal negative liberty, by drawing a protected private sphere around the family, left domination within it untouched. Many develop relational accounts of autonomy, in which capacities for choice are formed, and can be damaged, through relationships and social norms. The tradition divides over some liberties: radical feminists such as MacKinnon saw pornography and prostitution as practices of subordination, while liberal and sex-positive feminists defended choice and expression. Postcolonial feminists warn against claiming to 'save' women from their cultures in the name of freedom. | Feminism moved from formal equality before the law, in the vote, property and education, to substantive equality in outcomes, opportunities and power. It is divided by the equality–difference debate, which Pateman called Wollstonecraft's dilemma: women demand equal treatment as citizens, yet citizenship was defined around men, so equality on male terms can deny the value of what women distinctively do. Liberal feminists favour equal treatment with targeted remedies; radical feminists see equality within a patriarchal structure as assimilation. Intersectional critiques, from Kimberlé Crenshaw and bell hooks to Dalit feminists, show that equality for some women can leave others behind. | Feminists argue that a theory of justice that ignores the family, the body and care is incomplete. Susan Moller Okin's Justice, Gender, and the Family (1989) asked why Rawls's principles stopped at the household door, where unequal labour and dependence shape women's life chances. Iris Marion Young's Justice and the Politics of Difference (1990) replaced a purely distributive paradigm with five faces of oppression: exploitation, marginalisation, powerlessness, cultural imperialism and violence. Nancy Fraser argued in 1995 that justice requires both redistribution and recognition, later adding representation. Care ethicists treat dependency and care as questions of justice, and intersectional theorists ask whose justice, insisting that remedies reach the most marginalised women. | Feminists demand women's presence in representative institutions, through quotas, reservations or parity laws, because who is present shapes what is decided: Anne Phillips called this the politics of presence (1995). They challenge a public/private divide that kept domestic power, violence and care out of democratic debate, and point to democracy's gendered history, since many democracies enfranchised women late. Radical feminists organised through consciousness-raising groups and non-hierarchical collectives. Iris Marion Young criticised deliberative norms of dispassionate argument that privilege dominant groups and proposed a more inclusive, communicative democracy. Debate continues over whether more women in office produce substantive gains for women. | Feminism's central claim is that power operates where political theory traditionally did not look: in the family, sexuality, the body and everyday life, a claim summed up in the slogan that the personal is political. Radical feminists such as Kate Millett described patriarchy as a system of male domination maintained by socialisation and violence. Feminists drawing on Foucault analysed disciplinary power that shapes bodies and desires without visible command, while others distinguished power over others from power to act and power with others, the empowerment that collective action creates. Patricia Hill Collins's Black Feminist Thought (1990) describes a matrix of domination in which gender, race and class interlock. | Women's unpaid domestic and care work sustains the economy without being counted or paid. Feminists analyse the sexual division of labour, unequal pay, occupational segregation and the double shift of paid and unpaid work. Liberal feminists seek equal access to employment and property through anti-discrimination law, maternity rights and childcare. Socialist and Marxist feminists link patriarchy to capitalism through social reproduction, the daily and generational work that produces labour power, and the Wages for Housework campaign of the 1970s made that labour visible. Feminist economists criticised national accounts that ignore care, and development feminists showed that economic growth can leave women's position unchanged. | Liberal feminists pursue legal and policy reform: suffrage, equal pay, anti-discrimination law and representation. Radical feminists stress consciousness-raising, women-only organisation and the transformation of culture, sexuality and the family, because patriarchy is reproduced in everyday life. Socialist feminists seek the joint transformation of capitalism and patriarchy and link feminist demands to labour movements. Transnational feminists build alliances across borders while respecting local agency, and legal feminists use strategic litigation, as Indian women's groups did in Vishaka. The metaphor of 'waves' is itself contested, because it obscures continuous activism and the struggles of women outside the West. |
|---|
| Environmentalism | Green thought decentres humanity rather than proposing a new theory of the self. Ecologists treat human beings as one species embedded in ecosystems, dependent on and continuous with the rest of nature, so that the Enlightenment image of man as master of nature is the root error. Shallow or reform environmentalists keep a broadly liberal view of rational, self-interested individuals who need better incentives and information. Deep ecologists, following Arne Naess, call for an expanded 'ecological self' that identifies with other beings; social ecologists such as Murray Bookchin see the domination of nature as growing out of the domination of human beings by one another; ecofeminists trace it to a gendered dualism of reason and nature. | Greens are divided about the state. Reform environmentalists rely on it to regulate pollution, price carbon and negotiate treaties, and Robyn Eckersley argues for a 'green state' that acts as an ecological trustee. A minority in the 1970s, including Garrett Hardin and William Ophuls, argued that scarcity would require authoritarian controls, a position most greens rejected. Ecologists in the anarchist and Gandhian lines distrust the centralised state as an engine of industrial growth and prefer decentralised, self-reliant communities; social ecologists propose confederations of self-governing municipalities. Most green parties combine these positions: strong national and international regulation together with subsidiarity, local democracy and suspicion of state-led megaprojects. | Greens reinterpret liberty in the light of limits. Reform environmentalists accept liberal freedoms and seek to change choices through prices, information and regulation. Ecologists argue that freedom understood as unlimited consumption and mobility is unsustainable, and must be redefined as the freedom to live well within ecological limits, an ethic of sufficiency rather than maximisation. Some radical greens find freedom in self-realisation and connection with nature, as in Naess's ecosophy. The authoritarian ecologists of the 1970s were prepared to sacrifice liberty to survival, which most greens rejected; contemporary debate concerns how far climate policy may restrict choices such as flying, diet or car use, and who should bear the burden. | Green thought widens the circle of equal concern beyond living human beings. Deep ecologists assert biospherical egalitarianism, the equal right of all living things to live and flourish, at least in principle, and animal liberationists such as Peter Singer extend equal consideration to sentient creatures. Intergenerational equity asks that future generations inherit a liveable planet. Most greens also connect environmental and social equality: the poor, within and between countries, suffer most from pollution and climate change while contributing least to them. Environmental justice movements, from the United States to India's environmentalism of the poor, and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities give that connection political form. | Green political thought extends justice in three directions. Intergenerational justice asks what the present owes to future people who cannot bargain or vote, a question Rawls addressed through a just savings principle. Ecological justice asks whether animals and ecosystems can be wronged, and some legal systems now recognise rights of nature. Environmental and climate justice address the unequal distribution of harms and responsibilities: Anil Agarwal and Sunita Narain's Global Warming in an Unequal World (1991) distinguished the survival emissions of the poor from the luxury emissions of the rich. The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, written into the UN climate convention in 1992, is the diplomatic form of that claim. | Green parties champion grassroots and participatory democracy, decentralisation and the interests of future generations; the German Greens made grassroots democracy one of their founding pillars. Green democrats argue that deliberation, citizens' assemblies and local self-government produce more ecologically responsible decisions, and propose representing future generations or nature through ombudspersons and commissioners. There is a tension: democratic majorities and short electoral cycles may resist costly climate action, which has led a minority to favour expert or authoritarian solutions, the eco-authoritarian temptation. Most green theorists, including Eckersley and Dobson, reject that path, arguing that only democratic legitimacy can sustain long-term environmental change. | Greens trace environmental destruction to concentrations of power: fossil-fuel corporations, growth-driven states, consumer capitalism and, for social ecologists, hierarchy itself, since Bookchin argued that the domination of nature grows out of the domination of human beings by one another. Ecofeminists link it to patriarchal power over women and nature alike. Responses vary. Reformers use regulation, litigation and treaties to discipline polluters; radicals seek to decentralise power to communities able to manage commons, drawing on Elinor Ostrom's evidence that local users can govern shared resources without either state or market. Climate politics also exposes power between states, as large historical emitters shape the rules of response. | Green economics begins from limits. The Limits to Growth (1972) argued that exponential growth in population, industry and resource use cannot continue indefinitely on a finite planet. Reform environmentalists answer with green growth and sustainable development, defined by the Brundtland Report (1987) as meeting present needs without compromising the ability of future generations to meet theirs: carbon pricing, regulation, clean technology and ecological modernisation. Radical greens doubt that growth can be decoupled from resource use far enough and call for steady-state or degrowth economies, local self-reliance and lower consumption, echoing Schumacher and Gandhi. Eco-socialists blame capitalism's need for endless accumulation; ecomodernists place their hopes in technology. | Greens disagree about how deep and how fast change must be. Reformers work through elections, green parties, regulation, technology, consumer choice and international negotiation, trusting that sustainable development can be achieved within existing institutions. Radical ecologists seek a transformation of values and ways of life: deep ecologists call for a change of consciousness, social ecologists for the dismantling of hierarchy, eco-socialists for the end of capitalism. Methods range from lifestyle change and local experiments in self-reliance to non-violent direct action, as in Chipko and in the climate strikes and civil disobedience of the late 2010s. Debate continues over whether incremental policy can match the pace that climate science indicates. |
|---|
| Postcolonialism | Postcolonial thought is wary of any universal account of human nature, because colonialism justified itself through one: the claim that Europeans embodied reason and progress while colonised peoples were childlike, irrational or 'not yet' ready for self-rule, consigned to what Dipesh Chakrabarty calls the waiting room of history. Fanon showed in Black Skin, White Masks (1952) how racism produces internalised inferiority, and hoped that decolonisation would create a new humanity. Later theorists treat identity as constructed and hybrid: Homi Bhabha's ideas of mimicry and hybridity, and Spivak's caution about speaking for the subaltern, reject both the colonial stereotype and the nativist dream of an authentic, pre-colonial essence. | Postcolonial theorists ask why the state in formerly colonised societies behaves as it does. Hamza Alavi argued in 1972 that colonialism left an 'overdeveloped' bureaucratic-military apparatus, relatively autonomous because it mediates between metropolitan capital, a domestic bourgeoisie and landed classes. Fanon warned that a national bourgeoisie might simply inherit the colonial state and its habits of command. Partha Chatterjee distinguishes the civil society of rights-bearing citizens from the 'political society' of the governed, who negotiate with the state as populations, through welfare schemes and negotiated exceptions. Decolonial thinkers question the Westphalian nation-state itself as a colonial import, while critics reply that the post-colonial state also delivered sovereignty, democracy and development. | Freedom first means freedom from colonial rule, but postcolonial thinkers argue that political independence is incomplete. Fanon described colonialism as a system that dehumanises the colonised in body and mind, and saw decolonisation as the recovery of agency. Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o's Decolonising the Mind (1986) and Mignolo's 'epistemic disobedience' extend liberty to language and knowledge: the freedom to think and speak from one's own place rather than in borrowed categories. Postcolonial critics also note that liberal freedom was historically reserved for those deemed civilised, as when Mill held despotism legitimate for 'barbarians'. Liberty, on this view, must be decolonised before it can be universal. | Postcolonial thought exposes the inequality built into the colonial order, between colonisers and colonised, white and non-white, 'civilised' and 'backward' peoples, often codified in law. Quijano's coloniality of power holds that the racial classification invented in the conquest of the Americas still structures global hierarchies of labour, knowledge and wealth. Formal sovereign equality among states, enshrined in the UN Charter, coexists with deep material and epistemic inequality between North and South. Postcolonial feminists add that gender inequality in the colonies was shaped by colonial law as well as local patriarchy. The goal is not equal inclusion in a Eurocentric order but the transformation of the order itself. | Postcolonial justice is above all historical and epistemic. Colonialism is treated as a structural injustice whose effects persist in borders, economies, laws and hierarchies of race and knowledge, so justice requires a reckoning with that past; demands for reparations and for the restitution of looted artefacts are current examples. Spivak's question whether the subaltern can speak points to epistemic injustice, the exclusion of the colonised from producing knowledge about themselves. Decolonial thinkers call for 'pluriversal' standards rather than a single theory of justice derived from European experience. Critics worry that rejecting universal standards weakens the case against injustices committed by post-colonial states and local elites. | Postcolonial thinkers value democracy but question its European template. Colonial rule denied self-government on the ground that colonised peoples were not ready for it, and anti-colonial movements claimed democracy as their own. Partha Chatterjee argues that in post-colonial societies most people engage the state not as rights-bearing citizens in civil society but as populations in political society, bargaining for welfare and exceptions through collective mobilisation. Indian democracy, which sustained universal suffrage in a poor and diverse society, is a central case that unsettles modernisation theory's claim that democracy requires prior development. Decolonial critics add that democracy should include indigenous and communal forms of self-government. | Postcolonial thought analyses colonial power as knowledge as well as force. Said's Orientalism (1978), drawing on Foucault, showed how Western scholarship constructed 'the Orient' as an object to be known and governed. Gramsci's notion of the subaltern, adopted by Ranajit Guha's Subaltern Studies, examined how colonial and nationalist elites alike excluded peasants from history. Quijano's coloniality of power holds that racialised hierarchies outlived formal empire, and neo-colonialism names economic control without territorial rule. Resistance takes cultural and epistemic forms as well as political ones, from reclaiming languages to 'provincialising' European categories. Critics argue that this emphasis on discourse neglects material power. | Postcolonial and decolonial thinkers treat the world economy as structured by colonial history. Colonialism extracted wealth, the 'drain' that Dadabhai Naoroji measured in India, reorganised peasant agriculture for export and deindustrialised colonised economies. After independence, dependency theorists, Kwame Nkrumah's Neo-Colonialism (1965) and the demand for a New International Economic Order (1974) argued that formal sovereignty left economic subordination in place. Postcolonial theory adds a cultural critique of 'development' itself as a Western project that ranks societies on a single ladder. Marxist critics such as Vivek Chibber argue that postcolonial theory neglects capitalism's universal logic; its defenders reply that capitalism takes different forms in different societies. | Change means decolonisation, which postcolonial thinkers treat as unfinished. Anti-colonial movements chose different methods: Gandhi rejected violence as self-defeating; Fanon defended the violence of the colonised as both necessary and cathartic; Mandela's ANC turned to armed struggle in 1961 after non-violent campaigns were crushed; elsewhere power was transferred by negotiation. After independence the task became decolonising the economy, institutions, curricula and the mind. Postcolonial theory itself works largely through critique, rereading archives, canons and categories to expose their colonial assumptions. Decolonial thinkers call for 'delinking' from Eurocentric modernity, while critics warn that cultural critique can substitute for political and economic transformation. |
|---|
Origins
Socialism arose as a response to industrial capitalism in early nineteenth-century Europe. The word itself spread in the 1820s and 1830s among the followers of Robert Owen in Britain and Henri de Saint-Simon in France. These early socialists, with Charles Fourier, designed cooperative communities and planned societies; Pierre-Joseph Proudhon asked What Is Property? (1840) and answered that it was theft. Marx and Engels, who called their predecessors 'utopian', offered a 'scientific' socialism grounded in a theory of history and class struggle.
From the 1880s mass socialist parties formed: the German Social Democrats, the Fabian Society in Britain (1884) and later the Labour Party, whose 1918 constitution committed it to common ownership of the means of production. The movement split over method. Eduard Bernstein's revisionism (1899) argued for reform through parliament; Lenin's Bolsheviks took power by revolution in 1917; and after 1945 Western social democrats built welfare states and, as at the German party's Bad Godesberg congress of 1959, abandoned Marxist doctrine.