Contemporary political theory
Isaiah Berlin
The historian of ideas who distinguished negative from positive liberty, warned that the pursuit of a single rational ideal leads to coercion, and defended a liberalism grounded in the plurality and incompatibility of human values.
Thinker dossier
1909–1997
- Key works
- Karl Marx: His Life and Environment · 1939The Hedgehog and the Fox · 1953Historical Inevitability · 1954
- Key concepts
- Negative liberty · Positive liberty · Monstrous impersonation · Value pluralism · Monism
- In UPSC papers
- 3 questions, 2024, 2026
Start here:An introduction
1 min read
Isaiah Berlin (1909–1997) was a historian of ideas and political philosopher, born in Riga, who came to England as a boy in 1921 and spent most of his life at Oxford. He had seen the twentieth century's revolutions and dictatorships justify terrible coercion in the name of freedom, history or reason, and he asked what freedom really means and why the pursuit of a single ideal so often ends in tyranny.
In 'Two Concepts of Liberty' (1958) he distinguished negative liberty, freedom from interference by others, from positive liberty, freedom as self-mastery, and showed how the second could become a justification for forcing people to be free. Behind this lay his value pluralism: human values are many and can genuinely conflict, so no perfect society is possible. A student should care because his distinction remains the starting point for debates about liberty, rights and the limits of state power.
How to read this profile
The introduction is the first reading. The seventeen parts below are the full study of Isaiah Berlin, in five movements, about 14 minutes in all. Parts marked Advanced analysis (5, 11 and 12) weigh and contest the arguments: read them once the rest is secure.
Contents · 17 parts
Movement I: Foundations
The thinker in time: the setting, the influences, the works and the principal arguments.
01Historical context
Berlin's liberalism was shaped by the century's tyrannies. As a child in Petrograd he witnessed the revolutions of 1917; as an adult he watched Nazism and Stalinism justify mass murder in the name of historical necessity, racial destiny or the true interests of humanity. His lifelong question was how such ideas had come to seem compelling, and what in the history of Western thought had prepared them.
The Cold War gave his answer political resonance. 'Two Concepts of Liberty', delivered in Oxford in 1958, was read as a liberal manifesto against communism, though its targets included strands in Rousseau, Kant and Hegel and its main argument was about the dangers of any theory that claims to know what people would want if they were fully rational.
Life and intellectual formation
Born in Riga in 1909 to a Russian-speaking Jewish family, Berlin moved with his parents to Petrograd in 1915 and to England in 1921. He studied at Corpus Christi College, Oxford, and in 1932 became the first Jew elected to a prize fellowship at All Souls. His first book was a biography of Karl Marx (1939). During the Second World War he wrote political dispatches for the British embassy in Washington, and in 1945 his meeting in Leningrad with the poet Anna Akhmatova became one of the formative experiences of his life.
He was Chichele Professor of Social and Political Theory at Oxford from 1957 to 1967, the founding President of Wolfson College and President of the British Academy. He wrote mainly essays and lectures, many collected only through the editorial work of Henry Hardy. He was knighted in 1957, received the Order of Merit in 1971 and died in Oxford in 1997.
02Intellectual influences
Berlin began as an Oxford analytic philosopher in the circle around J. L. Austin in the 1930s, and the precision of that training stayed with him; but he came to think that the philosophers' questions could not be answered without the history of ideas. His liberal sources were John Stuart Mill, whose On Liberty he read as a defence of choice among plural ends, and Benjamin Constant, whose lecture on the liberty of the ancients and the moderns (1819) anticipated his distinction between freedom from interference and freedom as participation in collective self-rule. Kant supplied both the ideal of autonomy he respected and the line about the crooked timber of humanity he used against utopias.
His deepest sympathies were Russian. Alexander Herzen, whom he called a hero, warned against sacrificing living people to abstractions such as history or progress, and Turgenev's and Tolstoy's moral seriousness shaped his own. From the Counter-Enlightenment, Vico, Hamann and above all Herder, he took the idea that cultures are many and valuable in their own terms, the seed of his value pluralism, while recognising that the same sources fed nationalism and romantic irrationalism. He read Machiavelli as the thinker who first showed that the morality of the statesman and the morality of the Christian could not be reconciled.
He reacted against monism in every form: Plato's vision of a single truth, the Enlightenment hope of a science of society, Hegel's and Marx's philosophies of history, and the claims of totalitarian regimes to act in the name of history or reason. As a boy in Petrograd he saw the violence of revolution in the streets, and as a Jew and lifelong Zionist he was alert to the needs of peoples for recognition.
03Major works
- 1939Karl Marx: His Life and EnvironmentAn intellectual biography, sympathetic to Marx's moral passion and critical of his determinism.
- 1953The Hedgehog and the FoxAn essay on Tolstoy built on Archilochus's line that the fox knows many things, the hedgehog one big thing.
- 1954Historical InevitabilityA critique of determinist theories of history and their effect on moral responsibility.
- 1956EqualityProceedings of the Aristotelian Society. Equal treatment as the default that requires no special justification.
- 1958Two Concepts of LibertyHis inaugural lecture as Chichele Professor; the distinction between negative and positive liberty.
- 1962Does Political Theory Still Exist?An answer to claims that political philosophy was dead: it lives wherever ends are contested.
- 1969Four Essays on LibertyThe lectures and essays on liberty with a long introduction answering critics.
- 1976Vico and HerderTwo studies in the history of ideas; the sources of cultural pluralism.
- 1978Russian ThinkersEssays on Herzen, Belinsky, Turgenev, Tolstoy and the Russian intelligentsia.
- 1990The Crooked Timber of HumanityEssays on value pluralism, utopia and nationalism, titled from a line of Kant.
- 1999 (lectures of 1965)The Roots of RomanticismRomanticism as a revolt against the Enlightenment's single truth, and its political legacy.
04Principal arguments
Two questions
'Two Concepts of Liberty' distinguishes two questions. The first asks what is the area within which a person is, or should be, left to do or be what they are able to do or be, without interference by other persons. The answer gives negative liberty: freedom as the absence of coercion, the deliberate interference of other human beings within the area in which one could otherwise act. The second asks what, or who, is the source of control that determines someone to do or be one thing rather than another. The answer gives positive liberty: freedom as self-mastery, the wish to be one's own master and the author of one's own life.
Negative liberty
On the negative view, mere inability is not unfreedom; one lacks freedom only when others prevent one from acting. Poverty can count as unfreedom if it results from arrangements others have made, but Berlin insisted on distinguishing liberty from the conditions of its exercise. Liberty for the pike, he noted, is death for the minnows, and he did not deny that liberty may rightly be curtailed for the sake of equality, justice or security. His point was that such a curtailment should be called by its name, a loss of liberty traded for another value, and not disguised as a higher form of freedom. Some minimum area of personal freedom must on no account be violated if human beings are not to be degraded.
The inversion of positive liberty
Positive liberty is a noble ideal, but Berlin traced how it can be inverted. Self-mastery suggests a division within the self between a higher, rational self and a lower, empirical self of passions and desires. Once the rational self is identified with something larger, a church, a nation, a class, the state or the course of history, it becomes possible to coerce people in the name of what their true selves would want. Berlin called this a "monstrous impersonation": equating what a person would choose if they were something they are not with what they actually seek. Rationalist versions, from Rousseau's general will to Hegel and Marx, claim that a rational society would leave no conflict between the individual's real will and the law; in practice they license experts and vanguards to decide.
He also identified a retreat to the inner citadel, the Stoic and Kantian strategy of liberating oneself by renouncing desires one cannot satisfy, which he thought could make the slave free by making him content.
Liberty, democracy and status
Negative liberty answers the question how far government interferes, democracy the question who governs. They are distinct. A democracy can crush individual liberty, and a liberal-minded autocrat can allow a great deal of it. Berlin added that many movements described as struggles for freedom are struggles for recognition and status: the desire of a group to be governed by its own members, even oppressively, rather than by well-meaning strangers. This, he argued, explains much of nationalism and anti-colonial politics.
Value pluralism
Behind the distinction lies Berlin's deepest conviction. Human values are many, objective and often incompatible: liberty and equality, justice and mercy, spontaneity and order cannot all be fully realised together, and there is no common measure by which to rank them in every case. The belief that all genuine values must fit into a single harmonious whole, and that some final solution exists, he regarded as the root of utopian tyranny. Choice among values is inescapable and sometimes tragic, which is why freedom to choose matters.
Political theory
In 'Does Political Theory Still Exist?' (1962) Berlin answered those who thought political philosophy dead. Political theory exists wherever people disagree about ends and the questions are neither empirical nor formal; it would disappear only in a society in which all agreed on ends, which would be a society of technicians, not citizens.
On human nature
Berlin rejected the idea of a fixed human essence from which a single right way of life could be deduced, but he was not a relativist about human beings. People share a common human horizon: a core of needs and values, varied in their expression, that allows members of one culture to understand another. What is most distinctively human is the capacity to choose among ends, and to make oneself through those choices. Because values conflict and human beings are, in Kant's image, crooked timber, no perfect society can be built, and attempts to straighten them by force end in cruelty.
Movement II: Theory
What the thinker added to political theory, the concepts they defined, and their positions on the state, power, liberty, equality, justice and democracy.
05Major theoretical contributions
Advanced analysis
Berlin's best-known contribution is the distinction between negative and positive liberty, which organised the late twentieth-century debate on freedom. By separating the question of how far others may interfere with me from the question of who controls me, he showed that freedom from interference and self-rule are distinct values that can conflict, and he traced how positive liberty, through the idea of a true or rational self, could be inverted into coercion.
His second contribution, and in his own view the deeper one, was value pluralism: the claim that human values are many, objective and sometimes incompatible and incommensurable, so that choosing among them involves real loss and no single formula can rank them. This set him against the monism he found in much Western thought, from Plato to Marx, and became a foundation for liberal arguments about toleration and for later debates on multiculturalism.
Third, as a historian of ideas he recovered the Counter-Enlightenment of Vico, Hamann and Herder and traced the political legacy of Romanticism, including nationalism, which he took more seriously than most liberals of his time. His argument that the search for recognition and status, rather than liberty, drives many political movements anticipated the later politics of recognition. Finally, his critique of historical inevitability defended individual moral responsibility against determinist theories of history.
06Conceptual definitions
- Negative liberty
Freedom as non-interference by others within an area of personal choice.
- Positive liberty
Freedom as self-mastery and self-direction, which can be inverted into coercion in the name of a 'true' self.
- Monstrous impersonation
Treating what someone would want if fully rational as what they really want, so that coercion is described as liberation.
- Value pluralism
Genuine values are plural, sometimes incompatible and incommensurable, so tragic choice is part of moral life.
- Monism
The belief that all values form a single harmonious system, which Berlin regarded as the root of utopian tyranny.
- Search for status
The demand for recognition and self-government by one's own group, often mistaken for the demand for liberty.
- Counter-Enlightenment
The tradition of Vico, Hamann and Herder that challenged Enlightenment universalism, which Berlin studied as a source of both pluralism and nationalism.
07Theory of the State
The state should protect a sphere of non-interference and arbitrate among competing values, not pursue a single comprehensive vision of human perfection.
08Theory of Power
Berlin wrote no theory of power, but two convictions run through his political essays. The first is that ideas are among the strongest forces in politics: 'Two Concepts of Liberty' opens with Heine's warning to the French that ideas worked out quietly in a philosopher's study could bring down a civilisation, and his histories of ideas trace how doctrines of the Enlightenment and of Romanticism armed later movements. The second is that the main threat to liberty is coercion by other human beings, and that power is most dangerous when it claims to know people's real interests better than they do. He therefore cared less about who holds power than about how far it reaches: democratic self-rule does not by itself limit power, so liberty needs frontiers that no authority, popular or not, may cross.
09Liberty and equality
Liberty
Negative liberty is the core political value of liberalism, a protected area of personal choice. Positive liberty is a genuine value but dangerous when tied to a theory of the rational self. Berlin did not regard negative liberty as harmless: he accepted that it can be abused by the strong, and that liberty may rightly be limited for the sake of equality or security, provided the loss is called by its name.
Equality
Equality is a distinct value that may justify restricting liberty; Berlin rejected the view that redistribution creates 'more' freedom, insisting it trades one good for another. In 'Equality' (1956) he argued that equal treatment is the default: it needs no special justification, while every departure from it requires reasons.
Rights
Rights mark out the minimum area of freedom without which human beings are degraded, though Berlin grounded them in historical experience and the plurality of values, not in nature.
10Justice and democracy
Justice
Justice is one value among many, objective and important, but liable to conflict with others such as mercy, liberty or loyalty. Berlin's pluralism implies that justice cannot be pursued without limit or reduced to a formula; it must be weighed against other goods in particular circumstances, and the losses involved acknowledged rather than denied.
Democracy
Democracy answers who rules, not how far rule extends. It is compatible with serious restrictions of individual liberty, so it needs constitutional limits.
Movement III: Critique
How the arguments have been attacked, and how scholars read them differently.
11Criticisms
Advanced analysis
- 01
Gerald MacCallum
'Negative and Positive Freedom' (1967) argued that there is only one concept of freedom, a triadic relation: an agent is free from some constraint to do or become something. The two concepts differ only in what they count as constraints and goals.
- 02
Charles Taylor
'What's Wrong with Negative Liberty' (1979) argued that freedom is an exercise-concept: we must distinguish significant from trivial freedoms and recognise internal obstacles, which requires the very judgements about purposes that negative liberty excludes.
- 03
Quentin Skinner and Philip Pettit
The republican tradition defines freedom as non-domination: a slave with a kind master is unfree even when not interfered with. Berlin's dichotomy, they argue, obscured this third concept.
- 04
C. B. Macpherson
'Berlin's Division of Liberty' (1973) argued that Berlin ignored how unequal property gives some people power over others, so that market societies restrict the freedom of those without means.
- 05
John Gray
Isaiah Berlin (1995) argued that value pluralism does not entail liberalism: if values are incommensurable, liberal freedom is only one value among others, and non-liberal ways of life may be equally legitimate.
12Scholarly debates
Advanced analysis
How scholars have read Isaiah Berlin differently. An answer that names the reading it follows is stronger than one that treats the text as settled.
Does pluralism support liberalism?
Berlin presented his liberalism as following from value pluralism: if values conflict and cannot be ranked, people need freedom to choose among them. John Gray (Isaiah Berlin, 1995) argued that the inference fails. If values are incommensurable, liberal freedom is only one value among many, and non-liberal ways of life that rank other goods higher may be equally reasonable; the honest conclusion is a modus vivendi among different regimes, not liberalism. George Crowder (Liberalism and Value Pluralism, 2002; Isaiah Berlin, 2004) and William Galston (Liberal Pluralism, 2002) replied that pluralism itself favours societies that accommodate many goods and that respect the capacity to choose, which is what liberal institutions do.
Pluralism or relativism?
Leo Strauss ('Relativism', 1961) argued that Berlin's position was incoherent: he defended a minimum area of freedom as absolute while denying that any value is absolute, so his liberalism rested on nothing firmer than preference. Berlin insisted on the difference between pluralism and relativism. Values are objective, part of a common human horizon that allows people to understand cultures very different from their own, even when they cannot all be combined. Later readers, among them Steven Lukes, have asked whether objective but incommensurable values leave any principled way to resolve conflicts, or only judgement case by case.
Cold War liberal or a liberal of his time
Critics on the left, such as Perry Anderson ('England's Isaiah', 1990), read Berlin as an ideologue of Cold War liberalism, whose suspicion of positive liberty served to discredit social democracy and socialism along with communism. Joshua Cherniss (A Mind and Its Time, 2013) reconstructs a more complex figure, whose liberalism was an ethos formed by the experience of revolution and totalitarianism: a temperament of scepticism, moral seriousness and humane restraint rather than a doctrine of the free market. Berlin himself conceded in 1969 that unrestricted laissez-faire had produced its own grave violations of liberty.
Movement IV: Legacy
Why the thinker matters now, whom they connect with, and the arguments applied in India and beyond.
13Contemporary relevance
Berlin's distinction is the starting point for every discussion of liberty in political theory, even among those who reject it. His value pluralism shaped later liberalism, including Rawls's attention to reasonable disagreement, and his account of nationalism as a response to humiliation has proved prescient in the decades since the Cold War. Contemporary debates about paternalism and 'nudging', about welfare states and freedom, and about whether governments may override people's choices for their own good all revisit his warning about the inversion of positive liberty.
14Connections with other thinkers
Each connection recorded in this profile, by relation: who shaped Isaiah Berlin, whom Isaiah Berlin shaped, and who argued with or against them.
Influenced by
John Stuart Mill1806
Berlin presented Mill as a champion of negative liberty and of choice among plural values.
In dialogue with
Berlin read Machiavelli as having revealed two incompatible moralities, an early case of value pluralism.
John Rawls1921
Rawls's acceptance of reasonable pluralism and priority of liberty owe something to Berlin, whom he met in Oxford in 1952–53.
In contrast with
Amartya Sen1933
Sen's capabilities are a positive conception of freedom that Berlin's distinction would classify as conditions of liberty.
Michael Sandel1953
Sandel's civic republicanism treats self-government, not non-interference, as the core of freedom.
Critic of
Rousseau's general will is one of Berlin's central examples of positive liberty turned into coercion.
Karl Marx1818
Berlin's biography of Marx and his critique of historical inevitability target Marxist determinism and its vanguard politics.
Compare side by side
The written comparisons that involve Isaiah Berlin, and pairings to open in the Comparison Lab, chosen from the connections above.
Open in the Comparison Lab
- In contrast withIsaiah Berlin and Amartya SenSide by side on the state, power, justice, liberty, equality, democracy and rights.Compare
- In contrast withIsaiah Berlin and Michael SandelSide by side on the state, power, justice, liberty, equality, democracy and rights.Compare
- Critic ofIsaiah Berlin and Jean-Jacques RousseauSide by side on the state, power, justice, liberty, equality, democracy and rights.Compare
- Your own comparisonIsaiah Berlin and a thinker of your choiceChoose up to two more thinkers in the Comparison Lab and read their positions question by question.Open the Comparison Lab
15Indian and international applications
In India
India's Constitution combines both concepts. The Fundamental Rights of Part III began as largely negative protections against the state, read narrowly in A. K. Gopalan (1950); after Maneka Gandhi (1978), Article 21 grew to include livelihood in Olga Tellis (1985) and, through the 86th Amendment, education as Article 21A, turning a negative right into positive entitlements. The Directive Principles of Part IV express positive liberty as the state's duty to secure the conditions of a free life. A Berlinian would ask whether this expansion blurs liberty with its conditions; a capability theorist would welcome it. Puttaswamy (2017) affirmed privacy as a zone of non-interference. Berlin's account of the search for status also illuminates anti-colonial nationalism.
In the world
Cold War liberals read 'Two Concepts' as a defence of open societies against communism; today it frames debates about paternalist public health measures, welfare conditionality and the limits of state intervention in private life.
Movement V: Examination
Where the thinker sits in the syllabus, and what UPSC has asked.
16Exact syllabus mapping
PSIR Optional
Paper I · Part A · Political Theory and Politics
Political Theory
Political Theory: meaning and approaches.
Official wording · 6 official questions on this line in the PYQ dataset, 2024–26
PSIR Optional
Paper I · Part A · Political Theory and Politics
Equality
Equality: Social, political and economic; relationship between equality and freedom; Affirmative action.
Official wording · 4 official questions on this line in the PYQ dataset, 2024–26
PSIR Optional
Paper I · Part A · Political Theory and Politics
Rights
Rights: Meaning and theories; different kinds of rights; Concept of Human Rights.
Official wording · 2 official questions on this line in the PYQ dataset, 2024–26
PSIR Optional
Paper I · Part A · Political Theory and Politics
Political Ideologies
Political Ideologies: Liberalism, Socialism, Marxism, Fascism, Gandhism and Feminism.
Official wording · 8 official questions on this line in the PYQ dataset, 2024–26
IB Global Politics
Thematic study: Rights and justice
Rights and justice: contested meanings
Rights; justice, including political and social justice; liberty; equality.
Paraphrase of the prescribed topic (this platform)
The syllabus lines this profile of Isaiah Berlin serves. Progress is kept on this device and gathered on your dashboard.
17Related PYQs (official wording)
Official wording · verbatim
3 questions · 2024, 2026
2026PSIR IQ1(a)10 marks
Resurgence of political theory
The official paper (opens in a new tab)2026PSIR IQ1(c)10 marks
The freedom of the pike is death to the minnows.
The official paper (opens in a new tab)2024PSIR IQ2(c)15 marks
The nature of relationship between equality of democratic citizenship and liberty of citizens is influenced by economic equality. Comment.
The official paper (opens in a new tab)
Transcribed from the official UPSC papers and linked to Isaiah Berlin in the PYQ dataset (nine official papers, 228 questions: GS Paper II, PSIR Paper I, PSIR Paper II, 2024–2026).PYQ Intelligence →
Using Berlin in an answer
Berlin serves the Paper I units on Equality, especially its relationship with freedom, on Political Theory, Rights and liberalism, and IB work on the meanings of liberty. UPSC set a question on how economic equality shapes the relationship between equal democratic citizenship and liberty in 2024 (PSIR Paper I), and short notes in 2026 (PSIR Paper I) on the resurgence of political theory, for which Does Political Theory Still Exist? is relevant, and on the freedom of the pike as death to the minnows, an image he used in Two Concepts of Liberty.
Lead with the two questions behind negative and positive liberty, and with his warning that positive liberty can be inverted into coercion in the name of a true self. For equality, stress his insistence that liberty may rightly be curtailed for equality or justice, but that the trade should be named a loss of liberty rather than disguised as a higher freedom. Contrast him with Rousseau, whose general will is his central example of inversion, and with Sen, whose capabilities he would class as conditions of liberty. Judgement comes from the critics: MacCallum's single triadic concept, Taylor's freedom as exercise, the republican ideal of non-domination, and Macpherson's point that unequal property gives some people power over others, which bears directly on the 2024 question.
Avoid presenting Berlin as hostile to positive liberty, which he called a noble ideal, or as indifferent to poverty, and do not equate value pluralism with relativism, though Strauss pressed that charge.
Practice questions (original)
- Q1PSIR style15 marks· 200 words
Distinguish between negative and positive liberty. Why did Berlin regard positive liberty as dangerous?
How to approach it
The two questions; non-interference and self-mastery; the divided self and monstrous impersonation; examples (Rousseau, Marx); Berlin's acceptance that positive liberty is a genuine value.
- Q2PSIR style20 marks· 250 words
"There is only one concept of liberty." Examine this claim in the light of the critiques of Berlin.
How to approach it
MacCallum's triadic analysis; Taylor's exercise-concept; Pettit and Skinner's non-domination; Macpherson on property; a judgement on whether Berlin's distinction survives.
- Q3PSIR style10 marks· 150 words
Explain Berlin's idea of value pluralism.
How to approach it
Plural, objective, incompatible, incommensurable values; tragic choice; critique of monism; Gray's question whether pluralism supports liberalism.
- Q4PSIR style15 marks· 200 words
Examine Berlin's answer to the claim that political theory was in decline.
How to approach it
Laslett's 1956 claim; Berlin's 1962 essay; contested ends and the nature of political questions; the later revival through Rawls.
- Q5PSIR style15 marks· 200 words
How far does the Indian Constitution reflect Berlin's distinction between negative and positive liberty?
How to approach it
Part III as restraint and Part IV as directive; the expansion of Article 21; Puttaswamy; whether the expansion conflates liberty and its conditions.
Practice questions are original to this platform and are not previous year questions. For questions actually set by UPSC, see PYQ Intelligence.
Explore further
Ideology
PSIR Optional
Amendment
Judgment
IB Global Politics
Five-minute module
Resource
Sources and further reading
- 01Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty (1958)
- 02Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (1969); expanded as Liberty, ed. Henry Hardy (2002)
- 03Isaiah Berlin, 'Does Political Theory Still Exist?' (1962), in Concepts and Categories (1978)
- 04Isaiah Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity (1990)
- 05Michael Ignatieff, Isaiah Berlin: A Life (1998)
- 06John Gray, Isaiah Berlin (1995)
- 07George Crowder, Isaiah Berlin: Liberty and Pluralism (2004)
- 08Gerald C. MacCallum Jr., 'Negative and Positive Freedom', Philosophical Review (1967)
- 09Charles Taylor, 'What's Wrong with Negative Liberty' (1979)
- 10Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (1997)
- 11Isaiah Berlin, 'Equality', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (1956)
- 12Joshua L. Cherniss, A Mind and Its Time: The Development of Isaiah Berlin's Political Thought (2013)
- 13William A. Galston, Liberal Pluralism (2002)
- 14Benjamin Constant, 'The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with that of the Moderns' (1819)