Western political thought
Thomas Hobbes
The philosopher of fear and order, who built an absolute sovereign out of the consent of free and equal individuals and so laid the foundations of modern state theory.
Thinker dossier
1588–1679
- Key works
- The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic · 1640 (manuscript)De Cive (On the Citizen) · 1642Leviathan, or the Matter, Forme, and Power of a Common-Wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civill · 1651
- Key concepts
- State of nature · Right of nature and law of nature · Social covenant and authorisation · Absolute, indivisible sovereignty · Negative liberty
- In UPSC papers
- No linked question yet
Start here:An introduction
1 min read
Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) was an English philosopher who lived through the civil wars that tore England apart in the 1640s, including a king's trial and execution. He asked why people should obey a government at all, and what would happen without one.
His answer, in Leviathan (1651), was that without a common power life would be a war of every man against every man, in which no one could be safe. Rational people would therefore agree with one another to give up their right to do whatever they judged necessary for their own survival, and to obey a sovereign strong enough to keep the peace. That sovereign, a king or an assembly, must be absolute and undivided, but its authority rests on the consent of free and equal individuals and lasts only as long as it can protect them. A student should care because Hobbes founded modern social contract theory and the modern idea of the state, and because realists still describe a world without government in his terms.
How to read this profile
The introduction is the first reading. The seventeen parts below are the full study of Thomas Hobbes, in five movements, about 18 minutes in all. Parts marked Advanced analysis (5, 11 and 12) weigh and contest the arguments: read them once the rest is secure.
Contents · 17 parts
Movement I: Foundations
The thinker in time: the setting, the influences, the works and the principal arguments.
01Historical context
Hobbes lived through the most violent decades of English history. Disputes between Charles I and Parliament over taxation, religion and the limits of royal power led to civil war in 1642, the king's execution in January 1649 and a republic that demanded an oath of loyalty from those who had served the old regime. Religious sects, each claiming the authority of conscience and scripture, multiplied. Leviathan appeared in 1651 in the middle of the controversy over whether subjects might obey a government that had conquered their former sovereign.
He also wrote within the scientific revolution. Galileo's mechanics, Harvey's account of the circulation of blood and the geometry of Euclid persuaded him that politics too could be a demonstrative science built from clear definitions.
Life and intellectual formation
Hobbes was born in Malmesbury in 1588, the year of the Spanish Armada; he later wrote that his mother gave birth to twins, himself and fear. After Oxford he spent most of his life as tutor and secretary to the Cavendish family, which gave him access to libraries, patrons and European travel. His first publication was a translation of Thucydides (1629), whose account of civil strife in Corcyra stayed with him. On his continental travels he joined the circle of Marin Mersenne in Paris, engaged with Descartes's work and, in 1636, visited Galileo in Florence.
His Elements of Law circulated in manuscript in 1640. Fearing arrest for its defence of royal power, he left for Paris that year, where he wrote De Cive and later taught mathematics to the exiled Prince of Wales. Leviathan, with its hostility to clerical power, alienated royalist exiles, and he returned to England in 1651–52 and submitted to the Commonwealth. After the Restoration he was suspected of atheism, and in 1666 a Commons committee considered his book. He kept writing into his late eighties, translating Homer among much else, and died at Hardwick Hall in 1679.
02Intellectual influences
Hobbes took his method from geometry and the new mechanics. John Aubrey reports that he came to Euclid at about forty, finding the Elements open at the theorem of Pythagoras in a gentleman's library, and was converted to the ideal of demonstration from definitions. From Galileo, whom he visited in 1636, and the method of resolution and composition associated with the Paduan logicians, he took the procedure of breaking a whole into its simplest parts and rebuilding it; from the circle of Marin Mersenne in Paris, the mechanical philosophy of matter in motion. Thucydides, whom he translated in 1629, gave him a picture of fear, honour and interest as the springs of political conduct and, as he recalled in his verse autobiography, a low opinion of democracy. He was also formed by the humanist culture of rhetoric that he later distrusted: Quentin Skinner has shown how much Leviathan owes to the classical arts of persuasion.
Much of his thought is polemic. He rejected the Aristotelian philosophy of the universities, which chapter 46 of Leviathan calls vain philosophy; Aristotle's claim that man is by nature a political animal, which De Cive denies in its first chapter; the classical republicanism of Cicero and Livy, whose readers, he thought, learned to call kings tyrants; the parliamentarians and common lawyers who placed sovereignty in Parliament or in an ancient constitution; and every clerical claim, papal or Presbyterian, to authority independent of the sovereign, the target of his long reply to Cardinal Bellarmine in chapter 42. From Jean Bodin, whom he cites in The Elements of Law, he took the indivisibility of sovereignty and the case against the mixed constitution, but he removed the fundamental laws and rights of property that Bodin had left standing.
03Major works
- 1640 (manuscript)The Elements of Law, Natural and PoliticThe first statement of his civil philosophy, written in English for the royalist side and printed without his consent in 1650 as two treatises, Human Nature and De Corpore Politico.
- 1642De Cive (On the Citizen)A Latin treatise on liberty, dominion and religion; the second part of a planned trilogy with De Corpore (1655) and De Homine (1658).
- 1651Leviathan, or the Matter, Forme, and Power of a Common-Wealth Ecclesiasticall and CivillThe mature theory in four parts: of man, of commonwealth, of a Christian commonwealth and of the kingdom of darkness. A Latin version followed in 1668.
- written c. 1668; published 1679–1682BehemothA dialogue on the causes of the civil war, blaming clergy, universities and the imitation of ancient republics.
- published 1681A Dialogue between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of EnglandA posthumous attack on Sir Edward Coke and the common lawyers' claim that law rests on artificial reason and custom rather than on the sovereign's command.
04Principal arguments
Method and human nature
Hobbes resolves the commonwealth into its parts, individual human beings, and recomposes it. Human beings are bodies in motion, driven by appetite and aversion; what we call good is what we desire. Happiness is not repose but the continual progress of desire from one object to the next, so Hobbes puts as a general inclination of mankind "a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death". The cause is not that people are greedy by nature but that no one can secure the means of living well without acquiring more.
Equality and the state of nature
People are roughly equal: even the weakest can kill the strongest by stealth or alliance. Equality of ability produces equality of hope, and hope, when two want the same thing, produces enmity. Hobbes names three causes of quarrel: competition for gain, diffidence (distrust) for safety, and glory for reputation. Without a common power to keep them in awe, people live in a condition of war "of every man against every man". War consists not only in fighting but in the known disposition to fight. In such a condition there is no industry, agriculture, navigation, arts, letters or society, and the life of man is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short". There is also no justice or injustice, since where there is no common power there is no law.
Hobbes's evidence is partly hypothetical, partly observed: civil wars, the relations of sovereigns who stand towards one another in the posture of gladiators, and the precautions anyone takes in locking doors and travelling armed.
Right, law and covenant
The right of nature is each person's liberty to use their power to preserve their own life. A law of nature is a precept discovered by reason that forbids what is destructive of life. The first is to seek peace where it can be had; the second, to lay down one's right to all things if others will do likewise; the third, that covenants made be performed, which is the origin of justice. But reason alone cannot guarantee performance. Whoever keeps faith first exposes himself to those who do not, and "covenants, without the sword, are but words".
The limits of obedience
Absolutism has limits that follow from its purpose. No one can give up the right to resist those who assault him, so a subject may refuse to kill or wound himself and may resist even the sovereign's officers who come to kill him. Liberty in a commonwealth lies where the law is silent. And the obligation of subjects lasts as long as, and no longer than, the sovereign's power to protect them: a government that can no longer protect cannot claim obedience.
On human nature
Hobbes's politics rests on a mechanical psychology. Human beings are bodies moved by appetite and aversion; 'good' names what a person desires and 'evil' what he shuns, so outside a commonwealth there is no common measure of good. Felicity is not rest but continual success in obtaining what one desires, and since the future is uncertain the prudent seek ever more power to secure what they already have. Reason is reckoning, the calculation of consequences, and it serves the passions rather than ruling them. Three features make people dangerous to one another: rough equality of ability, which breeds equal hope; competition for scarce goods; and the love of glory, which makes them quarrel over trifles such as a word, a smile or a different opinion. Unlike the bees and ants that Aristotle counted political creatures, humans compare themselves with others, distinguish private from common good and use speech to misrepresent good and evil, so their agreement is artificial and needs a common power to hold it.
The same nature points towards peace: "The passions that incline men to peace are fear of death, desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living, and a hope by their industry to obtain them" (Leviathan, chapter 13). Whether this amounts to psychological egoism is disputed. Hobbes allows benevolence and pity among the passions, and Bernard Gert argued that his theory needs only the claim that fear of death usually prevails, not that people never act for others.
Movement II: Theory
What the thinker added to political theory, the concepts they defined, and their positions on the state, power, liberty, equality, justice and democracy.
05Major theoretical contributions
Advanced analysis
Hobbes founded modern political philosophy as a deductive science. Breaking the commonwealth into its parts, individual human beings and their passions, and rebuilding it by reasoning, he tried to put politics on the footing of geometry rather than custom, scripture or classical authority.
He reversed the classical starting point. Where Aristotle held that human beings are political by nature, Hobbes argued that political order is artificial, created by agreement among naturally free and equal individuals, and he shifted the language of natural law from duties towards rights, beginning with the right of nature to preserve oneself.
His social contract gave political authority a new foundation in consent, and his theory of authorisation and representation made the sovereign an artificial person acting in the name of all, which Skinner reads as the first clear statement of the state as a person distinct from both rulers and ruled.
He gave the classic modern account of sovereignty as absolute, undivided and the source of law and property, and of law as command rather than custom, which shaped legal positivism.
He defined liberty negatively, as the absence of external impediments, setting the terms of later debates, and his state of nature, a condition of insecurity without a common power, became the founding image of realist thought about international anarchy. Even liberal critics who rejected his absolutism adopted his premises.
06Conceptual definitions
- State of nature
The condition of human beings without a common power: a war of all against all, more a thought experiment about the absence of government than a historical epoch, though Hobbes points to civil war as its image.
- Right of nature and law of nature
The liberty to preserve oneself by any means, and the rational precepts that forbid self-destruction and direct people towards peace. Hobbes sharply distinguishes right as liberty from law as obligation.
- Social covenant and authorisation
Each covenants with each to authorise a representative. The sovereign's unity is created by representation, and subjects own the sovereign's acts as their own.
- Absolute, indivisible sovereignty
Sovereign power cannot be limited, divided or forfeited by any covenant, because any such limit would need a higher judge and so reopen the war.
- Negative liberty
Liberty is the absence of external impediments to motion. A subject who acts from fear acts freely, and liberty in a commonwealth lies in the silence of the law.
- Protection and obedience
The mutual relation that ends obligation when protection fails, which allowed Hobbes to justify submission to the new republic.
07Theory of the State
The state is an artificial person, created when a multitude is made one by being represented by one man or assembly: "that great Leviathan, or rather, to speak more reverently, of that mortal god, to which we owe under the immortal God our peace and defence" (chapter 17). It has no basis in natural sociability, and its only justification is protection. Skinner reads Hobbes as the first theorist to separate the person of the state from both ruler and ruled.
08Theory of Power
Power is a person's present means to obtain some future apparent good. It includes natural eminence of body and mind and instrumental power acquired through them: riches, reputation, friends. Because power is relative, the desire for security drives an endless competition that only a superior common power can halt, and the greatest of human powers is the one compounded of the powers of most men united by consent in one person, which is the commonwealth.
09Liberty and equality
Liberty
Liberty is physical freedom from external constraint, compatible with fear and with necessity. Hobbes ridicules the republican claim that citizens of free states are freer than subjects of monarchs. A free man, Leviathan chapter 21 explains, is one who is not hindered from doing what he has the strength and wit to do and wills to do. Actions done from fear, such as obeying the law to escape punishment, remain free. The liberty of subjects therefore lies in the silence of the law: buying and selling, choosing one's abode, diet and trade, and bringing up one's children as one thinks fit. The word Libertas on the turrets of Lucca, he observes, gives its citizens no more liberty than the subjects of Constantinople.
Equality
Natural equality of vulnerability, not of virtue or worth, is the starting point. The ninth law of nature commands every person to acknowledge others as equal by nature, and names its breach pride. Inequality of honour and rank is created by the sovereign and has no natural foundation, which is why Hobbes rejects Aristotle's natural masters and slaves. The same premise shapes his account of worth: a person's value, chapter 10 says, is like that of anything else, his price, set by others' estimation of his power rather than by any natural rank.
Rights
The one right that cannot be alienated is the right to preserve one's life. It is the root of the later liberal language of inalienable rights, though Hobbes uses it to defend absolute rule.
10Justice and democracy
Justice
There is no justice before the covenant. Justice is the keeping of covenants, and property itself is a creation of the sovereign's law. The third law of nature, that men perform their covenants made, is in Leviathan's words 'the fountain and original of justice', and injustice is simply the failure to perform a covenant. Since covenants without a power to enforce them are void, justice in practice begins with the commonwealth, and what the sovereign does cannot injure subjects who authorised it. Hobbes rejects the classical division of justice into arithmetical and geometrical proportion (chapter 15), but chapter 30 asks the sovereign to administer justice equally to rich and poor and to levy taxes equitably.
Democracy
Democracy is a legitimate form of sovereignty, and in The Elements of Law and De Cive the first in order of time, since those who assemble to institute a commonwealth are by that act a democracy that may then transfer its power. But Hobbes thinks it the least convenient form. Assemblies are moved by orators who inflame rather than inform, cannot keep counsel secret, change their membership and policy, and breed faction among the ambitious; the Elements describes democracy as in effect an aristocracy of orators interrupted by the temporary monarchy of one orator. What matters is that sovereignty be held entire: a democratic sovereign is as absolute as a king.
Movement III: Critique
How the arguments have been attacked, and how scholars read them differently.
11Criticisms
Advanced analysis
- 01
John Locke
Locke's Second Treatise distinguishes the state of nature, governed by a law of nature known to reason, from the state of war, and mocks those who guard against polecats and foxes but are content to be devoured by lions. Whether Locke aimed at Hobbes or at royal absolutism generally, the argument strikes at Hobbes's logic.
- 02
Jean-Jacques Rousseau
In the Discourse on Inequality Rousseau argues that Hobbes attributed to natural man passions, pride and competitive fear, that only society produces. Natural man is solitary and gentle, moved by self-love and pity.
- 03
John Bramhall
The Bishop of Derry attacked Hobbes's determinism in their debate on liberty and necessity, and in The Catching of Leviathan (1658) argued that his system dissolved religion, morality and every obligation not backed by fear.
- 04
C. B. Macpherson
The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (1962) argues that Hobbes's 'natural' man is the competitive individual of an emerging market society, so his state of nature is a mirror of seventeenth-century bourgeois relations.
- 05
Carole Pateman
Pateman notes that Hobbes's state of nature gives mothers dominion over infants, yet women are subordinate in his civil society. The Sexual Contract (1988) asks how equal women became subjects of men, and answers that the contract story conceals a prior conquest.
- 06
Robert Filmer
In Observations Concerning the Originall of Government (1652) the patriarchalist Filmer accepted Hobbes's account of the rights of sovereignty but rejected his way of acquiring them. A contract among naturally free and equal individuals, he argued, was both unhistorical and subversive, since what consent creates consent can unmake.
12Scholarly debates
Advanced analysis
How scholars have read Thomas Hobbes differently. An answer that names the reading it follows is stronger than one that treats the text as settled.
Founder of liberalism, or of possessive individualism
Leo Strauss argued in The Political Philosophy of Hobbes (1936) that Hobbes's science rested on a prior moral attitude, the opposition between the fear of violent death and vanity, and in Natural Right and History (1953) called him the founder of liberalism, because he made rights rather than duties the fundamental political fact and the protection of rights the function of the state. C. B. Macpherson (1962) agreed that something modern began with Hobbes but gave it a Marxist name: Hobbes's natural man, competitive and acquisitive, is the man of a possessive market society, and the state of nature abstracts the social relations of seventeenth-century England. Michael Oakeshott's introduction to Leviathan (1946) offered a third version: a philosopher of individuality and civil association who, without being a liberal, supplied more of liberalism's philosophy than most of its professed defenders. Against all three, critics point to Hobbes's censorship, his established church and his denial of any right of rebellion.
Prudence or duty: the ground of obligation
A. E. Taylor ('The Ethical Doctrine of Hobbes', 1938) argued that Hobbes's ethics can be detached from his psychology and read as a strict deontology, and Howard Warrender's The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: His Theory of Obligation (1957) held that the laws of nature oblige because they are commands of God, so that self-interest explains motivation but not obligation. A. P. Martinich's The Two Gods of Leviathan (1992) extended the religious reading. Thomas Nagel (1959) and the rational-choice readers replied that Hobbesian obligation is prudential: the laws of nature are theorems about what conduces to self-preservation. David Gauthier (The Logic of Leviathan, 1969), Gregory Kavka and Jean Hampton (both 1986) recast the state of nature as a prisoner's dilemma or an assurance problem. Hampton argued that the conflict arises from short-sighted passion and the absence of an agreed judge as much as from rational calculation, and doubted that the argument for an absolute sovereign succeeds.
Hobbes in his polemical context
Quentin Skinner, from 'The Ideological Context of Hobbes's Political Thought' (1966) to Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes (1996) and Hobbes and Republican Liberty (2008), reads Hobbes as an intervention in the arguments of his time. The theory of authorisation answered parliamentarians who said that sovereignty lay with the people; the definition of liberty as the absence of external impediment was devised to defeat the neo-Roman claim that only the citizens of free states are free; and the 'Review and Conclusion' of Leviathan joined the engagement controversy of 1649–51 over obedience to the new republic. Richard Tuck and Noel Malcolm have added the sceptical and European contexts. The contextual reading does not deny Hobbes's philosophical ambition, but it holds that his concepts cannot be understood apart from the opponents they were written against.
Movement IV: Legacy
Why the thinker matters now, whom they connect with, and the arguments applied in India and beyond.
13Contemporary relevance
Hobbes framed the questions every modern state still answers: what justifies coercion, what happens when government collapses, and how much liberty may be traded for security. International relations realists treat the absence of a world sovereign as a Hobbesian condition, and Alexander Wendt's constructivism describes a 'Hobbesian culture' of anarchy as one possibility among others. Debates about emergency powers, counter-terrorism law and state-building in collapsed states all replay the bargain of protection for obedience, and his own limit, that the right to life cannot be surrendered, is the hinge of the liberal reply.
14Connections with other thinkers
Each connection recorded in this profile, by relation: who shaped Thomas Hobbes, whom Thomas Hobbes shaped, and who argued with or against them.
Influenced by
Jean Bodin1530
Hobbes cites Bodin on the incoherence of divided sovereignty, then pushes the argument further by making property and the fundamental laws creatures of the sovereign rather than limits upon it.
Influenced
Alexander Wendt1958
Wendt's 'Hobbesian culture' of anarchy treats the state of nature as one socially constructed international order.
In contrast with
Kautilya320 BCE
Kautilya's matsyanyaya also justifies coercive rule by the chaos it prevents, but within a dharmic and dynastic order.
Both begin from insecurity; Machiavelli turns conflict into republican liberty, Hobbes ends it with an undivided sovereign.
Critic of
Aristotle384 BCE
Hobbes rejects the natural political animal and the classical idea of a highest good.
Criticised by
John Locke1632
Locke's constitutional, limited government answers the absolutist conclusion from within the same contract tradition.
Rousseau's natural man is constructed directly against Hobbes's picture of the state of nature.
Carole Pateman1940
Pateman's feminist rereading treats Hobbes as the clearest case of the sexual contract hidden in the social contract.
Also recorded on other profiles
Connections that other profiles in the Atlas make to Thomas Hobbes, read from Thomas Hobbes’s side. Their notes are on those profiles.
- Influenced
- Kenneth N. Waltz
- In dialogue with
- Hanna Fenichel Pitkin
- In contrast with
- John Stuart Mill
- Criticised by
- Michel Foucault
Compare side by side
The written comparisons that involve Thomas Hobbes, and pairings to open in the Comparison Lab, chosen from the connections above.
Curated comparisons
- Compared directly · 11 questionsHobbes, Locke and RousseauHobbesLockeRousseauThree social contract theorists who used the same device, a state of nature and an agreement to leave it, to reach absolute sovereignty, limited constitutional government and popular self-legislation.
- Discussed in · 11 questionsRealism and liberalismClassical realismStructural realismLiberal institutionalismThe central debate of international relations: whether anarchy condemns states to competition for power, or whether institutions, interdependence and domestic politics allow durable cooperation.
Open in the Comparison Lab
- In contrast withThomas Hobbes and KautilyaSide by side on the state, power, justice, liberty, equality and democracy.Compare
- In contrast withThomas Hobbes and Niccolò MachiavelliSide by side on the state, power, justice, liberty, equality and democracy.Compare
- Critic ofThomas Hobbes and AristotleSide by side on the state, power, justice, liberty, equality, democracy and rights.Compare
- Your own comparisonThomas Hobbes and a thinker of your choiceChoose up to two more thinkers in the Comparison Lab and read their positions question by question.Open the Comparison Lab
15Indian and international applications
In India
Classical Indian thought offers a close parallel in matsyanyaya, the law of the fishes, by which the strong devour the weak when there is no king to wield danda; the Arthashastra and the Shanti Parva of the Mahabharata both use it to justify kingship. The Hobbesian question surfaced in ADM Jabalpur (1976), where the majority held that during the Emergency no one could move the courts to enforce the right to life. Hobbes himself regarded the right to resist those who come to kill you as inalienable, so the majority went further than Leviathan. The nine-judge bench in Puttaswamy (2017) repudiated that reasoning.
In the world
The vocabulary of 'failed states', post-conflict reconstruction and the security dilemma is Hobbesian. So is the persistent argument, in pandemics and wars, that extraordinary threats justify concentrating power in the executive.
Movement V: Examination
Where the thinker sits in the syllabus, and what UPSC has asked.
16Exact syllabus mapping
PSIR Optional
Paper I · Part A · Political Theory and Politics
Theories of state
Theories of state: Liberal, Neo-liberal, Marxist, Pluralist, post-colonial and Feminist.
Official wording · 3 official questions on this line in the PYQ dataset, 2024–26
PSIR Optional
Paper I · Part A · Political Theory and Politics
Rights
Rights: Meaning and theories; different kinds of rights; Concept of Human Rights.
Official wording · 2 official questions on this line in the PYQ dataset, 2024–26
PSIR Optional
Paper I · Part A · Political Theory and Politics
Western Political Thought
Western Political Thought: Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, John S. Mill, Marx, Gramsci, Hannah Arendt.
Official wording · 7 official questions on this line in the PYQ dataset, 2024–26
PSIR Optional
Paper II · Part A · Comparative Politics and International Relations
Approaches to the Study of International Relations
Approaches to the Study of International Relations: Idealist, Realist, Marxist, Functionalist and Systems theory.
Official wording · 6 official questions on this line in the PYQ dataset, 2024–26
The syllabus lines this profile of Thomas Hobbes serves. Progress is kept on this device and gathered on your dashboard.
Beyond the optional: General Studies
GS Paper II: emergency provisions and preventive detention raise the Hobbesian trade-off between security and liberty. The Essay paper often invites the question whether order is the precondition of freedom.
17Related PYQs (official wording)
No linked question yet
None of the questions in the PYQ dataset is linked to Thomas Hobbes, so none is shown here. The practice questions further down are original to this platform, not previous year questions.
Dataset searched: Nine official papers, 228 questions: GS Paper II, PSIR Paper I, PSIR Paper II, 2024–2026.
Browse every question in PYQ IntelligenceUsing Hobbes in an answer
Hobbes is named in the Western political thought unit and is the natural starting point for Theories of state, especially the social contract and sovereignty, and for the realist approach in Paper II, where the absence of a world sovereign is treated as a Hobbesian condition. GS Paper II questions on emergency powers and preventive detention replay his trade-off between security and liberty.
Lead with the state of nature as a thought experiment about the absence of a common power: rough equality, the three causes of quarrel in competition, diffidence and glory, and a war of every man against every man. Then show how the right and laws of nature lead to a covenant of authorisation that creates an absolute, indivisible sovereign, since covenants without the sword cannot secure peace. Contrast him with Locke, who uses the same contract method to reach limited government, with Rousseau, who argues that Hobbes attributed social passions to natural man, and with the natural political animal of Aristotle; the matsyanyaya of Kautilya is the Indian parallel. Wendt later recast the Hobbesian condition as one culture of anarchy among others.
Evaluate through Macpherson's claim that his natural man is the competitive individual of market society, and the question of Pateman about how equal women become subordinate. Avoid presenting Hobbes as a defender of tyranny or divine right: his sovereign rests on consent, and obligation ends when protection fails. Do not treat the state of nature as a historical epoch.
Practice questions (original)
- Q1PSIR style20 marks· 250 words
"Hobbes's premises are individualist; his conclusions are absolutist." Examine.
How to approach it
Equality, self-preservation and consent as individualist premises; authorisation and indivisible sovereignty as absolutist conclusions; the residual right to life; Strauss and Macpherson on whether he is a liberal.
- Q2PSIR style10 marks· 150 words
Is Hobbes's state of nature a historical account or a logical construction? Explain its significance for his theory.
How to approach it
Hypothetical device with observational support (civil war, sovereigns, locked doors); its function in justifying obligation; contrast with Locke.
- Q3PSIR style15 marks· 200 words
"Covenants, without the sword, are but words." Explain in the context of Hobbes's theory of political obligation.
How to approach it
Laws of nature oblige in conscience but not in action without security; the first-performer problem; the sovereign as enforcer; whether obligation rests on prudence or on consent.
- Q4PSIR style15 marks· 200 words
Critically assess the claim that Hobbes is the founder of modern liberalism.
How to approach it
Rights before duties, individual consent, negative liberty, the state as artifice; against it, absolutism, censorship and no right of rebellion; a balanced verdict.
- Q5PSIR style15 marks· 200 words
Assess the relevance of Hobbes's idea of the state of nature to the realist understanding of international politics.
How to approach it
Sovereigns as gladiators; anarchy, self-help and the security dilemma; limits of the analogy (states are less vulnerable and less equal than individuals); Wendt's cultures of anarchy.
- Q6PSIR style15 marks· 200 words
Compare Bodin and Hobbes on the limits of sovereign power.
How to approach it
Bodin's absolute and perpetual power bound by divine and natural law, the fundamental laws and the property of subjects; Hobbes's authorised representative limited only by the purpose of protection and the inalienable right of self-preservation; why Hobbes thought Bodin's limits reopened the problem of divided sovereignty.
Practice questions are original to this platform and are not previous year questions. For questions actually set by UPSC, see PYQ Intelligence.
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Ideology
PSIR Optional
Judgment
IB Global Politics
Five-minute module
Resource
Timeline
Sources and further reading
- 01Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1651), especially chapters 13–21 and 29
- 02Thomas Hobbes, De Cive (1642) and The Elements of Law (1640)
- 03Noel Malcolm (ed.), Leviathan, Clarendon Edition (2012)
- 04Quentin Skinner, Hobbes and Republican Liberty (2008)
- 05Richard Tuck, Hobbes (1989)
- 06C. B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (1962)
- 07Leo Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes (1936)
- 08Jean Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition (1986)
- 09Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract (1988)
- 10Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (1953)
- 11Howard Warrender, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: His Theory of Obligation (1957)
- 12David Gauthier, The Logic of Leviathan (1969)
- 13Michael Oakeshott, Introduction to Leviathan (1946), reprinted in Hobbes on Civil Association (1975)
- 14Quentin Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes (1996)
- 15Robert Filmer, Observations Concerning the Originall of Government (1652)