Contemporary political theory
Robert Nozick
The Harvard philosopher whose Anarchy, State, and Utopia defended the minimal state and an entitlement theory of justice, arguing that individual rights are side constraints no social goal can override, and that liberty upsets every pattern of distribution.
Thinker dossier
1938–2002
- Key works
- Anarchy, State, and Utopia · 1974Philosophical Explanations · 1981The Examined Life · 1989
- Key concepts
- Rights as side constraints · Separateness of persons · Minimal (night-watchman) state · Entitlement theory · Historical versus patterned principles
- In UPSC papers
- No linked question yet
Start here:An introduction
1 min read
Robert Nozick (1938–2002) was an American philosopher who taught at Harvard for more than thirty years. In 1974, three years after his colleague John Rawls published A Theory of Justice, he wrote Anarchy, State, and Utopia, the most rigorous philosophical defence of libertarianism.
His question was what, if anything, a state may legitimately do to its citizens. His answer started from individual rights: people own themselves and what they acquire justly, and no government, however well meaning, may take their holdings to help others. Only a minimal state, protecting people against force, theft and fraud and enforcing contracts, can be justified, and taxation to redistribute income violates rights. His Wilt Chamberlain example argued that free choices will always upset any pattern of equal or fair shares. A student should care because Nozick is the classic libertarian reply to Rawls, defined the entitlement theory of justice, and frames arguments about taxation, welfare and property that recur in every debate on the state.
How to read this profile
The introduction is the first reading. The seventeen parts below are the full study of Robert Nozick, in five movements, about 15 minutes in all. Parts marked Advanced analysis (5, 11 and 12) weigh and contest the arguments: read them once the rest is secure.
Contents · 17 parts
Movement I: Foundations
The thinker in time: the setting, the influences, the works and the principal arguments.
01Historical context
Nozick wrote at a turning point. By the early 1970s the post-war consensus on the welfare state and Keynesian management was under strain, and economists such as Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman were making the case for markets with growing influence. In philosophy, Rawls's A Theory of Justice (1971) had just offered a powerful liberal-egalitarian defence of redistribution. Nozick, Rawls's colleague in the Harvard philosophy department, replied with the most rigorous philosophical defence of libertarianism of the century.
His concern was not efficiency, which was the economists' ground, but rights. Where others defended markets because they produce wealth, Nozick argued that redistributive taxation is wrong even if it would make society better off, because it violates the rights of persons.
Life and intellectual formation
Born in Brooklyn in 1938 to Jewish immigrants from Russia, Nozick was a socialist as a student at Columbia. He took his doctorate at Princeton, working on decision theory, and a conversation with the libertarian economist Murray Rothbard, which he credits in the preface to Anarchy, State, and Utopia, drew him to individualist anarchism; he set out to see whether a state could be justified at all. He became a full professor at Harvard at thirty and taught there for the rest of his life.
Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974) won the National Book Award. Nozick then turned to other subjects, knowledge, personal identity, the meaning of life, rationality and objectivity, and never wrote a sequel. In The Examined Life (1989) he said the libertarian position he had once propounded now seemed to him seriously inadequate, because it neglected the symbolic importance of joint action through government. He died in 2002.
02Intellectual influences
Nozick's starting points were Locke and Kant. From Locke's Second Treatise he took the state of nature, natural rights, the inconveniences of private enforcement that make protective arrangements rational, and the labour theory of acquisition with its proviso; from Kant, the principle that individuals are ends and not merely means, which grounds rights as side constraints. The individualist anarchists, Murray Rothbard above all, posed the challenge to which Part I replies, and F. A. Hayek's critique of 'social justice' and his account of spontaneous order shaped the argument that patterns cannot be maintained without continual interference. Decision theory and game theory, his doctoral field, supplied the invisible-hand explanations and much of the analytical style. The socialism he had held as a student gave him his sense of the opposing case.
He reacted against Rawls's A Theory of Justice, above all its treatment of natural talents as a common asset and its end-state conception of distributive justice; against utilitarianism's willingness to sacrifice individuals for aggregate welfare; and against redistributive taxation. In his later books he reacted, in part, against his own earlier position.
03Major works
- 1974Anarchy, State, and UtopiaPart I justifies the minimal state against the anarchist; Part II argues that no more extensive state is justified; Part III presents the minimal state as a framework for utopia.
- 1981Philosophical ExplanationsKnowledge, free will, personal identity and the foundations of ethics.
- 1989The Examined LifePhilosophical meditations, including his reconsideration of libertarianism.
- 1993The Nature of RationalityDecision theory and the symbolic value of actions.
- 2001InvariancesObjectivity, truth and the structure of the objective world.
04Principal arguments
Rights as side constraints
The preface of Anarchy, State, and Utopia begins: "Individuals have rights, and there are things no person or group may do to them (without violating their rights)." Rights are side constraints on action, not goals to be maximised. One may not violate one person's rights even to prevent more violations elsewhere. The ground is Kantian: individuals are ends, not merely means, and there is no social entity that can undergo a sacrifice for its own greater good, only individual people with their own lives. Using one person for the benefit of others does not respect the fact that each is a separate person.
From anarchy to the minimal state
Part I answers the anarchist. Begin with a Lockean state of nature in which people have rights but face the inconveniences of enforcing them. They form protective associations; competition among them produces a dominant association in each territory, an 'ultra-minimal' state. If it prohibits independents from using risky private procedures of enforcement, it must compensate them, which it does by protecting them too. The result is a minimal state, limited to protection against force, theft and fraud and the enforcement of contracts, which arises by an invisible-hand process without violating anyone's rights.
The entitlement theory
Part II holds that "the minimal state is the most extensive state that can be justified." Nozick's entitlement theory has three parts: justice in acquisition, how unowned things may come to be owned; justice in transfer, how holdings pass from one person to another, by voluntary exchange and gift; and the rectification of injustice in either. A distribution is just if it arose from a just distribution by just steps. The theory is historical: it asks how a distribution came about, not what shape it has. It contrasts with end-state principles, which judge the current pattern, and with patterned principles, which distribute according to some natural dimension such as need, merit or effort. Nozick's alternative slogan is: "From each as they choose, to each as they are chosen."
Liberty upsets patterns
The Wilt Chamberlain argument makes the case. Begin with any distribution you consider just. A million fans each freely pay twenty-five cents to watch the basketball star play; at the end of the season he is far richer than anyone else. Each step was voluntary, and the starting point was just by hypothesis, so how can the result be unjust? Maintaining any pattern requires continual interference to stop people from using their holdings as they choose, or periodic seizure of what they have been given. "The socialist society would have to forbid capitalist acts between consenting adults." Taxation of earnings from labour, Nozick argues, is on a par with forced labour, since it takes the fruits of some hours of a person's work for the purposes of others.
Acquisition and the proviso
Nozick follows Locke on acquisition but questions him. Why should mixing labour with something make it mine, rather than mean I have lost my labour, as when I pour a can of tomato juice into the sea? He keeps a weakened Lockean proviso: an appropriation is illegitimate if it worsens the situation of others. One may not, for example, appropriate the only water hole in a desert and charge what one will.
Against Rawls
Rawls's difference principle, Nozick argues, treats goods as if they fell like manna from heaven, ignoring that they are produced by particular people who have entitlements to them. And whether or not natural talents are arbitrary from a moral point of view, people are entitled to them and to what flows from them, so long as they acquired them without violating others' rights. To treat talents as a common asset is to deny that people own themselves.
Utopia and rectification
Part III presents the minimal state as a framework for utopia, within which people may form whatever voluntary communities they wish, including socialist ones, but may not impose their vision on others. Nozick also conceded that past injustices might be so great as to make a more extensive state necessary in the short run to rectify them, a concession whose implications for societies built on conquest and slavery he left largely unexplored.
On human nature
Nozick grounds rights in what persons are. Chapter 3 of Anarchy, State, and Utopia asks which features of human beings make side constraints appropriate, and proposes a cluster: rationality, free will, moral agency and, above all, the capacity to regulate one's life in accordance with an overall conception one chooses to accept, which he connects with the meaning of a life. The experience machine makes the point from the other side: people want to do certain things and to be certain kinds of people, not merely to have experiences. The separateness of persons, each with a single life of their own, is the moral fact on which the rest depends.
Movement II: Theory
What the thinker added to political theory, the concepts they defined, and their positions on the state, power, liberty, equality, justice and democracy.
05Major theoretical contributions
Advanced analysis
Nozick's main contribution was to give libertarianism a rigorous philosophical foundation in rights rather than in economic efficiency. By treating rights as side constraints, limits on what anyone may do to a person rather than goals to be maximised, he grounded political theory in the Kantian separateness of persons and turned that idea against both utilitarianism and Rawls.
He introduced the entitlement theory of justice and the distinctions that still frame the debate: historical against end-state principles, and unpatterned against patterned ones. With the Wilt Chamberlain argument he posed a problem every egalitarian theory must answer: liberty upsets patterns, so maintaining any distribution requires continuing interference with free choices.
He offered a new justification of the state against the anarchist: an invisible-hand account of how a minimal state could arise from a state of nature without violating anyone's rights, which revived the social-contract question of the state's legitimacy in analytical form.
His claim that taxation of earnings is on a par with forced labour, together with the idea of self-ownership, became the main target of egalitarian and left-libertarian critics such as G. A. Cohen.
Finally, Part III recast the minimal state as a framework for utopia in which people choose among voluntary communities. Together these ideas made Anarchy, State, and Utopia the indispensable counterpart to A Theory of Justice.
06Conceptual definitions
- Rights as side constraints
Rights limit what may be done to persons and may not be traded off against aggregate goods.
- Separateness of persons
There is no social entity with a good of its own; sacrificing one person for others uses them as a means.
- Minimal (night-watchman) state
A state limited to protection against force, theft and fraud and the enforcement of contracts.
- Entitlement theory
Justice in acquisition, justice in transfer and rectification: a distribution is just if it arose by just steps.
- Historical versus patterned principles
Judging distributions by their history, not by their shape or by a criterion such as need or merit.
- Lockean proviso
Appropriation must not worsen the situation of others, Nozick's weakened version of Locke's condition.
- Experience machine
A thought experiment showing that people value doing and being, not only pleasant experiences, an argument against hedonism.
07Theory of the State
Only a minimal state is justified. Any more extensive state, including one that redistributes income or provides welfare by taxation, violates rights. The minimal state, the night-watchman state of classical liberal theory, protects against force, theft and fraud and enforces contracts. Part I argues against the anarchist that it can arise legitimately, by an invisible-hand process in which a dominant protective association emerges and compensates independents for prohibiting their risky methods of enforcement. Part III presents it as a framework for utopia: by refusing to impose any single vision of the good life, it leaves people free to form voluntary communities, socialist, religious or experimental, according to their own ideals.
08Theory of Power
Nozick's political theory is a theory of the legitimate use of coercion. The state is justified only as the dominant protective association holding a de facto monopoly of force in its territory, and its power may be used only to protect rights against force, theft and fraud. Any further use, to redistribute, to enforce morals or to make people help themselves, is illegitimate coercion. He denies that unequal market power coerces in the same way: chapter 8 argues that whether an action is voluntary depends on whether those who limited one's options acted within their rights, so a worker who must take a job or starve is not forced if others acted rightly. Critics reply that this makes freedom depend on a prior theory of rights.
09Liberty and equality
Liberty
Liberty is the free exercise of rights over one's person and holdings. It is incompatible with maintaining any distributive pattern. Its foundation is a principle of self-ownership: each person has rights over his body, talents and labour, and so to what he acquires through them, which is why taxing earnings is likened to forced labour and to making others part-owners of the taxed person. Liberty is negative, freedom from interference, and Nozick denies that lacking options because of others' legitimate choices makes one unfree. The Wilt Chamberlain example shows liberty upsetting patterns: free people acting on their rights continually depart from any distribution a principle prescribes.
Equality
Equality of outcome has no special claim. Inequalities that result from free exchange are not unjust, though Nozick allowed that rectifying past injustice might require redistribution. Anarchy, State, and Utopia challenges arguments for equality directly. Chapter 7 replies that Rawls's claim that natural talents are morally arbitrary does not show that their fruits belong to society, since people are entitled to their natural assets and to what flows from them, deserved or not; chapter 8 argues that equality of opportunity cannot be secured without using the holdings of some to provide it for others, which violates their rights. The equality he accepts is an equality of rights: everyone is protected by the same side constraints.
Rights
Rights, including self-ownership and property, are side constraints grounded in the inviolability of persons. They are negative: rights not to be interfered with, not rights to be provided for.
10Justice and democracy
Justice
Justice is historical entitlement. There is no just pattern of distribution to be achieved; whatever arises from just holdings by voluntary transfer is just. The theory has three principles: justice in acquisition, justice in transfer and the rectification of past injustice. Acquisition is limited by a Lockean proviso that others not be made worse off by an appropriation, and rectification may require large transfers where holdings descend from theft, conquest or enslavement. Nozick conceded that, without detailed historical information, a rough rule of thumb for rectification might resemble a pattern favouring the worst off, and that past injustice might justify a more extensive state in the short run.
Democracy
Majority rule has no special authority over what belongs to individuals. In 'The Tale of the Slave' (chapter 9) Nozick describes a sequence that begins with a slave at the mercy of a brutal master and ends with a person who has one vote among ten thousand 'masters' who decide what everyone may do, and asks at which step the story stopped being a tale of slavery. Democratic participation does not convert collective control over a person's life and holdings into respect for his rights.
Movement III: Critique
How the arguments have been attacked, and how scholars read them differently.
11Criticisms
Advanced analysis
- 01
Thomas Nagel
'Libertarianism without Foundations' (1975) argued that Nozick asserts his strong rights without justifying them, and that a plausible theory of rights would include positive rights and permit taxation to meet basic needs.
- 02
G. A. Cohen
Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Equality (1995) argued that self-ownership does not entail unequal ownership of external resources, and that the Wilt Chamberlain fans could not foresee or consent to the power the resulting inequality would give him over others.
- 03
Will Kymlicka
Kymlicka's Contemporary Political Philosophy (1990) pressed the historical objection: actual holdings almost everywhere trace back to conquest and fraud, so the entitlement theory, consistently applied, would condemn rather than vindicate existing property.
- 04
Amartya Sen
Sen argued that a system of libertarian entitlements could be fully respected while people starve: his studies of famine showed that famines can occur without any violation of property rights.
- 05
Robert Nozick
In The Examined Life (1989) Nozick himself judged his earlier libertarianism seriously inadequate, because it did not allow for the value of acting together through government to express solidarity.
12Scholarly debates
Advanced analysis
How scholars have read Robert Nozick differently. An answer that names the reading it follows is stronger than one that treats the text as settled.
Libertarianism without foundations, or with Kantian ones
Nozick admitted in his preface that he offered no precise theory of the moral basis of individual rights. Thomas Nagel ('Libertarianism without Foundations', 1975) and many later critics concluded that the strong rights are simply assumed, and that a plausible foundation, respect for persons, would also support positive rights. Defenders such as Eric Mack and Jonathan Wolff's sympathetic critical study (1991) reconstruct the argument from the separateness of persons and the capacity to shape a life, and ask whether any rival theory has a firmer foundation for its own principles.
Left-libertarianism: self-ownership without inequality
A group of philosophers accepted Nozick's self-ownership while rejecting his conclusions about external resources. Hillel Steiner (An Essay on Rights, 1994), Peter Vallentyne and Michael Otsuka (Libertarianism without Inequality, 2003) argued that the Lockean proviso, properly understood, gives everyone an equal claim to natural resources, so that self-owners owe compensation for what they appropriate and a strongly egalitarian distribution is compatible with full self-ownership. G. A. Cohen's critique (1995) attacked self-ownership itself. The debate shows that the weakest link in Nozick's case may be acquisition, not transfer.
Apostasy or refinement: the later Nozick
The Examined Life (1989) said the libertarian position he had once propounded now seemed seriously inadequate, because it gave no place to the symbolic value of acting together through government, and critics took this as a recantation. In an interview with Julian Sanchez in 2001 Nozick said that he had become less 'hardcore' but that reports of his apostasy were much exaggerated, and that he still worked within a broadly libertarian framework. David Schmidtz and others read the change as narrower than a retreat; the Stanford Encyclopedia account notes that he downplayed the repudiation in his last years.
Movement IV: Legacy
Why the thinker matters now, whom they connect with, and the arguments applied in India and beyond.
13Contemporary relevance
Nozick gave libertarianism philosophical respectability. His arguments, rights as side constraints, the distinction between historical and patterned principles, the Wilt Chamberlain case and the claim that taxation resembles forced labour, remain the standard objections to redistribution in political philosophy, even among those who reject them. His influence on public policy is often overstated: the market reforms of the 1980s drew more on Hayek and Friedman's arguments from efficiency than on Nozick's arguments from rights. His real legacy is to have forced egalitarians to explain why the state may take what people have acquired by voluntary exchange.
14Connections with other thinkers
Each connection recorded in this profile, by relation: who shaped Robert Nozick, whom Robert Nozick shaped, and who argued with or against them.
Influenced by
John Locke1632
Nozick begins from Locke's state of nature, rights and theory of acquisition, while doubting the labour-mixing argument.
In contrast with
Michael Sandel1953
Nozick's self-owning individual is exactly the unencumbered self that Sandel's communitarian critique rejects.
Karl Marx1818
Self-ownership against exploitation: Cohen's critique of Nozick is a Marxist argument conducted on Nozick's own ground.
Critic of
John Rawls1921
Anarchy, State, and Utopia is a direct reply to A Theory of Justice, written by his Harvard colleague.
Criticised by
Amartya Sen1933
Sen's work on famine shows that respect for entitlements can coexist with mass starvation.
Carole Pateman1940
Pateman's critique of property in the person challenges the self-ownership on which Nozick's theory rests.
Compare side by side
The written comparisons that involve Robert Nozick, and pairings to open in the Comparison Lab, chosen from the connections above.
Curated comparisons
- Compared directly · 9 questionsRawls and NozickRawlsNozickTwo Harvard colleagues who began from the same commitment to the separateness of persons and reached opposite conclusions: justice as fairness and the redistributive state, against entitlement and the minimal state.
- Discussed in · 11 questionsLiberalism and MarxismLiberalismMarxismThe two great modern ideologies of emancipation compared: one seeks freedom through rights, markets and limited government, the other through the abolition of class and the collective control of production.
Open in the Comparison Lab
- In contrast withRobert Nozick and Michael SandelSide by side on the state, power, justice, liberty, equality, democracy and rights.Compare
- In contrast withRobert Nozick and Karl MarxSide by side on the state, power, justice, liberty, equality, democracy and rights.Compare
- Criticised byRobert Nozick and Amartya SenSide by side on the state, power, justice, liberty, equality, democracy and rights.Compare
- Your own comparisonRobert Nozick and a thinker of your choiceChoose up to two more thinkers in the Comparison Lab and read their positions question by question.Open the Comparison Lab
15Indian and international applications
In India
Indian constitutional history runs against Nozick. The right to property was diluted by the First Amendment, removed from the Fundamental Rights by the 44th Amendment (1978) and retained only as a constitutional right in Article 300A, while zamindari abolition and land ceilings were constitutionally shielded. Nozick's framework nonetheless clarifies Indian debates: the consent requirements for land acquisition in the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, raise the question of when the state may take property; and his principle of rectification, applied to holdings shaped by caste dispossession and colonial land settlement, could justify the very redistribution his theory usually opposes. The rhetoric of 'minimum government' in Indian politics is closer to arguments from efficiency than to Nozick's arguments from rights.
In the world
Libertarian think tanks and parties invoke Nozick, and his self-ownership thesis recurs in bioethical debates on organ sale and bodily autonomy. Critics of welfare states and defenders of them still argue in his terms.
Movement V: Examination
Where the thinker sits in the syllabus, and what UPSC has asked.
16Exact syllabus mapping
PSIR Optional
Paper I · Part A · Political Theory and Politics
Theories of state
Theories of state: Liberal, Neo-liberal, Marxist, Pluralist, post-colonial and Feminist.
Official wording · 3 official questions on this line in the PYQ dataset, 2024–26
PSIR Optional
Paper I · Part A · Political Theory and Politics
Justice
Justice: Conceptions of justice with special reference to Rawl's theory of justice and its communitarian critiques.
Official wording · 1 official question on this line in the PYQ dataset, 2024–26
PSIR Optional
Paper I · Part A · Political Theory and Politics
Equality
Equality: Social, political and economic; relationship between equality and freedom; Affirmative action.
Official wording · 4 official questions on this line in the PYQ dataset, 2024–26
PSIR Optional
Paper I · Part A · Political Theory and Politics
Rights
Rights: Meaning and theories; different kinds of rights; Concept of Human Rights.
Official wording · 2 official questions on this line in the PYQ dataset, 2024–26
IB Global Politics
Thematic study: Rights and justice
Rights and justice: contested meanings
Rights; justice, including political and social justice; liberty; equality.
Paraphrase of the prescribed topic (this platform)
The syllabus lines this profile of Robert Nozick serves. Progress is kept on this device and gathered on your dashboard.
17Related PYQs (official wording)
No linked question yet
None of the questions in the PYQ dataset is linked to Robert Nozick, so none is shown here. The practice questions further down are original to this platform, not previous year questions.
Dataset searched: Nine official papers, 228 questions: GS Paper II, PSIR Paper I, PSIR Paper II, 2024–2026.
Browse every question in PYQ IntelligenceUsing Nozick in an answer
Nozick is essential to the Justice unit of Paper I as the classic libertarian reply to Rawls, and he also serves the neo-liberal theory of the state, Rights and Equality, as well as IB work on contested meanings of justice.
Lead with rights as side constraints, grounded in the separateness of persons, and with the entitlement theory: justice in acquisition, justice in transfer and rectification, so that a distribution is just if it arose by just steps. The distinction between historical and patterned principles, illustrated by the Wilt Chamberlain argument that liberty upsets patterns, is the core of any critique of redistribution, while the minimal state, limited to protection against force, theft and fraud and the enforcement of contracts, supplies his theory of the state. Set him directly against Rawls, trace his debt to Locke, and contrast him with Sandel, for whom the self-owning individual is the purest unencumbered self. Evaluation is rich: Sen shows that libertarian entitlements can coexist with starvation, Cohen that self-ownership does not entail unequal ownership of external resources, and Kymlicka that actual holdings trace back to conquest and fraud. India's constitutional history, which diluted and then removed the fundamental right to property, runs against him.
Avoid filing Nozick among the communitarian critics of Rawls, since his critique is libertarian. Do not overlook his own later judgement in The Examined Life that his earlier libertarianism was seriously inadequate, and do not confuse his entitlement theory with Sen's entitlement approach to famine.
Practice questions (original)
- Q1PSIR style15 marks· 200 words
Critically examine Nozick's entitlement theory of justice.
How to approach it
Three principles; historical versus end-state and patterned principles; the Lockean proviso; objections from Kymlicka (history of injustice) and Cohen; a judgement.
- Q2PSIR style15 marks· 200 words
"Taxation of earnings from labour is on a par with forced labour." Examine Nozick's claim.
How to approach it
Self-ownership and side constraints; the argument; replies (Nagel on positive rights, the social production of earnings, consent to institutions); relevance to welfare states.
- Q3PSIR style10 marks· 150 words
Explain Nozick's argument that "liberty upsets patterns".
How to approach it
The Wilt Chamberlain example; voluntary transfers from a just starting point; Cohen's objection about power and foresight.
- Q4PSIR style20 marks· 250 words
Compare Rawls and Nozick on the moral significance of natural talents.
How to approach it
Rawls's moral arbitrariness and common asset; Nozick's entitlement to natural assets and the manna objection; self-ownership; implications for redistribution; a reasoned position.
- Q5PSIR style15 marks· 200 words
Is Nozick's minimal state compatible with a commitment to social justice in a country like India?
How to approach it
The minimal state and its limits; Indian constitutional history of property; rectification of caste and colonial injustice; welfare rights; a balanced conclusion.
Practice questions are original to this platform and are not previous year questions. For questions actually set by UPSC, see PYQ Intelligence.
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Sources and further reading
- 01Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974)
- 02Robert Nozick, The Examined Life (1989)
- 03Jeffrey Paul (ed.), Reading Nozick (1981)
- 04Jonathan Wolff, Robert Nozick: Property, Justice and the Minimal State (1991)
- 05G. A. Cohen, Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Equality (1995)
- 06Thomas Nagel, 'Libertarianism without Foundations', Yale Law Journal (1975)
- 07Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction (1990)
- 08Ralf M. Bader, Robert Nozick (2010)
- 09Michael Otsuka, Libertarianism without Inequality (2003)
- 10Hillel Steiner, An Essay on Rights (1994)