Curated comparison · thinkers
Rawls and Nozick
Two Harvard colleagues who began from the same commitment to the separateness of persons and reached opposite conclusions: justice as fairness and the redistributive state, against entitlement and the minimal state.
Framing the comparison
Rawls's A Theory of Justice (1971) and Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974) define the central debate of contemporary liberal political philosophy. Both are liberals in the broad sense: both reject utilitarianism because it fails to respect the distinction between persons, both give priority to individual rights, and both use a version of the contract tradition. Their disagreement is therefore internal to liberalism, about what respecting persons as separate and free requires for the distribution of income, wealth and opportunity.
The debate frames the PSIR unit on justice and much of the argument about the welfare state, taxation and property.
Side by side
Starting point
Method
Kind of principle
Natural talents
Liberty
- Rawls
Equal basic liberties have priority, but liberty does not include unlimited rights of property; the fair value of political liberty must be secured.
- Nozick
Liberty upsets patterns: maintaining any distribution requires continual interference with voluntary exchange, as the Wilt Chamberlain example shows.
Taxation and redistribution
The state
Main objection faced
- Rawls
From Nozick, that it ignores how holdings arose and treats goods as manna from heaven; from Sen, that primary goods ignore conversion differences.
- Nozick
From Nagel, Cohen and Kymlicka, that self-ownership does not justify unequal external holdings and that actual holdings rest on historical injustice.
Later revisions
- Rawls
Political Liberalism (1993) recast justice as fairness as a political conception for a pluralist society, and the Restatement (2001) rejected welfare-state capitalism in favour of a property-owning democracy or liberal socialism.
- Nozick
In The Examined Life (1989) Nozick wrote that the libertarian position he had propounded now seemed seriously inadequate, because it did not knit humane considerations and joint cooperative activity closely enough into its fabric; he did not offer a new theory of justice to replace it.
What they share
The two books share a starting point. Both reject utilitarianism because, in Rawls's phrase, it does not take seriously the distinction between persons; Nozick cites Rawls on exactly this point before turning it against him. Both draw on Kant's principle that persons are ends and not merely means, Rawls through the inviolability of each person, Nozick through rights as side constraints that forbid using some for the benefit of others. Both give individual liberty a priority that no calculation of aggregate welfare can override.
Neither grounds distributive shares in moral desert: Rawls denies that anyone deserves their natural talents or starting place, and Nozick's entitlement theory asks how holdings were acquired and transferred, not whether their owners deserve them. Both are anti-perfectionist, unwilling to have the state impose a conception of the good life; Nozick's 'framework for utopia' and Rawls's later neutrality express the same refusal. And both use thought experiments in the contract tradition, an original position and a state of nature, to test what a legitimate state may do. That shared liberal ground is what makes their disagreement over redistribution so sharp.
The real disagreement
The fault line is whether justice is a property of patterns or of histories. Rawls holds that a fair society must look at the overall shape of the distribution its institutions produce, because those institutions profoundly affect everyone's life chances, and that people's natural and social luck should not determine their share. Nozick holds that justice concerns how holdings came about, that no one has the authority to impose a pattern on the free choices of individuals, and that respect for persons means respect for what they own, including their talents and labour. Beneath this lies a disagreement about self-ownership and about whether the cooperative product of a society belongs, in some sense, to its members jointly. Nozick's own concession that rectifying past injustice might require a more extensive state shows how much of the debate depends on history.
The assumptions underneath
What each side takes for granted about human nature, knowledge, history or the state, and why the disagreement follows from it.
Several assumptions separate them.
- Persons and self-ownership. Nozick assumes that each person fully owns himself, his talents and his labour, and so what he makes with them, subject only to the Lockean proviso. Rawls treats persons as free and equal citizens with two moral powers, but holds that the distribution of talents is a matter of luck whose benefits should be shared.
- What a society is. For Rawls society is a cooperative venture for mutual advantage, and its product is in a sense joint, so its division must be justified to all who take part. For Nozick there is no social product to divide: holdings arise from countless individual acts of production and exchange, and talk of distribution wrongly implies a distributor.
- The subject of justice. Rawls's subject is the basic structure, the institutions that shape lives from birth; individual transactions can be fair and still add up to an unjust pattern. Nozick's subject is the history of each holding, so that a distribution produced by just steps from a just starting point is just whatever its shape.
- The state. Nozick takes anarchism seriously and assumes that the state must prove its legitimacy against it, step by step; Rawls assumes a political society and asks what its basic structure should be.
- Method. Rawls justifies principles through a hypothetical agreement and reflective equilibrium. Nozick begins by asserting that individuals have rights and argues from intuitions about cases such as Wilt Chamberlain, which led Thomas Nagel to call his position 'libertarianism without foundations'.
Using the comparison in an answer
Present both as liberals who share a rejection of utilitarianism, then use the four contrasts that do the work: original position against state of nature, patterned against historical principles, talents as common asset against self-ownership, and redistribution against the minimal state. Add the strongest objections to each and, if space allows, the third parties: Sen's capabilities, the communitarian critique and G. A. Cohen's Marxist critique of both. In Indian answers the comparison illuminates the history of the right to property, the constitutional commitment to the Directive Principles and debates on taxation and welfare, and Nozick's rectification principle offers an unexpected argument for redistribution in a society marked by caste dispossession.
Practice questions
- Q1PSIR style20 marks· 250 words
Compare the theories of justice of Rawls and Nozick. Which better respects the separateness of persons?
How to approach it
Shared rejection of utilitarianism; original position versus entitlement; talents and self-ownership; redistribution versus minimal state; a reasoned conclusion on the shared premise.
- Q2PSIR style15 marks· 200 words
"Liberty upsets patterns." How might a Rawlsian respond to Nozick's argument?
How to approach it
The Wilt Chamberlain case; Rawls's focus on the basic structure rather than individual transactions; background justice; Cohen's point on power.
- Q3PSIR style15 marks· 200 words
Examine the debate between Rawls and Nozick on the moral significance of natural talents.
How to approach it
Moral arbitrariness and common asset; entitlement and the manna objection; Sandel's communitarian twist; implications for reservations and taxation.
Practice questions are original to this platform and are not previous year questions. For questions actually set by UPSC, see PYQ Intelligence.
Sources
- 01John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971)
- 02Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974)
- 03Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction (1990)
- 04G. A. Cohen, Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Equality (1995)
- 05Jonathan Wolff, Robert Nozick: Property, Justice and the Minimal State (1991)
- 06Robert Nozick, The Examined Life: Philosophical Meditations (1989)
- 07Thomas Nagel, 'Libertarianism without Foundations', Yale Law Journal (1975)
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