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Contemporary political theory

John Rawls

The philosopher who revived normative political theory with a contractarian account of justice as fairness, in which inequalities are just only if they benefit the least advantaged, and who later recast liberalism for societies divided by reasonable disagreement.

Thinker dossier

1921–2002

Key works
Justice as Fairness · 1958A Theory of Justice · 1971 (revised edition 1999)Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory · 1980
Key concepts
Original position and veil of ignorance · Basic structure · Two principles of justice · Difference principle · Primary goods

Start here:An introduction

1 min read

John Rawls (1921–2002) was an American philosopher who taught at Harvard for more than thirty years. He asked a question with large consequences: what rules would we accept for our society if we had to choose them without knowing who we would be in it, rich or poor, talented or not, believer or sceptic? His answer, in A Theory of Justice (1971), was that we would guarantee the same basic freedoms to everyone and accept economic inequalities only when they improve the position of the worst off.

Before Rawls, many philosophers doubted that justice could be argued about rigorously at all. After him, it became the centre of political philosophy. A student should care for two reasons. Almost every later theory of justice, whether libertarian, communitarian, feminist or capability-based, defines itself by where it departs from Rawls. And his ideas are used in live arguments about taxation, welfare, affirmative action and how citizens who disagree deeply can share one political order.

How to read this profile

The introduction is the first reading. The seventeen parts below are the full study of John Rawls, in five movements, about 16 minutes in all. Parts marked Advanced analysis (5, 11 and 12) weigh and contest the arguments: read them once the rest is secure.

Parts 1–4

Movement I: Foundations

The thinker in time: the setting, the influences, the works and the principal arguments.

01Historical context

In 1956 Peter Laslett could write that, for the moment anyway, political philosophy was dead. Analytic philosophy had turned to language, positivism treated value judgements as expressions of preference, and the social sciences aspired to value-free description. Where public argument about justice continued, utilitarianism, the view that institutions should maximise aggregate welfare, was the dominant systematic theory.

Rawls changed this. His work developed through the 1950s and 1960s, as the American civil rights movement challenged legal segregation, the Vietnam War raised questions of conscience and civil disobedience, and the welfare state was being built and contested across the West. A Theory of Justice (1971) offered a systematic alternative to utilitarianism and made questions of distributive justice central to political philosophy for half a century.

Life and intellectual formation

Born in Baltimore in 1921, Rawls lost two younger brothers to illnesses they caught from him, an experience biographers connect to his later preoccupation with undeserved fortune. He studied at Princeton and served as an infantryman in the Pacific; the war, including what he saw of Hiroshima's destruction, ended his intention to enter the priesthood. After a doctorate at Princeton, a year at Oxford in 1952–53 among H. L. A. Hart, Isaiah Berlin and Stuart Hampshire, and posts at Cornell and MIT, he taught at Harvard from 1962 until his retirement.

His essay 'Justice as Fairness' (1958) contained the core of the theory, which he refined for more than a decade before publishing A Theory of Justice. He spent the rest of his career answering critics and revising, culminating in Political Liberalism (1993), The Law of Peoples (1999) and Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (2001). A series of strokes from 1995 slowed his work; he died in 2002.

02Intellectual influences

Rawls described his theory as carrying the social contract of Locke, Rousseau and Kant to a higher level of abstraction. Kant mattered most: the original position is meant, on Rawls's 'Kantian interpretation', to model persons as free and equal rational beings who give themselves the principles they act on. From Hume he took the 'circumstances of justice', moderate scarcity and limited altruism, that make justice both necessary and possible. His great opponent was classical utilitarianism, which he studied above all in Henry Sidgwick's The Methods of Ethics (1874), the model of a systematic moral theory that his own book set out to rival.

He drew on economics and decision theory, then reshaping the social sciences, for the idea of rational choice under uncertainty and the maximin rule, and on Wittgenstein's later philosophy, which he studied at Princeton with Norman Malcolm, for the idea that practices are constituted by rules. His year in Oxford in 1952–53, among H. L. A. Hart, Isaiah Berlin and Stuart Hampshire, shaped his interest in law and liberty. Later he took from the economist James Meade the idea of a property-owning democracy that disperses capital, and his lectures treat Hegel and Marx as serious critics whose questions about social unity and the domination of capital a liberal theory must answer. His undergraduate thesis on sin and faith, written while he still intended to enter the church, shows the religious concern with the equal worth of persons that his later secular theory kept.

03Major works

  1. 1958Justice as FairnessThe first statement of the two principles and the contract idea.
  2. 1971 (revised edition 1999)A Theory of JusticeThe original position, the two principles, the critique of utilitarianism, civil disobedience and the stability of a just society.
  3. 1980Kantian Constructivism in Moral TheoryThe Dewey Lectures, making explicit the Kantian conception of the person behind the original position.
  4. 1985Justice as Fairness: Political not MetaphysicalPhilosophy and Public Affairs. The first statement of the political turn.
  5. 1993Political LiberalismJustice as fairness recast as a political conception for a society marked by reasonable pluralism; overlapping consensus and public reason.
  6. 1997The Idea of Public Reason RevisitedUniversity of Chicago Law Review. A revised account of public reason, allowing comprehensive doctrines into public debate under a 'proviso'.
  7. 1999The Law of PeoplesPrinciples of justice among peoples, the duty of assistance and the rejection of a global difference principle.
  8. 2001Justice as Fairness: A RestatementA compact restatement, including the case for property-owning democracy over welfare-state capitalism.
  9. 2007 (posthumous)Lectures on the History of Political PhilosophyHarvard lectures on Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Rousseau, Mill, Marx and Sidgwick.

04Principal arguments

The subject and the standard

A Theory of Justice opens: "Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought." Its subject is the basic structure of society, the major political, economic and social institutions, such as the constitution, property and the family, that distribute rights and duties and shape people's prospects from birth. Its standard is fairness. "Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override."

The original position

To find principles that are fair, Rawls asks what principles free and equal persons would choose in an original position behind a veil of ignorance. The parties do not know their class, race, sex, natural talents, conception of the good or the generation they belong to, though they know general facts about society. Because no one can tailor principles to their own advantage, whatever they agree to is fair. The device models the conviction that the natural and social lottery is morally arbitrary: no one deserves their place in the distribution of talents or their starting point in society.

The two principles

Rawls argues that the parties would choose two principles. In their later form: first, each person has the same claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, compatible with the same scheme for all; second, social and economic inequalities must be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity, and must be to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society, the difference principle. The principles are lexically ordered: liberty comes first, and fair opportunity before the difference principle, so that basic liberties cannot be traded for economic gains. The fair value of political liberties must be secured so that wealth cannot buy political power.

Why would the parties choose this? Facing a choice under uncertainty where the stakes are their whole life prospects, they would reasonably secure the best worst outcome, the maximin rule, rather than gamble on the average utility a utilitarian society would deliver. Utilitarianism, Rawls argues, extends to society the principle of choice for one person and so does not take seriously the distinction between persons.

Talents as a common asset

The difference principle represents an agreement to regard the distribution of natural talents as a common asset and to share in its benefits. People may gain from their good fortune only on terms that improve the situation of those who have lost out. Inequality is permitted, for instance to provide incentives, but only if it works to the benefit of the worst off.

Method and civil disobedience

Rawls justifies principles by reflective equilibrium, moving back and forth between considered judgements about particular cases and general principles until they cohere. A Theory of Justice also offers an account of civil disobedience in a nearly just society: a public, non-violent, conscientious breach of law, addressed to the majority's sense of justice and accepting the legal penalty, justified against serious and clear violations of equal liberty or fair opportunity.

Political liberalism

Rawls came to think that A Theory of Justice relied on a comprehensive liberal philosophy that many reasonable citizens would reject. Free societies are marked by reasonable pluralism: people hold different religious and moral doctrines and will continue to do so. Political Liberalism presents justice as fairness as a freestanding political conception that adherents of different doctrines can endorse from within their own views, an overlapping consensus. On fundamental political questions, citizens and officials should reason in terms that others could reasonably accept: the idea of public reason.

Justice between peoples

The Law of Peoples extends the method to international society. Liberal and 'decent' non-liberal peoples would agree on principles of independence, non-intervention, human rights and a duty of assistance to burdened societies. Rawls rejected a global difference principle, arguing that a people's prosperity depends mainly on its political culture, a position his cosmopolitan students found too modest.

On human nature

Rawls avoids a metaphysical theory of human nature, especially in his later work, but his theory rests on a conception of the person as free and equal, with two moral powers: the capacity for a sense of justice and the capacity to form, revise and pursue a conception of the good. These capacities, not any particular talent, are the basis of equality. A Theory of Justice adds a moral psychology: people come to love and trust those who care for them, and a sense of justice grows through the morality of family, of association and finally of principles, so that a just society can reproduce the attachment that sustains it. Its Aristotelian Principle holds that people enjoy exercising their realised capacities, and the more so the more complex those capacities are.

Parts 5–10

Movement II: Theory

What the thinker added to political theory, the concepts they defined, and their positions on the state, power, liberty, equality, justice and democracy.

05Major theoretical contributions

Advanced analysis

Rawls's first contribution was to show that political philosophy could again be systematic and normative. Against the positivist view that judgements of justice merely express preferences, he built a theory that could be argued for, tested against cases and revised.

He gave the social contract a new task. For Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau the contract explained political obligation; for Rawls a hypothetical agreement behind a veil of ignorance is a device for selecting principles, so that the fairness of the conditions of choice carries over to the principles chosen.

He moved the subject of justice from individual conduct to the basic structure of society, the institutions that shape people's prospects from birth. With it came a new egalitarianism: because talents and social starting points are morally arbitrary, inequalities must be justified to those who have least. The principle accepts markets and incentives but not indifference to the worst off.

He made the separateness of persons the decisive objection to utilitarianism, established the priority of the right over the good, and made reflective equilibrium the standard method of justification in moral and political philosophy.

Later, Political Liberalism recast liberalism as a political conception for societies marked by reasonable pluralism, introducing overlapping consensus, public reason and the liberal principle of legitimacy, and The Law of Peoples opened the modern debate on global justice.

06Conceptual definitions

Original position and veil of ignorance

A thought experiment in which principles are chosen by parties ignorant of their social position and natural assets, so the choice is fair.

Basic structure

The major institutions that distribute rights and opportunities, the primary subject of justice.

Two principles of justice

Equal basic liberties; and fair equality of opportunity with the difference principle, in lexical order.

Difference principle

Inequalities are just only if they work to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged.

Primary goods

Rights, liberties, opportunities, income, wealth and the social bases of self-respect: what anyone needs whatever their plan of life.

Reflective equilibrium

Justification through the mutual adjustment of principles and considered judgements.

Overlapping consensus and public reason

Agreement on a political conception from within different reasonable doctrines, and argument on fundamental questions in terms all can accept.

07Theory of the State

The state's role is to establish and maintain a just basic structure, neutral among reasonable comprehensive doctrines but not neutral about justice. Because political power is always coercive power exercised by citizens over one another, it is legitimate, on Rawls's liberal principle of legitimacy, only when exercised in accordance with a constitution whose essentials all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles acceptable to their common reason.

08Theory of Power

Rawls worried less about power in the abstract than about the conversion of economic power into political power. The fair value of the political liberties must be guaranteed, through public financing of elections and limits on the influence of wealth, so that citizens similarly gifted and motivated have roughly equal chances to influence policy whatever their class. His rejection of welfare-state capitalism in favour of property-owning democracy follows from this: concentrated capital means concentrated political power.

09Liberty and equality

Liberty

Basic liberties, of conscience, speech, association, political participation and the person, have priority and may not be traded for economic gain; their fair value must be secured. Rawls defends not liberty in general but a list of basic liberties, chosen because they are needed to develop and exercise the two moral powers. A basic liberty may be limited only for the sake of liberty itself, as when rules of order regulate public debate, never for greater aggregate wealth. He distinguishes liberty from its worth: poverty lowers the worth of liberty to the poor, which the difference principle addresses, while the political liberties alone are guaranteed equal fair value.

Equality

Inequalities in income and wealth are just only if they improve the position of the least advantaged; offices must be open under fair, not merely formal, equality of opportunity. Rawls rejects the 'system of natural liberty', which offers only careers open to talents, and 'liberal equality', which corrects for class background but still lets natural endowments decide shares, in favour of 'democratic equality', which joins fair equality of opportunity to the difference principle. The basis of equality is the capacity for a sense of justice and a conception of the good, which all persons have to the required degree. Shares are measured by an index of primary goods rather than by welfare, so the standard stays public.

Rights

Rights are grounded in the principles of justice, not in nature or in utility. Human rights in The Law of Peoples form a minimal standard for decent societies.

10Justice and democracy

Justice

Justice is fairness in the basic structure: principles that free and equal persons would accept from a fair initial situation. It has priority over the maximisation of welfare. Rawls's conception is institutional: it judges the rules that assign rights, opportunities, income and wealth, not isolated transactions, and treats society as a fair system of cooperation over time. Because the natural and social lottery is morally arbitrary, justice must limit its effects on people's life prospects as far as fairness and efficiency allow. The right is prior to the good: no conception of the good life, however widely held, may override the principles of justice.

Democracy

Rawls favoured a constitutional democracy with public financing of elections and limits on the influence of wealth, and later a property-owning democracy that disperses capital. His is a constitutional rather than majoritarian democracy: the first principle places the basic liberties beyond the reach of ordinary majorities, and in Political Liberalism a supreme court serves as an exemplar of public reason. Legitimacy depends on citizens justifying fundamental laws to one another in terms all could reasonably accept, which links his work to deliberative democracy. In the Restatement (2001) he argued that welfare-state capitalism cannot realise these ideals, because it leaves control of the economy and of political life to a small class.

Parts 11–12

Movement III: Critique

How the arguments have been attacked, and how scholars read them differently.

11Criticisms

Advanced analysis

  1. 01

    Robert Nozick

    Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974) argues that any patterned principle of distribution, the difference principle included, requires continual interference with free transfers, and that treating talents as a common asset fails to respect persons as the owners of themselves.

  2. 02

    Michael Sandel

    Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (1982) argues that the original position presupposes an 'unencumbered self' prior to its ends, which cannot support the community the difference principle requires.

  3. 03

    Susan Moller Okin

    Justice, Gender, and the Family (1989) points out that Rawls treated the parties as heads of families and left the gendered family's internal justice largely unexamined, though it is part of the basic structure.

  4. 04

    Amartya Sen

    In 'Equality of What?' (1979) and The Idea of Justice (2009) Sen argues that primary goods ignore differences in people's ability to convert resources into capabilities, and that a theory of a perfectly just society is neither necessary nor sufficient for comparing real injustices.

  5. 05

    G. A. Cohen

    Rescuing Justice and Equality (2008) argues that if the talented demanded incentives only because they would not otherwise work as hard, a society with a genuine egalitarian ethos would not need the inequalities the difference principle permits.

12Scholarly debates

Advanced analysis

How scholars have read John Rawls differently. An answer that names the reading it follows is stronger than one that treats the text as settled.

  1. Rational choice or moral device

    Economists and decision theorists read the original position as a problem in rational choice. John Harsanyi ('Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality?', 1975) argued that rational parties behind a veil of ignorance, assigning equal probability to every position, would maximise average utility, not choose the difference principle, so the argument collapses into a form of utilitarianism. Rawls and interpreters such as Samuel Freeman replied that the original position is a device of representation: it models moral conditions of fairness, and the case for the two principles rests on the strains of commitment, publicity and the social bases of self-respect, not on maximin alone. Rawls's Dewey Lectures ('Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory', 1980) made the Kantian reading explicit.

  2. Political Liberalism: retreat or refinement

    Some readers saw Political Liberalism as a retreat. Brian Barry ('John Rawls and the Search for Stability', 1995) argued that Rawls had weakened a theory of justice into a search for agreement among existing doctrines, and Michael Sandel argued that public reason asks citizens to bracket the moral and religious convictions that political questions such as abortion actually turn on. Freeman and Charles Larmore read the shift as a refinement: A Theory of Justice had failed to show how a just society could be stable among people who disagree about religion and the good, and political liberalism answers that problem without abandoning the principles of justice.

  3. Welfare-state liberal or property-owning democrat

    Left critics in the 1970s, such as Robert Paul Wolff (Understanding Rawls, 1977), read A Theory of Justice as a sophisticated defence of the welfare-state capitalism of its day. Rawls himself, in the preface to the revised edition (1999) and in the Restatement (2001), rejected welfare-state capitalism because it allows a small class to control the economy and, indirectly, political life, and endorsed either a property-owning democracy or liberal socialism. Martin O'Neill and Thad Williamson (Property-Owning Democracy: Rawls and Beyond, 2012) developed this more radical Rawls, whose principles require the wide dispersal of wealth and capital before market income is earned, not only redistribution after it.

Parts 13–15

Movement IV: Legacy

Why the thinker matters now, whom they connect with, and the arguments applied in India and beyond.

13Contemporary relevance

Rawls is the reference point for almost all later work on justice: libertarians, communitarians, feminists, capability theorists, Marxists and cosmopolitans define themselves by where they part from him. Outside philosophy, the veil of ignorance has become a common test of fairness in public argument, and his ideas shape debates on taxation, health care, education and campaign finance. Political Liberalism's question of how citizens who disagree deeply can share a political order is, if anything, more pressing now than when he posed it.

14Connections with other thinkers

Each connection recorded in this profile, by relation: who shaped John Rawls, whom John Rawls shaped, and who argued with or against them.

Influenced by

  • John Locke1632

    Rawls presented his theory as generalising the social contract of Locke, Rousseau and Kant.

  • Jean-Jacques Rousseau1712

    Rawls's lectures treat Rousseau's general will and concern for equality as forerunners of justice as fairness.

In dialogue with

  • Isaiah Berlin1909

    Rawls met Berlin at Oxford; both took the plurality of values seriously, though Rawls sought principles that could command agreement despite it.

  • Jürgen Habermas1929

    The Rawls–Habermas exchange of 1995 compared political liberalism with discourse ethics.

Criticised by

  • Robert Nozick1938

    Nozick's entitlement theory is the classic libertarian reply, written by a Harvard colleague.

  • Michael Sandel1953

    Sandel's critique of the unencumbered self launched the liberal–communitarian debate.

  • Amartya Sen1933

    Sen, a friend and interlocutor, challenged primary goods and the transcendental approach to justice.

  • Carole Pateman1940

    Pateman's The Sexual Contract treats the original position as another contract story that conceals subordination.

Also recorded on other profiles

Connections that other profiles in the Atlas make to John Rawls, read from John Rawls’s side. Their notes are on those profiles.

Influenced by
John Stuart Mill
In contrast with
B. R. Ambedkar

Compare side by side

The written comparisons that involve John Rawls, and pairings to open in the Comparison Lab, chosen from the connections above.

Curated comparisons

15Indian and international applications

In India

Indian arguments for reservations are often put in Rawlsian terms of fair equality of opportunity and priority for the least advantaged, but the constitutional scheme differs from Rawls in being historical and group-based, a remedy for caste exclusion rather than a principle chosen behind a veil. The Supreme Court's move to substantive equality in Indra Sawhney (1992), and the debate in Janhit Abhiyan (2022) over an economic criterion that excluded SC, ST and OBC households, both raise the Rawlsian question of who counts as least advantaged. Indian theorists such as Rajeev Bhargava have tested political liberalism's public reason against a secularism that permits state intervention in religion.

In the world

Rawls's influence extends from legal theory, through Ronald Dworkin, to policy debates on welfare and inequality and to global justice, where cosmopolitans such as Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge argued for extending the difference principle beyond borders.

Parts 16–17

Movement V: Examination

Where the thinker sits in the syllabus, and what UPSC has asked.

16Exact syllabus mapping

  1. PSIR Optional

    Paper I · Part A · Political Theory and Politics

    Political Theory

    Political Theory: meaning and approaches.

    Official wording · 6 official questions on this line in the PYQ dataset, 2024–26

    In the Syllabus NavigatorWhere it is taught
  2. PSIR Optional

    Paper I · Part A · Political Theory and Politics

    Justice

    Justice: Conceptions of justice with special reference to Rawl's theory of justice and its communitarian critiques.

    Official wording · 1 official question on this line in the PYQ dataset, 2024–26

    In the Syllabus NavigatorWhere it is taught
  3. PSIR Optional

    Paper I · Part A · Political Theory and Politics

    Equality

    Equality: Social, political and economic; relationship between equality and freedom; Affirmative action.

    Official wording · 4 official questions on this line in the PYQ dataset, 2024–26

    In the Syllabus NavigatorWhere it is taught
  4. PSIR Optional

    Paper I · Part A · Political Theory and Politics

    Democracy

    Democracy: Classical and contemporary theories; different models of democracy—representative, participatory and deliberative.

    Official wording · 3 official questions on this line in the PYQ dataset, 2024–26

    In the Syllabus NavigatorWhere it is taught
  5. PSIR Optional

    Paper I · Part A · Political Theory and Politics

    Political Ideologies

    Political Ideologies: Liberalism, Socialism, Marxism, Fascism, Gandhism and Feminism.

    Official wording · 8 official questions on this line in the PYQ dataset, 2024–26

    In the Syllabus NavigatorWhere it is taught
  6. IB Global Politics

    Thematic study: Rights and justice

    Rights and justice: contested meanings

    Rights; justice, including political and social justice; liberty; equality.

    Paraphrase of the prescribed topic (this platform)

    In the course outlineWhere it is taught

The syllabus lines this profile of John Rawls serves. Progress is kept on this device and gathered on your dashboard.

Beyond the optional: General Studies

GS Paper IV: the veil of ignorance and the priority of the least advantaged are widely used frameworks for fairness in public policy and administration.

17Related PYQs (official wording)

Official wording · verbatim

4 questions · 2024, 2025, 2026

  1. 2026PSIR IQ1(a)10 marks

    Resurgence of political theory

    The official paper (opens in a new tab)
  2. 2025PSIR IQ1(a)10 marks

    Explain the Philosophical approach to the study of Political theory.

    The official paper (opens in a new tab)
  3. 2025PSIR IQ2(c)15 marks

    Explain how Rawls used the liberal and egalitarian perspective to develop his concept of distributive justice.

    The official paper (opens in a new tab)
  4. 2024PSIR IQ2(c)15 marks

    The nature of relationship between equality of democratic citizenship and liberty of citizens is influenced by economic equality. Comment.

    The official paper (opens in a new tab)

Transcribed from the official UPSC papers and linked to John Rawls in the PYQ dataset (nine official papers, 228 questions: GS Paper II, PSIR Paper I, PSIR Paper II, 2024–2026).PYQ Intelligence →

Using Rawls in an answer

Rawls is the one thinker the Justice unit names, since it prescribes his theory and its communitarian critiques, and he also serves Equality, Political Theory and Democracy. UPSC asked how economic equality shapes equal citizenship and liberty in 2024 (PSIR Paper I), how Rawls used liberal and egalitarian perspectives to develop distributive justice in 2025 (PSIR Paper I), and set short answers on the philosophical approach to political theory in 2025 (PSIR Paper I) and on its resurgence in 2026 (PSIR Paper I).

Lead with the original position and the veil of ignorance, then the two principles in lexical order: equal basic liberties first, then fair equality of opportunity and the difference principle. The liberal and egalitarian strands map onto the two principles, which answers the 2025 question directly, while the fair value of political liberties, which keeps wealth from buying political power, answers the 2024 one. For the resurgence of political theory, present A Theory of Justice as the work that revived normative theory. The prescribed critique is communitarian, led by Sandel on the unencumbered self; add Nozick on patterned principles, Sen on primary goods, and Okin on the family. Evaluate by asking whether Political Liberalism refines or retreats from the earlier theory, and whether India's historical, group-based reservations fit a Rawlsian frame.

Avoid describing the difference principle as equality of outcome: it permits inequalities that benefit the least advantaged. Do not treat the veil of ignorance as a historical event, or file Nozick among the communitarian critics: his objection is libertarian.

Practice questions (original)

  1. Q1PSIR style15 marks· 200 words

    Examine the significance of the original position and the veil of ignorance in Rawls's theory of justice.

    How to approach it

    Purpose (fair conditions of choice), what is known and unknown, the moral arbitrariness of fortune, maximin; objections from Sandel and Sen.

  2. Q2PSIR style20 marks· 250 words

    "Inequality is just only if it benefits the least advantaged." Critically examine Rawls's difference principle.

    How to approach it

    Statement and lexical order; talents as common asset; incentives; Nozick's liberty objection and Cohen's egalitarian objection; application to a contemporary policy question.

  3. Q3PSIR style15 marks· 200 words

    What led Rawls from A Theory of Justice to Political Liberalism?

    How to approach it

    The stability problem; reasonable pluralism; political versus comprehensive liberalism; overlapping consensus and public reason; whether the shift answers the communitarians.

  4. Q4PSIR style10 marks· 150 words

    Why does Rawls reject utilitarianism?

    How to approach it

    Separateness of persons, inviolability, aggregation; the choice in the original position; a utilitarian reply.

  5. Q5PSIR style15 marks· 200 words

    Assess the relevance of Rawls's theory of justice to affirmative action in India.

    How to approach it

    Fair equality of opportunity and the difference principle; group-based historical remedy versus individual, ahistorical principles; Indra Sawhney and Janhit Abhiyan; the question of the least advantaged.

Practice questions are original to this platform and are not previous year questions. For questions actually set by UPSC, see PYQ Intelligence.

Explore further

Sources and further reading

  1. 01John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971; revised edition 1999)
  2. 02John Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993)
  3. 03John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (1999)
  4. 04John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, ed. Erin Kelly (2001)
  5. 05Samuel Freeman, Rawls (2007)
  6. 06Thomas Pogge, John Rawls: His Life and Theory of Justice (2007)
  7. 07Susan Moller Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family (1989)
  8. 08G. A. Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality (2008)
  9. 09Peter Laslett (ed.), Philosophy, Politics and Society (1956)
  10. 10John Harsanyi, 'Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality?', American Political Science Review (1975)
  11. 11Martin O'Neill and Thad Williamson (eds), Property-Owning Democracy: Rawls and Beyond (2012)
  12. 12Brian Barry, 'John Rawls and the Search for Stability', Ethics (1995)
  13. 13Leif Wenar, 'John Rawls', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (opens in a new tab). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  14. 14'John Rawls', Encyclopaedia Britannica (opens in a new tab). Encyclopaedia Britannica