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Curated comparison · thinkers

Rawls and the Communitarians

The debate of the 1980s in which Sandel, MacIntyre, Walzer and Taylor challenged Rawls's liberalism for its picture of the self, its claim to neutrality and its universalism, and Rawls's reply in Political Liberalism.

Framing the comparison

The PSIR syllabus names this debate directly: Rawls's theory of justice 'and its communitarian critiques'. Four books published within a few years of one another, Michael Sandel's Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (1982), Alasdair MacIntyre's After Virtue (1981), Michael Walzer's Spheres of Justice (1983) and Charles Taylor's essays culminating in Sources of the Self (1989), attacked different parts of Rawls's project. They were never a school: MacIntyre rejected the communitarian label, Walzer is a social democrat, Taylor a liberal of a particular kind and Sandel a civic republican. What they shared was the claim that liberal theory abstracts individuals from the communities, traditions and shared meanings that make them who they are.

Side by side

The self

Rawls

Persons are free and equal, able to form, revise and pursue a conception of the good; the original position abstracts from their particular ends.

Sandel

Rawls assumes an unencumbered self prior to its ends; in fact we are partly constituted by attachments we did not choose.

MacIntyre

The self has narrative unity, understood through the roles, practices and traditions in which a life is embedded.

Walzer

People are bearers of the shared understandings of a particular political community, not abstract choosers.

Taylor

Identity is formed through strong evaluation within frameworks of meaning and through dialogue and recognition; the 'atomist' self is a fiction.

The right and the good

Rawls

The right is prior to the good: principles of justice constrain the pursuit of any conception of the good.

Sandel

The priority of right fails; justice cannot be defined without reasoning about the good.

MacIntyre

Justice is intelligible only within a tradition with a conception of the human good; liberalism is itself a tradition that denies being one.

Walzer

Justice is relative to social meanings; distributive principles follow from what goods mean to a community.

Taylor

Liberal rights presuppose goods, such as autonomy, which themselves require social conditions that a theory of rights must support.

Neutrality and the state

Rawls

The state should be neutral among reasonable comprehensive doctrines, though not neutral about justice.

Sandel

Neutrality is impossible and undesirable; politics should cultivate the civic virtue self-government needs.

MacIntyre

The modern liberal state cannot embody a shared conception of the good; moral life must be sustained in local communities.

Walzer

A political community may legitimately pursue its shared understandings, provided spheres of distribution are kept separate.

Taylor

Procedural liberalism can be inhospitable to difference; a liberalism that allows collective goals, such as protecting the French language in Quebec, is legitimate.

Method

Rawls

Principles chosen in an idealised original position and tested against considered judgements in reflective equilibrium.

Sandel

Moral reasoning about the purposes of practices, drawing on Aristotle and civic republican tradition.

MacIntyre

Historical narrative of the fragmentation of moral language and the comparison of rival traditions.

Walzer

Interpretation of a community's shared meanings from within: standing in the cave, not walking out of it.

Taylor

Philosophical anthropology and the history of the modern identity; interpretation of the goods implicit in practices.

Distributive justice

Rawls

The difference principle, fair equality of opportunity and equal basic liberties for the basic structure as a whole.

Sandel

The difference principle presupposes a community that shares its members' assets, which Rawls's self cannot support.

MacIntyre

Desert and the common good, grounded in shared practices, are central; modern societies lack the agreement to apply them.

Walzer

Complex equality: each good distributed by its own criterion; injustice is the domination of one good, such as money, over others.

Taylor

The social thesis: since capacities develop only in society, individuals have obligations to sustain the community that makes them possible.

Politics

Rawls

Constitutional democracy, overlapping consensus and public reason.

Sandel

Civic republicanism and limits on markets and meritocracy.

MacIntyre

Withdrawal into local communities of practice; scepticism of national politics.

Walzer

Democratic socialism and social criticism from within the community.

Taylor

Politics of recognition and multicultural liberalism.

Response to Political Liberalism

Rawls

Justice as fairness is a political conception, not a comprehensive doctrine: the original position models fairness among citizens and presupposes no metaphysics of the self; stability comes from an overlapping consensus.

Sandel

Bracketing comprehensive views fails where justice depends on them, as on abortion, or as in the Lincoln–Douglas debates over slavery, where 'neutrality' would have been a moral choice.

MacIntyre

The political turn confirms his diagnosis: liberalism admits it cannot settle disagreement about the good and offers procedures in place of a shared understanding of justice.

Walzer

In 'The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism' (1990) he described communitarianism as a recurring corrective within liberal societies rather than an alternative to them.

Taylor

Liberalism can be procedural in some areas and still pursue collective goals, such as a language's survival, provided basic rights are protected.

What they share

The debate took place within shared commitments. None of the critics, with the partial exception of MacIntyre, rejected constitutional democracy, civil liberties or toleration; most wrote as citizens of liberal democracies asking how those societies understood themselves. All of them, Rawls included, rejected utilitarianism's indifference to the separateness of persons and the libertarian view that markets left alone produce justice: Rawls through the difference principle, Walzer through complex equality, Sandel through his critique of markets and meritocracy, Taylor through the social thesis.

Rawls himself was not indifferent to community. A Theory of Justice describes a well-ordered society as a 'social union of social unions' and gives a long account of how a sense of justice grows out of family and association. And the critics' methods resembled his more than the polemics suggested: reflective equilibrium starts from a society's considered judgements, much as Walzer starts from shared meanings. The argument was therefore about the foundations and limits of a liberalism that all sides, in different degrees, accepted.

The real disagreement

The fault line is whether principles of justice can be justified independently of particular communities and their conceptions of the good. Rawls's original position seeks principles any free and equal person could accept, whatever their identity; the critics reply that there is no such standpoint, because persons, goods and reasons are constituted by communities and traditions. Taylor clarified the stakes in 'Cross-Purposes' (1989) by separating two questions: the ontological question of whether selves are atomistic or socially constituted, and the advocacy question of whether politics should give priority to individual rights or to community. One can, like Taylor, accept that selves are socially formed and still defend liberal rights. Rawls's Political Liberalism (1993) answered that justice as fairness was political, not metaphysical, presupposing no theory of the self, which some critics took as concession and others as evasion.

The assumptions underneath

What each side takes for granted about human nature, knowledge, history or the state, and why the disagreement follows from it.

The disagreement rests on assumptions that run deeper than the policy positions.

  • The self. Rawls's person, drawing on Kant, has the capacity to stand back from any particular end and revise it; that capacity grounds equal respect. The critics, drawing on Aristotle and Hegel, hold that persons are partly constituted by attachments, roles and traditions, so that the capacity to stand back is limited and the abstraction from ends distorts.
  • Justification. Rawls seeks principles that could be justified from a standpoint shared by free and equal persons whatever their identities. MacIntyre holds that rationality is itself constituted within traditions; Walzer that justice is interpreted from within a community's shared meanings; Taylor that moral reasoning articulates goods already implicit in our practices.
  • History. MacIntyre tells the history of modern moral philosophy as the fragmentation of an Aristotelian tradition, leaving liberal argument without foundations; Taylor tells it as the formation of a modern identity whose goods liberalism presupposes. Rawls traces liberalism to the wars of religion and the discovery that people with irreconcilable faiths could live together under shared terms.
  • The state. For Rawls the coercive power of the state must be justifiable to all reasonable citizens, which requires restraint about contested conceptions of the good. The critics treat politics as formative, unavoidably shaping citizens and better doing so deliberately.
  • Pluralism. Rawls treats reasonable disagreement about the good as a permanent result of free institutions. The critics see more shared meaning than Rawls allows, or think a society needs more of it than his theory can supply.

Using the comparison in an answer

Treat the critics separately, since each targets a different element: the self (Sandel), the Enlightenment project and tradition (MacIntyre), universalism and social meanings (Walzer), atomism and recognition (Taylor). Then give the liberal reply: Rawls's political turn, Amy Gutmann's warning that communitarians want Salem without witches, Will Kymlicka's argument that liberals can value community while defending the right to revise one's ends, and Susan Moller Okin's point that communities often oppress women. In India the debate maps onto the constitutional recognition of religious and cultural communities, personal laws, minority rights under Articles 29 and 30 and the danger, illustrated by the Shah Bano controversy, that protecting communities may sacrifice their vulnerable members. Bhikhu Parekh's multiculturalism offers a theorist who writes from both traditions.

Practice questions

  1. Q1PSIR style20 marks· 250 words

    Critically examine the communitarian critique of Rawls's theory of justice.

    How to approach it

    Distinguish Sandel, MacIntyre, Walzer and Taylor; Rawls's reply in Political Liberalism; liberal counter-critique (Gutmann, Kymlicka, Okin); a reasoned verdict.

  2. Q2PSIR style15 marks· 200 words

    "Justice is relative to social meanings." Discuss Walzer's idea of complex equality.

    How to approach it

    Spheres, social meanings, dominance and monopoly; contrast with Rawls's universalism; the relativism objection; an example of one good dominating others.

  3. Q3PSIR style15 marks· 200 words

    Does the communitarian critique have particular relevance for a diverse society like India?

    How to approach it

    Communities in the Constitution, personal laws, minority rights; benefits of recognition; dangers to individuals and women within groups; a balanced conclusion.

Practice questions are original to this platform and are not previous year questions. For questions actually set by UPSC, see PYQ Intelligence.

Sources

  1. 01John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971) and Political Liberalism (1993)
  2. 02Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (1982)
  3. 03Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (1981) and Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (1988)
  4. 04Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice (1983)
  5. 05Charles Taylor, 'Atomism' (1979), 'Cross-Purposes: The Liberal–Communitarian Debate' (1989) and 'The Politics of Recognition' (1992)
  6. 06Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift, Liberals and Communitarians (1992)
  7. 07Amy Gutmann, 'Communitarian Critics of Liberalism' (1985)
  8. 08Bhikhu Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism (2000)
  9. 09Michael Walzer, 'The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism', Political Theory (1990)
  10. 10Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture (1989)
  11. 11Michael J. Sandel, 'Political Liberalism' (review), Harvard Law Review (1994)

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