Paper I · Part A · Unit 3
Justice
From Plato's harmony to Rawls's fairness and the communitarian reply: why the most argued-over concept in political theory still divides liberals from their critics.
Official syllabus
Justice: Conceptions of justice with special reference to Rawl's theory of justice and its communitarian critiques.
What the unit asks
The syllabus asks for three layers. First, the conceptions of justice that preceded and surround Rawls: harmony, desert, utility, entitlement, need. Second, Rawls's theory itself, in enough detail to reconstruct the argument from the original position to the two principles. Third, the communitarian critiques, with Rawls's later revisions read as a response to them.
The examiner expects candidates to argue, not summarise. Is the Rawlsian self too thin to bear the weight of a theory of justice? Can principles chosen behind a veil of ignorance claim universal validity? The unit also invites Indian application: the Preamble's promise of social, economic and political justice, Ambedkar's case for social democracy, and the reservation debate.
01Conceptions of justice before Rawls
In Plato's Republic justice is harmony: each part of the soul, and each class of the city, performs its own function. Aristotle distinguished distributive justice (goods allocated in proportion to merit, defined differently by democrats and oligarchs) from corrective justice (restoring the balance after a wrong). Natural law theorists grounded justice in a higher law; utilitarians from Bentham to Mill defined it by its contribution to aggregate welfare.
Modern debates turn on the criteria of distribution: desert, need, rights or entitlement, and equality. A further distinction separates procedural justice, which attends to fair rules, from social or distributive justice, which judges outcomes. Marx's principle 'from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs' rejected bourgeois justice altogether. The Indian Preamble, promising justice 'social, economic and political', is a substantive conception; see Justice.
02Rawls: justice as fairness
John Rawls's A Theory of Justice (1971) revived the social contract to answer utilitarianism, which in his view fails to take seriously the separateness of persons. Rational parties in an original position, behind a veil of ignorance that hides their class, talents, sex and conception of the good, choose principles to govern the basic structure of society.
Rawls argues they would choose two principles. The first gives each person an equal right to the most extensive scheme of basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme for all. The second permits social and economic inequalities only if they are attached to positions open to all under fair equality of opportunity, and if they are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged — the difference principle. The first principle has lexical priority over the second. Parties reason by a maximin rule, and the theory is tested against our considered judgements through reflective equilibrium.
03The libertarian challenge
The sharpest early attack came from the right. Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974) argued that justice is historical, not patterned: a distribution is just if it arose from just acquisition and voluntary transfer, whatever its shape. His Wilt Chamberlain example claims that liberty upsets patterns, so maintaining any pattern requires continuous interference with free exchange. Taxation of earnings, on this view, is on a par with forced labour.
Rawls's defenders reply that Nozick takes property rights as given and never explains where the original entitlements came from, and that talents are morally arbitrary: no one deserves their natural endowments or starting place. The syllabus names the communitarians, but the libertarian critique clarifies what is distinctive about theirs. See Rawls and Nozick.
04The communitarian critiques
Communitarians attacked Rawls's foundations rather than his conclusions. Michael Sandel's Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (1982) argued that the original position presupposes an unencumbered self, prior to its ends, whereas our identities are partly constituted by our attachments. Alasdair MacIntyre's After Virtue (1981) held that justice can only be understood within a tradition and a narrative of the good life. Charles Taylor criticised liberal 'atomism' and argued that the capacity for autonomous choice itself depends on a supporting culture. Michael Walzer's Spheres of Justice (1983) proposed complex equality: each good (money, office, education, health care) should be distributed by the criteria implicit in its shared social meaning.
The critics are not a school. Walzer and Taylor remain close to liberal democracy; MacIntyre rejects modern liberalism outright. See Rawls and the Communitarians.
05Rawls's reply: political liberalism
Rawls's later work can be read as a reply. In 'Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical' (1985) and Political Liberalism (1993) he presented justice as fairness as a political conception, not a comprehensive moral doctrine. A democratic society is marked by reasonable pluralism; citizens holding different religious and philosophical views can endorse the same principles through an overlapping consensus, and settle fundamental questions by public reason.
This concedes something to the communitarians (the theory now rests on the shared political culture of democracies rather than a universal account of the self) while refusing their central claim that politics should promote a common good. Will Kymlicka's liberal answer went further, arguing that culture matters as a context of choice and can justify minority rights within liberalism. Rawls also distinguished his ideal of a property-owning democracy from welfare-state capitalism in Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (2001).
06After Rawls: capability, gender and recognition
Amartya Sen's The Idea of Justice (2009) criticised 'transcendental institutionalism' (the search for perfectly just institutions) in favour of comparative judgements that reduce manifest injustice. Drawing on the Sanskrit distinction between niti (rules and institutions) and nyaya (realised justice), he argued that the capability to achieve valued functionings, not primary goods, is the right metric.
Feminists such as Susan Moller Okin (Justice, Gender, and the Family, 1989) faulted Rawls for exempting the family from the principles of justice. Iris Marion Young and Nancy Fraser argued that justice concerns domination and recognition as well as distribution. For India, Ambedkar's insistence that political democracy cannot survive without social democracy anticipates these concerns; Articles 38 and 39 and the reservation debate (see Indra Sawhney and Equality) are the natural field for testing them.
Debates
Is the liberal–communitarian debate a real disagreement?
One view holds that the debate was largely a misunderstanding: Rawls never claimed that people are unencumbered in real life, only that the original position is a device of representation, and Political Liberalism made this explicit. The other view holds that a deep disagreement remains about whether the state may promote a shared conception of the good, visible today in arguments over religion in public life, national identity and multiculturalism.
Does Rawls's theory travel to India?
Rawlsian readers see the Indian Constitution as broadly consistent with justice as fairness: equal basic liberties in Part III, fair equality of opportunity in Articles 15 and 16, and the Directive Principles as a difference principle for the basic structure. Critics reply that caste injustice is group-based and historical, which Rawls's individual-centred, ideal theory handles poorly; Ambedkar's and Sen's comparative, realisation-focused approaches fit Indian conditions better.
Answer strategy
A strong answer reconstructs Rawls as an argument (from the problem with utilitarianism, through the original position, to the two principles and their priority) before criticising it. Name the communitarians individually and keep their objections distinct: Sandel on the self, MacIntyre on tradition, Taylor on atomism, Walzer on spheres. Then show how Political Liberalism responds.
Common errors: calling Rawls a socialist or simply a welfarist; treating Nozick as a communitarian; forgetting the lexical priority of liberty; and writing about the veil of ignorance without explaining why parties choose maximin. For Indian illustration use the Preamble, Articles 38–39, and reservation jurisprudence, and close with Sen's comparative approach as the most influential recent alternative.
Readings
- John Rawls, A Theory of Justice
- Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice
- Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift, Liberals and Communitarians
- Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction
- Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice
- Rajeev Bhargava and Ashok Acharya (eds), Political Theory: An Introduction
In the UPSC papers
Asked by UPSC
2 questions · 2025–2026
2026 · PSIR I · Q4(b) · 15 marks
What is capability approach? Elaborate the distinctive features of the capability theory of equality.
2025 · PSIR I · Q2(c) · 15 marks
Explain how Rawls used the liberal and egalitarian perspective to develop his concept of distributive justice.
Verbatim from the official UPSC Main papers, linked to Justice in the PYQ dataset.PYQ Intelligence →
Practice questions
- Q1PSIR style15 marks· 200 words
Explain the role of the 'original position' in Rawls's theory of justice. Why would parties behind the veil of ignorance choose the difference principle?
How to approach it
The device and what the veil hides; primary goods; maximin under uncertainty; Harsanyi's objection that parties might choose average utility.
- Q2PSIR style20 marks· 250 words
'The Rawlsian self is unencumbered.' Examine this communitarian critique and Rawls's response to it.
How to approach it
Sandel's argument, supported by MacIntyre and Taylor; Rawls's 1985 essay and Political Liberalism; a judgement on whether the reply succeeds.
- Q3PSIR style15 marks· 200 words
Critically compare Walzer's idea of 'complex equality' with Rawls's difference principle.
How to approach it
Spheres and social meanings versus a single principle for the basic structure; relativism objection to Walzer; an Indian sphere such as education or office.
- Q4PSIR style10 marks· 150 words
Assess Amartya Sen's critique of 'transcendental institutionalism'.
How to approach it
Niti and nyaya; comparative judgements; capabilities; whether a comparative theory needs an ideal benchmark after all.
Practice questions are original to this platform and are not previous year questions. For questions actually set by UPSC, see PYQ Intelligence.
Explore further
Thinker
Ideology
PSIR Optional
Polity & Governance
Article
- Article 15 · Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth
- Article 16 · Equality of opportunity in matters of public employment
- Article 38 · State to secure a social order for the promotion of welfare of the people
- Article 39 · Certain principles of policy to be followed by the State
Judgment
IB Global Politics
Five-minute module
Timeline
Sources
- 01UPSC, Civil Services Examination Notice: Scheme and Syllabus (Political Science and International Relations) (opens in a new tab). Union Public Service Commission
- 02John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 1971
- 03John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 1993
- 04Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 1982
- 05Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice, 2009
- 06Constitution of India (Legislative Department, Ministry of Law and Justice) (opens in a new tab)