Answer framework · PSIR Paper II
Multi-alignment and India's core values and interests
“India has adopted multi-alignment to fulfill its core values and interests in International relations. Discuss.”
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01What the question asks
Directive. Discuss asks for an examination of the statement from more than one side, ending in a view. The statement makes a causal claim: that India adopted multi-alignment in order to fulfil its core values and interests. The answer must show what those values and interests are, how the method serves them, and where it falls short or creates tension.
Scope. Multi-alignment is India's practice of building close partnerships with several powers at once, including powers hostile to one another, issue by issue and without alliance commitments. It must be distinguished from non-alignment, a refusal to join blocs, and related to strategic autonomy, the goal it serves. See Multi-Alignment.
The trap. Three: treating multi-alignment as a declared doctrine, when it is a description of practice, popularised by commentators, which official policy broadly accepts; listing groupings (Quad, SCO, BRICS, I2U2) without linking each to a value or an interest; and ignoring the costs, which became visible after 2022.
02The approach
First identify the core interests: security against China and Pakistan; growth, investment and technology; energy; autonomy of decision; and status, including a larger voice in global institutions. Then the core values India itself invokes: strategic autonomy as a principle, sovereignty and non-interference, multilateralism, the peaceful settlement of disputes and solidarity with the Global South. Note that autonomy is both an interest and a value, which is why multi-alignment can be presented as continuity with Nehru's non-alignment.
Then match the method to these ends. The Quad serves maritime security and technology against Chinese pressure; Russia supplies defence equipment and, since 2022, discounted oil; the SCO and BRICS keep India present in Eurasian and Global South forums that China would otherwise shape; the G20 presidency of 2023 and the Voice of the Global South summits serve status and solidarity together; minilaterals such as I2U2 and the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor serve connectivity and investment.
Then test the claim. Realists read multi-alignment as hedging in a multipolar system, a Kautilyan management of rivals in which values are mainly rhetoric. Sceptics point to its limits: partners offer issue-by-issue cooperation in return; coercion raises the price of keeping every option open, as with the American tariff penalty of August 2025; and a sharper US–China confrontation would compress the space the method needs. The value question is sharpest over Ukraine: critics argue that India's abstentions put its interests with Russia ahead of the principle of territorial integrity it upholds elsewhere, while the government's own explanations of its votes affirmed the UN Charter and the territorial integrity of states and argued that dialogue serves peace better than isolation. The conclusion should judge whether the method fulfils interests and values together or trades one against the other. See Strategic Autonomy.
03Competing viewpoints
Continuity: autonomy by other means
Multi-alignment pursues the purpose of non-alignment, independence of judgement, through engagement instead of distance. Where Nehru kept away from blocs, India now joins many groupings so that none can claim it. On this view the value of strategic autonomy is constant and only the method has adapted to a multipolar world; S. Jaishankar's The India Way (2020) makes a version of this argument.
Interest-driven hedging
A realist reading: India balances China with American, Japanese and Australian help, keeps Russia as a supplier and as a check on a closer Russia–China alignment, and courts the Global South for votes and legitimacy. Values are the vocabulary in which interests are presented. Kautilya's mandala, in which the enemy's enemy is a natural friend, is often cited as an indigenous precedent, and Morgenthau's national interest defined in terms of power fits as well.
The sceptical view
Multi-alignment serves interests only in a permissive environment. Partners who have been offered no commitment owe none: after the Galwan clash of June 2020 India received statements of support but no guarantees. Coercion exposes the method, from the risk of American sanctions over Russian arms to the tariff penalty of 2025. And the gap between declared values and practice, over Ukraine or democracy, costs credibility with Western and Southern partners alike.
04Structure
- 1
Introduction
Define multi-alignment and distinguish it from non-alignment and from alliance. State the thesis: the method serves India's interests well and its values unevenly, and its success depends on a multipolar environment India does not control. No word limit is printed; plan for about 200 words.
- 2
Core values and interests
Name them briefly; note that strategic autonomy is both a value and an interest.
- 3
How the method serves interests
Security (the Quad; defence partnerships with the United States, France and Russia); development and technology; energy; connectivity; status (the G20 presidency, the Global South summits). One example for each.
- 4
How it serves, or strains, values
Autonomy and multilateralism served; sovereignty and territorial integrity contested over Ukraine; solidarity with the Global South sometimes in tension with membership of Western-led minilaterals.
- 5
Limits and costs
Trust, coercion and capacity; the tariff episode of 2025; the risk of a bipolar squeeze.
- 6
Conclusion
A judgement: multi-alignment is the rational method for a rising power without allies; it fulfils interests more fully than values, and it lasts only while great-power rivalry leaves room for manoeuvre.
05Evidence and examples
- The Quad held its first leaders' summit, virtually, in March 2021 and its first in-person summit in Washington in September 2021.
- India became a full member of the SCO, together with Pakistan, in 2017.
- India agreed in October 2018 to buy S-400 air defence systems from Russia despite the risk of US sanctions under CAATSA.
- After February 2022 India abstained on UN resolutions condemning Russia's invasion of Ukraine and sharply increased its imports of discounted Russian crude.
- Meeting Putin on the sidelines of the SCO summit in Samarkand in September 2022, Modi told him that the present era was not one for war.
- I2U2 (India, Israel, the UAE and the United States) held its first leaders' summit in July 2022.
- At the G20 summit in New Delhi in September 2023 the African Union became a permanent member and the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor was announced.
- India convened the first Voice of the Global South Summit, virtually, in January 2023.
- In August 2025 the United States imposed an additional tariff on Indian goods, linked to India's purchases of Russian oil.
Counterarguments
Two objections deserve full statement. The first holds that multi-alignment is a phase, not a strategy: it suited the years after 2008, when the great powers competed for India's favour, and it becomes untenable if the United States and China demand that states choose, as export controls and tariffs increasingly do. The second holds that the method has produced breadth without depth: many partnerships, few with the institutional density of an alliance, and a diplomatic service too small to manage them all.
Defenders answer that alliance would cost India more than it gains, tying it to a partner's quarrels and inviting Chinese hostility without guaranteeing support, and that India's size makes it a pole in its own right, which partners cannot easily abandon.
Evaluation
The claim is broadly right about interests and partly right about values. Multi-alignment has delivered defence technology, energy at a discount, access to minilateral forums and a convening role in the Global South, while preserving the freedom of decision that Indian governments of every party have treated as non-negotiable. It fulfils the value of autonomy fully and the values of sovereignty and multilateralism selectively.
The method's durability depends on the structure of the international system: it is a strategy for a multipolar world and would be strained by a bipolar one. See Indian Foreign Policy and India's Contribution to the Non-Alignment Movement.
Conclusion
Conclude that India adopted multi-alignment less as a choice of values than as the most rational way to pursue its interests without allies, and then presented it in the language of its oldest value, strategic autonomy. The method fulfils those interests well in a contested but open order; its claim to serve India's values will be judged by whether India can keep its principles consistent when its partners collide.
An illustrative answer
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Written to show the framework in use. It is one way to answer, not the answer, and it is not an official or model answer.
Multi-alignment describes India's practice of building close partnerships with several powers at once, including powers opposed to each other, issue by issue and without alliance commitments. It differs from non-alignment, which kept distance from blocs, but serves the same end: strategic autonomy.
India's core interests are security against China and Pakistan, growth and technology, energy, autonomy of decision and a larger voice in global institutions; its declared values include sovereignty, multilateralism, peaceful settlement and solidarity with the Global South.
The method serves these interests closely. The Quad and defence ties with the United States and France strengthen India against Chinese pressure; Russia supplies arms and, since 2022, discounted oil; the SCO and BRICS keep India inside forums China would otherwise shape; the G20 presidency of 2023, which brought the African Union into the group, and the Voice of the Global South summits served status and solidarity together.
Values are served less evenly. Autonomy is fully preserved, but critics argue that abstaining on Russia's invasion of Ukraine put interest before the principle of territorial integrity that India upholds elsewhere. The method also has costs: partners offered no commitment give none in a crisis, as after Galwan in 2020, and coercion such as the American tariff penalty of 2025 raises the price of keeping every option open.
Multi-alignment is therefore the rational strategy of a rising power without allies. It fulfils India's interests more completely than its values, and it depends on a multipolar order that leaves room for manoeuvre.
Sources
- 01Shashi Tharoor, Pax Indica: India and the World of the Twenty-first Century, 2012
- 02S. Jaishankar, The India Way: Strategies for an Uncertain World, 2020
- 03Sunil Khilnani and others, NonAlignment 2.0: A Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in the Twenty First Century. Centre for Policy Research, 2012
- 04Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India: statements and explanations of vote (opens in a new tab)
- 05UPSC, Civil Services (Main) Examination 2026, Political Science and International Relations Paper II, question paper (opens in a new tab). Union Public Service Commission