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Five-minute module · Theoretical debate

Negative and positive liberty

Isaiah Berlin's two concepts of liberty, the danger he saw in the second, and the replies suggesting that the line between them is less sharp than he drew it.

5 minutes5 steps3 questions to check yourself
Begin with step 1
  1. Step 1 of 5

    Two questions, not one

    In "Two Concepts of Liberty", his inaugural lecture at Oxford in 1958, Isaiah Berlin argued that the word freedom answers two different questions. The negative concept asks how large is the area within which a person is, or should be, left to do or be what they are able to, without interference by others. The positive concept asks who or what is the source of control that can determine what someone does or is. The first is freedom from interference; the second is freedom as self-mastery, being one's own master. Berlin treated both as genuine values. His argument concerned what happens when the second is stretched too far.

  2. Step 2 of 5

    How self-mastery can become coercion

    Berlin's warning traced a sequence. Self-mastery suggests a divided self: a higher, rational self that ought to rule and a lower self of passing desires. The higher self is then identified with something larger, a church, a class, a nation or the state, which claims to know what individuals would want if they were fully rational. Coercing people in the name of their real selves can then be described as liberation rather than coercion. Rousseau's claim that whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be "forced to be free" is the classic instance. Writing after the totalitarian regimes of the twentieth century, Berlin judged this inversion more dangerous than any abuse of negative liberty.

  3. Step 3 of 5

    The case for negative liberty

    Negative liberty, on Berlin's view, protects a frontier around the individual that no authority may cross, whoever governs. It concerns the extent of control, not its source, so it is compatible with some forms of autocracy and can be violated by democracies. Its lineage runs through Hobbes, Bentham and Mill, whose harm principle confines interference to preventing harm to others. Berlin tied it to value pluralism: because human goods are many and sometimes incompatible, no one can claim to know the single right way to live, so people need a protected space in which to choose among them. The case for negative liberty is thus partly a case for modesty about what politics can know.

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    The critics: one concept, or a third

    Critics have questioned the dichotomy itself. Gerald MacCallum argued in 1967 that every claim about freedom has one triadic form: an agent is free from some constraint to do or become something. The two camps differ only over what counts as the agent, the constraint and the end. Charles Taylor argued that negative liberty, an "opportunity concept", cannot explain why some freedoms matter more than others; for that we need an "exercise concept" of acting on our significant purposes. Philip Pettit and Quentin Skinner revived a republican third concept, freedom as non-domination: a slave with a kindly master is unfree even if never interfered with, because he lives at another's mercy.

  5. Step 5 of 5

    The debate in the Indian Constitution

    The Indian Constitution holds both concepts. The freedoms of Article 19 are largely negative: they mark out areas the state may restrict only reasonably and on stated grounds. The Directive Principles and the right to education in Article 21A express a positive view: freedom needs capacities that the state must help to create. Ambedkar's argument that liberty is hollow without social and economic equality, and Amartya Sen's account of development as the expansion of capabilities, sit on the positive side. Berlin's warning still applies: a state that claims to know its citizens' real interests can justify much. The constitutional task, on this view, is to build capacities without licensing paternalism.

The idea to keep

Negative liberty asks how far a person is left alone; positive liberty asks who governs them, and whether they govern themselves. Berlin defended the first as the safer political ideal because the second can be turned into coercion in the name of people's real selves, but his critics show that freedom also depends on capacity and on the absence of domination.

Check yourself

Answer each question in your own words first, then open it to compare.

  1. Q1State the question that each concept of liberty answers, according to Berlin.

    Answer

    Negative liberty: how large is the area within which a person is left to act without interference by others? Positive liberty: who or what is the source of control that determines what a person does?

  2. Q2Why did Berlin think positive liberty could become dangerous?

    Answer

    Because self-mastery invites a split between a higher, rational self and a lower, empirical one, and an authority that claims to speak for the higher self can then coerce people while calling it liberation.

  3. Q3What is freedom as non-domination?

    Answer

    The republican view, revived by Philip Pettit and Quentin Skinner, that a person is unfree when exposed to another's arbitrary power, even if that power is never actually used to interfere.

These questions are original to this platform; they are not previous year questions.

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Sources

  1. 01Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty: An Inaugural Lecture (1958), reprinted in Four Essays on Liberty (1969). Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press
  2. 02Gerald C. MacCallum Jr., "Negative and Positive Freedom", Philosophical Review 76 (1967)
  3. 03Charles Taylor, "What's Wrong with Negative Liberty", in Alan Ryan (ed.), The Idea of Freedom (1979). Oxford University Press
  4. 04Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (1997). Oxford University Press
  5. 05Quentin Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism (1998). Cambridge University Press

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