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Answer framework · PSIR Paper I

The advisory jurisdiction of the Supreme Court

“Examine the constitutional provisions and nature of advisory jurisdiction of Supreme Court of India. Evaluate your answer with relevant examples.”
UPSC CSE (Main) 2025 · PSIR Paper I · Question 6(b)Official paper (opens in a new tab)15 marks

The platform’s own guidance for planning an answer. It is not an official or model answer.

01What the question asks

The question has two directives. 'Examine' asks for the provisions and the nature of the jurisdiction: what Article 143 permits, who may use it, what the Court must or may do and what force its opinion has. 'Evaluate … with relevant examples' asks for a judgement on how the jurisdiction has worked, which the examples must support rather than decorate.

The traps are familiar. Listing references by name without saying what each shows earns little. Claiming that the President is bound by the opinion, or that the Court must answer every reference, is wrong: under Article 143(1) the Court may decline, and it did so over Ayodhya in 1994. An answer that ignores the risks of advisory opinions (political questions, abstract adjudication, an executive monopoly over references) has not evaluated anything.

02The approach

Treat the jurisdiction as a formal channel of consultation between the executive and the Court, inherited from the Government of India Act, 1935, under which the Governor-General could consult the Federal Court.

Set out the text first. Under Article 143(1) the President may refer a question of law or fact of public importance, and the Court 'may' report its opinion; under Article 143(2), for disputes that the proviso to Article 131 excludes (those arising from pre-Constitution treaties, agreements and similar instruments), it must. Article 145(3) requires a bench of at least five judges. Then characterise the power: advisory rather than adjudicatory, discretionary under clause (1) and obligatory under clause (2), not binding on the President yet followed in practice.

Finally group the references by function (territorial and federal questions, conflicts between institutions, institutional design, the legality of proposed laws, refusals) and weigh benefits against risks, using the United States and Canada as contrasting models.

03Competing viewpoints

A constitutional safety valve

Advice can settle a legal uncertainty before it becomes a crisis. Berubari (1960) established that ceding territory needs a constitutional amendment, which Parliament then passed; Keshav Singh (1964) defused a confrontation between the Uttar Pradesh Assembly and the Allahabad High Court; the Third Judges reference (1998) settled the composition of the collegium. Because at least five judges hear every reference, the opinion carries the authority of a Constitution Bench even though it does not bind the President.

A risk to the judicial role

Advisory opinions are given without a concrete dispute or a full factual record, on questions the executive chooses and frames. Governments may be tempted to pass contested political decisions to the Court or to seek a second opinion on a judgment they dislike. The Ayodhya reference, which the Court declined to answer in 1994, shows the danger of asking judges a historical and religious question; the references that followed the 2G spectrum judgment (2012) and State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu (2025) raised the concern that Article 143 could be used to revisit decided cases.

Comparative models

The justices of the United States Supreme Court declined in 1793 to answer questions put to them on behalf of President Washington, treating advice to the executive as incompatible with the judicial role, and federal courts there still give no advisory opinions. Canada took the opposite path: its reference jurisdiction produced the Reference re Secession of Quebec (1998), which settled an existential constitutional question. India stands with Canada, but its Court has guarded itself with the power to decline and by refusing to treat a reference as an appeal against its own judgments.

04Structure

  1. 1

    Introduction

    Define advisory jurisdiction as the Court's power to give the President its opinion outside an ordinary dispute. Note its origin in the Government of India Act, 1935 and its place beside the Court's original, appellate and writ jurisdictions.

  2. 2

    Constitutional provisions

    Article 143(1): any question of law or fact of public importance, referred by the President on the advice of the Council of Ministers; the Court 'may' report after such hearing as it thinks fit. Article 143(2): disputes excluded by the proviso to Article 131; the Court 'shall' report. Article 145(3): a bench of at least five judges.

  3. 3

    Nature of the jurisdiction

    Advisory, not adjudicatory; discretionary under clause (1), obligatory under clause (2); the opinion does not bind the President, though it has been followed in practice; the Court's practice of declining, reframing or limiting questions; the debate over whether an opinion is law declared under Article 141.

  4. 4

    Evaluation through examples

    Territorial and federal questions (Berubari, 1960; the Cauvery tribunal, 1991); conflicts between institutions (Keshav Singh, 1964; assent to State Bills, 2025); institutional design (Third Judges, 1998); the legality of proposed laws (Kerala Education Bill, 1958; Special Courts Bill, 1978); policy (natural resources, 2012); refusal (Ayodhya, 1994). Say what each shows about the jurisdiction's value or risk.

  5. 5

    Assessment

    Benefits: authoritative early guidance, de-escalation of conflicts between institutions, legal clarity in federal disputes. Risks: abstract questions, political outsourcing, the executive's monopoly over references, and indirect review of judgments. Safeguards: the five-judge bench, the power to decline and the refusal to sit in appeal.

  6. 6

    Conclusion

    A useful jurisdiction when the question is legal, structural and urgent; a dangerous one when it is political, historical or an attempt to reopen a judgment. The Court's discretion is the main safeguard.

05Evidence and examples

  • In re Delhi Laws Act (1951), an early reference on the limits of delegated legislation.
  • In re Kerala Education Bill (1958): minority educational rights under Article 30, considered before the Bill became law.
  • Berubari (1960): ceding Indian territory requires an amendment under Article 368, not a law under Article 3.
  • Keshav Singh (1964): a legislature's power to punish for contempt is subject to Fundamental Rights and judicial review.
  • Special Reference No. 1 of 1998 (the Third Judges case): the Chief Justice of India must consult the four senior-most judges.
  • Ayodhya (Dr M. Ismail Faruqui v. Union of India, 1994): the Court declined to answer whether a temple had existed at the disputed site.
  • Natural resources (Special Reference No. 1 of 2012): auction is not a constitutional requirement for allocating every natural resource.
  • Assent to State Bills (2025): the reference that followed State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu.
  • Comparisons: the refusal of the United States justices in 1793 and Canada's Reference re Secession of Quebec (1998).

Counterarguments

A sceptic can argue that the jurisdiction is either useless or too powerful. If opinions do not bind, a government may ignore them and the Court spends its authority for nothing; if they are always followed and treated as law, the Court makes binding law without the adversarial testing that gives judgments their legitimacy. The States and the opposition cannot initiate a reference, so the Union executive controls the agenda, and questions can be framed to invite a particular answer.

Evaluation

The record is better than the sceptic allows. Most references have concerned genuine legal uncertainty with high stakes, such as territory, legislative privilege, judicial appointments and the validity of proposed laws, and the opinions have been followed, which is the practical test of an advisory institution. The refusal in the Ayodhya reference showed that the discretion in Article 143(1) is real.

The weaknesses are structural: the executive's monopoly over references and the temptation to use them after an unwelcome judgment. A balanced conclusion supports the jurisdiction while insisting on the Court's freedom to decline abstract, factual or political questions and to refuse any use of a reference as a disguised review.

Conclusion

Article 143 makes the Court an adviser as well as a judge. It works when the Court treats advice with judicial discipline and keeps the right to say no.

An illustrative answer

Show an illustrative answer written for this platform

Written to show the framework in use. It is one way to answer, not the answer, and it is not an official or model answer.

Advisory jurisdiction allows the Supreme Court to give the President its opinion outside an ordinary dispute. It descends from the Government of India Act, 1935, under which the Governor-General could consult the Federal Court.

Under Article 143(1) the President, acting on ministerial advice, may refer any question of law or fact of public importance, and the Court 'may' report its opinion. Under Article 143(2), for disputes arising from pre-Constitution treaties and similar instruments, which Article 131 excludes, it must. Article 145(3) requires at least five judges.

The jurisdiction is advisory, not adjudicatory. The opinion does not bind the President, though it has been followed in practice, and the Court may decline to answer, as it did in 1994 when asked whether a temple had stood at the disputed site in Ayodhya.

References have served the constitutional order. Berubari (1960) required an amendment to cede territory; Keshav Singh (1964) subordinated legislative privilege to Fundamental Rights and calmed a clash between a legislature and a High Court; the Third Judges reference (1998) fixed the collegium. The Kerala Education Bill (1958) and Special Courts Bill (1978) references tested proposed laws before they took effect.

The risks are real. Opinions are given without a full factual record, the executive alone frames the questions, and the references that followed the 2G judgment (2012) and the Tamil Nadu assent judgment (2025) raised fears of indirect review. The United States refused advisory opinions in 1793 for reasons of this kind, while Canada's reference on Quebec secession (1998) shows their value.

Article 143 is worth keeping because the Court controls its use: the five-judge bench, the power to decline and the refusal to sit in appeal over its own judgments keep advice judicial.

Sources

  1. 01H. M. Seervai, Constitutional Law of India
  2. 02M. P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law
  3. 03Granville Austin, Working a Democratic Constitution: The Indian Experience
  4. 04Sujit Choudhry, Madhav Khosla and Pratap Bhanu Mehta (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Indian Constitution