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Landmark judgment · 1964

Keshav Singh reference

Resolving a confrontation between the Uttar Pradesh Assembly and the Allahabad High Court, the Court advised that a legislature's power to punish for contempt is subject to Fundamental Rights and to judicial review, and that judges who entertain a detenu's petition commit no contempt of the House.

Special Reference No. 1 of 1964 (In re Keshav Singh)
Court
Supreme Court of India
Decided
30 September 1964
Bench
7-judge bench (advisory opinion under Article 143)
Citation
AIR 1965 SC 745; [1965] 1 SCR 413
Doctrine
Legislative privilege subject to Fundamental Rights and judicial review

01The constitutional issue

In 1964 the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly found Keshav Singh, a socialist worker, guilty of contempt over a pamphlet and committed him to prison for seven days. Two judges of the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court granted him interim bail on a habeas corpus petition. The Assembly then resolved that the two judges and his advocate be brought before it in custody. A full bench of the High Court stayed the resolution, and the President referred the conflict to the Supreme Court under Article 143.

02The decision

Gajendragadkar CJ, for six judges, advised that the powers and privileges conferred on State legislatures by Article 194(3) — then those of the House of Commons — are subject to the rest of the Constitution, including Article 21 and the writ jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226. The House of Commons' immunity from inquiry into general warrants of commitment rested on its history as a High Court of Parliament, which Indian legislatures had not inherited; courts could therefore examine whether a commitment was lawful.

The High Court had jurisdiction to entertain the petition, and neither the judges nor the advocate had committed contempt of the House by doing so. Sarkar J dissented.

03Significance

The opinion established that no organ of the State in India enjoys an absolute, self-defined privilege: legislatures, like courts and executives, act within the Constitution. It qualified M.S.M. Sharma (1959), where the Court had held that privilege prevailed over the press's freedom of speech. Its critics in the legislatures argued that the Court had made itself judge of the Houses' own dignity; its defenders that the alternative was a legislature able to imprison judges.

04What happened afterwards

The 44th Amendment (1978) removed the reference to the House of Commons in Articles 105(3) and 194(3) without codifying the privileges. Raja Ram Pal (2007) confirmed judicial review of the exercise of privilege, and Sita Soren (2024) held that bribery is not protected by legislative privilege.

Why it matters for UPSC

Prelims: 1964; seven judges; Article 143; Article 194(3); Sarkar J's dissent. In Mains, use it on legislative privileges and the case for codifying them.

In the UPSC papers

Asked by UPSC

1 question · 2025

  1. 2025 · PSIR I · Q6(b) · 15 marks

    Examine the constitutional provisions and nature of advisory jurisdiction of Supreme Court of India. Evaluate your answer with relevant examples.

Verbatim from the official UPSC Main papers, linked to Keshav Singh reference in the PYQ dataset.PYQ Intelligence →

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Sources

  1. 01Supreme Court of India, judgment of 30 September 1964 (advisory opinion). Supreme Court of India
  2. 02Special Reference No. 1 of 1964 (Keshav Singh), opinion of 30 September 1964: text (opens in a new tab). Indian Kanoon