Skip to content

Section H · Constitutional Bodies

Constitutional Bodies

A comparative account of the bodies created by the Constitution itself: how their members are appointed and removed, what protects their independence, and to whom they answer.

Overview

Constitutional bodies are institutions created and defined by the Constitution rather than by statute: among them the Election Commission, the Comptroller and Auditor General, the Union and State Public Service Commissions, the Finance Commission, the National Commissions for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Backward Classes, the Special Officer for Linguistic Minorities, the State Election Commissions and Finance Commissions, and the GST Council. Their constitutional status protects them from being abolished or remodelled by ordinary law.

Many of them guard the democratic process or check the executive, which is why scholars increasingly treat them as a distinct "fourth branch" of government. Comparing them shows that constitutional status alone does not secure independence; the terms of appointment, removal, finance and reporting do.

Constitutional and legal provisions

Article 76
Attorney General for India.
Articles 148–151
Comptroller and Auditor General: appointment, removal, duties, form of accounts, audit reports.
Article 243-I, 243K, 243Y, 243ZA
State Finance Commissions and State Election Commissions for local bodies.
Article 279A
GST Council.
Article 280
Finance Commission.
Articles 315–323
Union and State Public Service Commissions.
Article 324
Election Commission: superintendence, direction and control of elections to Parliament, State legislatures and the offices of President and Vice-President.
Articles 338, 338A, 338B
National Commissions for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Backward Classes.
Article 350B
Special Officer for Linguistic Minorities.

Why some bodies are constitutional

The framers placed in the Constitution the bodies they thought indispensable to a democratic and federal republic: an independent manager of elections, an independent auditor of public money, merit-based recruitment to the civil services, and a periodic, neutral allocation of revenue between the Union and the States. Later amendments added bodies for the protection of disadvantaged groups and for local government.

Comparative constitutional scholarship describes such institutions as a "fourth branch": Bruce Ackerman wrote of an integrity branch, South Africa's Constitution groups its counterparts in Chapter 9 as "state institutions supporting constitutional democracy", and Tarunabh Khaitan calls them guarantor institutions. Their purpose is to protect the conditions of democratic competition from the people who win it.

Appointment

Almost all are appointed by the President, or for State bodies by the Governor, on the advice of the government of the day: the CAG, the members of the Public Service Commissions and the Finance Commission, and the members of the National Commissions. The Constitution prescribes qualifications for few of them; the Finance Commission's are set by the Finance Commission (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1951, and half the members of a Public Service Commission must have held government office for ten years.

The Election Commission is now the exception. Article 324(2) left its appointment subject to a law Parliament had never made. In Anoop Baranwal (2023) the Supreme Court required a committee of the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition and the Chief Justice until Parliament legislated. Parliament then enacted the Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023, under which a committee of the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition and a Union Cabinet minister nominated by the Prime Minister selects from a panel prepared by a search committee. Challenges to the Act were filed in the Supreme Court.

Tenure and removal

The strongest protection is removal on the same terms as a Supreme Court judge, by an address of both Houses on proved misbehaviour or incapacity. The CAG and the Chief Election Commissioner enjoy it; other Election Commissioners may be removed only on the Chief Election Commissioner's recommendation. Members of the Public Service Commissions may be removed by the President for misbehaviour only after an inquiry by the Supreme Court, or for insolvency, outside employment or infirmity (Article 317). A State Election Commissioner is removable only like a High Court judge.

Others have weaker protection. Members of the National Commissions serve on terms set by presidential rules, and the Attorney General holds office during pleasure. Tenure varies from six years or age 65 (CAG, Election Commissioners, UPSC members; 62 for State commissions) to three years (the National Commissions).

Other safeguards

Three further devices recur. Financial security: the salaries and administrative expenses of the CAG and the UPSC are charged on the Consolidated Fund and not voted annually, whereas the Election Commission's budget is voted, a difference the Commission has asked to remove. Conditions of service cannot be varied to an incumbent's disadvantage (for the CAG, UPSC members and State Election Commissioners). Post-tenure bars: the CAG is ineligible for any further office under the Union or a State (Article 148(4)), and the chairman of the UPSC for any further government employment (Article 319), which removes the temptation to please the government in the hope of reward.

Accountability

Independence does not mean that these bodies answer to no one. The CAG's reports go to the President or Governor and are laid before the legislature, where the Public Accounts Committee examines them. The UPSC's annual report is laid with a memorandum explaining any case in which its advice was not accepted (Article 323). The National Commissions' reports are laid with a memorandum on action taken (Article 338(6)). The Finance Commission's recommendations are laid with an explanatory memorandum (Article 281).

The Election Commission has no comparable reporting duty; its accountability runs through the courts, which review its decisions after elections (Article 329 bars interference while an election is in progress), and through public scrutiny. In T.N. Seshan v. Union of India (1995) the Supreme Court upheld the multi-member Commission and its decision-making by majority.

Commissions for disadvantaged groups

The original Article 338 provided a Special Officer for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The 65th Amendment (1990) replaced the officer with a multi-member National Commission, and the 89th Amendment (2003) divided it into the National Commission for Scheduled Castes (Article 338) and the National Commission for Scheduled Tribes (Article 338A). The 102nd Amendment (2018) gave constitutional status to the National Commission for Backward Classes (Article 338B); after the Supreme Court held in 2021 that the amendment had removed the States' power to identify backward classes, the 105th Amendment (2021) restored it. These commissions investigate complaints with the powers of a civil court and advise on policy, but their recommendations do not bind.

Debates

Should appointments to all constitutional bodies be made by broad-based committees?

For: appointment by the government of the day lets it choose the officials who will audit, examine or regulate it; committees including the Leader of the Opposition, as for the Lokpal and the CBI Director, would make appointments more credible. Commissions on electoral reform and the Law Commission (Report 255, 2015) proposed such a committee for the Election Commission. Against: committees with a government majority, like the one created in 2023, add form without changing outcomes, while including the Chief Justice raises separation-of-powers concerns. The design of the committee, not its existence, decides whether it adds independence.

Does constitutional status make an institution independent?

The Election Commission's authority grew in the 1990s through the conduct of its members, especially under T.N. Seshan, more than through any change in its legal status, and the CAG's influence depends on the attention its reports receive in Parliament and the media. Conversely, the National Commission for Backward Classes gained constitutional status in 2018 without gaining binding powers. Constitutional status protects existence; independence depends on appointment, tenure, finance and political culture.

Commissions and committees

  • Dinesh Goswami Committee on Electoral Reforms1990

    Recommended that the Chief Election Commissioner be appointed in consultation with the Chief Justice of India and the Leader of the Opposition.

  • Law Commission of India, 255th Report (Electoral Reforms)2015

    Recommended a collegium of the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition and the Chief Justice for appointing Election Commissioners, and equal removal protection for all Commissioners.

Prelims points

  • Election Commission: Article 324; multi-member since 1993; T.N. Seshan (1995) upheld decisions by majority.
  • Chief Election Commissioner removable like a Supreme Court judge; other Commissioners only on the CEC's recommendation.
  • CEC and Election Commissioners: selection committee of the Prime Minister, Leader of the Opposition and a Cabinet minister (2023 Act).
  • CAG: Article 148; removable like a Supreme Court judge; ineligible for further office after tenure.
  • UPSC: Articles 315–323; members serve six years or until 65; State PSC members until 62.
  • UPSC members are removed by the President for misbehaviour only after a Supreme Court inquiry (Article 317).
  • NCSC (Article 338) and NCST (Article 338A) were separated by the 89th Amendment (2003).
  • NCBC (Article 338B) gained constitutional status through the 102nd Amendment (2018).
  • Special Officer for Linguistic Minorities: Article 350B, added by the 7th Amendment (1956).
  • State Election Commissioner (Article 243K) is removable like a High Court judge.

In the UPSC papers

Asked by UPSC

3 questions · 2024–2026

  1. 2026 · GS-II · Q5 · 10 marks

    Do constitutional bodies like the National Commission for Scheduled Castes (NCSC) and the National Commission for Scheduled Tribes (NCST) possess adequate enforcement powers to secure substantive social equality ? Suggest measures to enhance their institutional effectiveness.

  2. 2025 · PSIR I · Q7(c) · 15 marks

    There is a debate on the procedure for appointment of the Chief Election Commissioner and Election Commissioners to the Election Commission of India. Analyse its various aspects.

  3. 2024 · GS-II · Q4 · 10 marks

    “The duty of the Comptroller and Auditor General is not merely to ensure the legality of expenditure but also its propriety.” Comment.

Verbatim from the official UPSC Main papers, linked to Constitutional Bodies in the PYQ dataset.PYQ Intelligence →

Practice questions

  1. Q1UPSC Mains style15 marks· 250 words

    Compare the safeguards of independence for the Election Commission, the Comptroller and Auditor General and the Union Public Service Commission.

    How to approach it

    Compare appointment, tenure, removal, finance, post-tenure bars and reporting for each; identify the weakest point in each design and propose a reform.

  2. Q2UPSC Mains style10 marks· 150 words

    Discuss the Supreme Court's judgment in Anoop Baranwal (2023) and Parliament's legislative response.

    How to approach it

    Explain the gap in Article 324(2), the interim committee, the 2023 Act's composition, and the arguments about independence.

  3. Q3UPSC Mains style10 marks· 150 words

    Does constitutional status make an institution independent? Discuss with reference to the National Commission for Backward Classes.

    How to approach it

    Use the 102nd and 105th Amendments and contrast with the Election Commission's and CAG's sources of authority.

Practice questions are original to this platform and are not previous year questions. For questions actually set by UPSC, see PYQ Intelligence.

Explore further

Political system

Sources

  1. 01The Constitution of India (as amended) (opens in a new tab). Legislative Department, Ministry of Law and Justice
  2. 02Judgments of the Supreme Court of India (opens in a new tab). Supreme Court of India
  3. 03Granville Austin, Working a Democratic Constitution: The Indian Experience (1999). Oxford University Press
  4. 04The Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023. Legislative Department, Ministry of Law and Justice
  5. 05Tarunabh Khaitan, "Guarantor Institutions", Asian Journal of Comparative Law 16(S1) (2021)
  6. 06Bruce Ackerman, "The New Separation of Powers", Harvard Law Review 113 (2000)