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Section J · Elections and Political Processes

Election Funding

Indian elections cost far more than the law admits. The rules on donations, disclosure and spending, the electoral bonds judgment of 2024, and the arguments for and against public funding.

Overview

India's law of political finance regulates the wrong end of the problem most tightly. It caps what a candidate may spend but places no limit on what a party spends. It requires parties to report donations above ₹20,000 but lets smaller and cash donations go unnamed. It permits corporate donations subject to company law. The result is a large gap between declared and actual spending, and a system in which money is easiest to raise for those already in power.

The electoral bond scheme of 2018 promised to bring donations into the banking system while keeping donors anonymous. On 15 February 2024 a Constitution Bench struck it down in Association for Democratic Reforms v Union of India, holding that voters' right to information about political funding outweighed the scheme's claims. The judgment settled what the law may not do; it did not design what should replace the bonds.

Constitutional and legal provisions

RPA 1951, section 77 and rule 90 of the Conduct of Election Rules
Candidates' expenditure limits (₹95 lakh for the Lok Sabha and ₹40 lakh for assemblies in larger states since 2022). Explanation 1 excludes party spending on general propaganda and star campaigners' travel.
RPA 1951, sections 10A and 29B–29C
Failure to lodge an account of expenses disqualifies for three years; parties may accept contributions from anyone except government companies and must report those above ₹20,000.
Companies Act, 2013, section 182
A company in existence for three years may donate up to 7.5 per cent of its average net profit of the previous three years and must disclose the amount. The 2017 removal of the cap was struck down in 2024.
Income-tax law and FCRA
Parties' income is tax-exempt only if they keep audited accounts, report donations and take no cash donation above ₹2,000 (a condition added in 2017). Parties and candidates may not receive foreign contributions, though 2016 and 2018 amendments narrowed the definition of a foreign source retrospectively.

The cost gap

Declared expenditure is a fraction of what campaigns spend. Independent estimates, such as those of the Centre for Media Studies, put total spending in recent general elections at many times the sum of candidates' declared accounts, because party spending is uncapped and much campaign money moves in cash. The gap has three consequences: candidates who can finance themselves are favoured, which helps explain the persistence of candidates facing criminal charges; donors expect returns in contracts, licences and policy; and incumbents, who control the means of reward, raise more than challengers.

Electoral bonds and the 2024 judgment

The Finance Act, 2017 created bearer bonds sold by the State Bank of India and redeemable only by parties that had polled at least 1 per cent of votes in the previous election. Donors were anonymous to the public and to the recipient on paper, but not to the bank, and so not necessarily to the government. The same Act removed the cap on corporate donations and the duty to name recipient parties.

The Court, in opinions by the Chief Justice and by Justice Sanjiv Khanna, held unanimously that voters' right to information under Article 19(1)(a), recognised in Union of India v ADR (2002), extends to political funding, because large donations can buy influence. Curbing black money was a legitimate aim, but less restrictive means existed. The unlimited corporate donations allowed by the 2017 amendment were manifestly arbitrary, opening the door to shell companies. The Court ordered the bank to disclose purchase and redemption data, which the Commission published in March 2024.

What remains after the bonds

Three channels remain. Direct donations by cheque or bank transfer must be reported above ₹20,000, but smaller donations need not be. Electoral trusts, registered under a 2013 scheme, must pass on at least 95 per cent of what they receive each year and disclose their donors and recipients, though not which donor's money went to which party. Corporate donations again face the 7.5 per cent cap. None of these limits party spending, and the trust route still blurs the link between donor and beneficiary that the Court treated as central to voters' right to know.

State funding: the recurring proposal

The Indrajit Gupta Committee (1998) recommended partial state funding in kind, such as broadcast time and materials, for recognised parties and their candidates. The Law Commission (1999) accepted state funding only after parties' accounts and internal democracy were regulated, warning that public money added to unregulated private money would change nothing. Comparative practice varies: Germany funds parties partly in proportion to votes and small donations; Britain caps national campaign spending and requires reporting of donations; the United States offers public funding for presidential campaigns, which candidates may decline.

Debates

Is donor anonymity protection or concealment?

Anonymity protects donors from retaliation by governments and rival parties, a real risk where the state controls licences and investigations; without it, defenders argued, donors would return to cash. The Court accepted that donor privacy has value but held that, for large contributions, the public interest in exposing possible quid pro quo prevails. A threshold approach, with anonymity for small donations and disclosure for large ones, is the common compromise.

Would public funding clean up elections?

Public funding reduces parties' dependence on large donors and levels the field for challengers. Critics answer that, without spending caps on parties and credible enforcement, it would be a subsidy on top of private money, that allocation by past votes entrenches incumbents, and that the taxpayer should not finance parties the voter may oppose. Most proposals therefore pair funding with caps, audits and full disclosure.

Commissions and committees

  • Indrajit Gupta Committee on State Funding of Elections1998

    Recommended partial state funding in kind for recognised parties and their candidates.

  • Law Commission of India, 170th Report1999

    Supported state funding only after regulation of party finances and internal democracy.

  • Second Administrative Reforms Commission, 4th Report: Ethics in Governance2007

    Recommended partial state funding to reduce the role of illegitimate money in elections.

  • Law Commission of India, 255th Report2015

    Proposed fuller disclosure of donations, including aggregated small donations, and tighter regulation of party expenditure.

Prelims points

  • Expenditure limits apply to candidates, not to parties.
  • Rule 90 limits since 2022: ₹95 lakh (Lok Sabha) and ₹40 lakh (assembly) in larger states.
  • Section 29C: parties report contributions above ₹20,000; since 2017 a cash donation above ₹2,000 costs a party its tax exemption.
  • The Electoral Bond Scheme was notified on 2 January 2018 and struck down on 15 February 2024 by a five-judge bench.
  • Section 182 of the Companies Act caps corporate donations at 7.5 per cent of average net profit of three years; government companies may not donate.
  • Electoral trusts must distribute at least 95 per cent of their annual receipts.
  • Explanation 1 to section 77 (1974) followed Kanwar Lal Gupta v Amar Nath Chawla (1974).
  • Parties and candidates are barred from receiving foreign contributions under the FCRA.

In the UPSC papers

Asked by UPSC

1 question · 2026

  1. 2026 · GS-II · Q15 · 15 marks

    To what extent do pressure groups, social movements and corporate lobbies deepen pluralistic democracy in India by representing excluded interests ? Analyse whether the growing convergence of corporate wealth and political power poses a threat to the autonomy of formal democratic institutions.

Verbatim from the official UPSC Main papers, linked to Election Funding in the PYQ dataset.PYQ Intelligence →

Practice questions

  1. Q1UPSC Mains style15 marks· 250 words

    The electoral bonds judgment settled what the law may not do but not what it should do. Suggest a framework for political finance that reconciles transparency, donor privacy and fair competition.

    How to approach it

    Summarise the judgment's reasoning; identify remaining gaps (small donations, trusts, uncapped party spending); propose thresholds for disclosure, party spending limits, audits by an independent body and possibly matched public funding.

  2. Q2UPSC Mains style10 marks· 150 words

    Why have expenditure limits failed to restrain the cost of Indian elections? Examine with reference to the treatment of party expenditure.

    How to approach it

    Explain section 77 and Explanation 1; show the shift of spending to parties; note enforcement limits and cash; suggest party caps.

  3. Q3UPSC Mains style15 marks· 250 words

    Examine the case for state funding of elections in India in the light of comparative experience.

    How to approach it

    Use Indrajit Gupta and the Law Commission; compare Germany, Britain and the United States; weigh dependence on donors against entrenchment and fiscal cost; state preconditions.

Practice questions are original to this platform and are not previous year questions. For questions actually set by UPSC, see PYQ Intelligence.

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