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Case study · Latin America (Colombia) · 2012–2026

Colombia: building peace after the 2016 agreement

A peace agreement that ended the Americas' largest insurgency, a referendum that rejected it, a court that trades acknowledgement for restorative sentences, and armed groups that never disarmed: peacebuilding tested over a decade.

Checked to 7 August 2026legitimacysovereigntypower

The case

The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) fought the state from the 1960s in a conflict that also drew in other guerrilla groups, right-wing paramilitaries, drug-trafficking organisations and the armed forces, and that left millions of registered victims. Negotiations in Havana from 2012, with Cuba and Norway as guarantors, produced an agreement in 2016. On 2 October 2016 voters narrowly rejected it in a referendum; a revised text was signed in November 2016 and approved by Congress instead of a second vote. The FARC handed over its weapons to a UN mission in 2017 and became a political party, now called Comunes, with guaranteed seats in Congress for two terms.

The agreement's justice component created the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP). Those who acknowledge responsibility and tell the truth receive restorative sanctions of up to eight years, served through work such as searching for the disappeared, clearing landmines and environmental repair, with restrictions on liberty but no ordinary prison; those who refuse and are convicted face prison terms of up to twenty years. On 16 September 2025 the JEP issued its first sentences, imposing eight-year restorative sanctions on seven former members of the FARC secretariat for a policy of kidnapping that affected thousands of people.

Implementation has been uneven. Hundreds of social leaders and former combatants have been killed since 2016, FARC dissident factions and the ELN guerrillas have kept fighting, and armed groups compete for coca and mining revenues where the state is thin. President Gustavo Petro's 'total peace' policy (2022–2026) opened talks with several armed groups, with limited results. In June 2026 voters elected Abelardo de la Espriella, who campaigned against negotiating with armed groups and promised a harder security policy; he took office on 7 August 2026.

Actors and stakeholders

  • Colombian stateState (successive governments)

    Role

    Negotiated and signed the agreement; responsible for rural reform, security guarantees and reintegration.

    Power and its sources

    Armed forces, budget and law, unevenly present across the territory; its policy changes with each government.

  • FARC, now ComunesFormer insurgency turned political party

    Role

    Signatory; disarmed in 2017; its former leaders appear before the JEP.

    Power and its sources

    Guaranteed congressional seats until 2026, little electoral support, and dependence on the agreement's guarantees.

  • Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP)Transitional justice court

    Role

    Investigates the gravest crimes through 'macro-cases' and imposes restorative or ordinary sanctions.

    Power and its sources

    Legal authority over former combatants and state agents who submit to it; its legitimacy is contested.

  • Victims and social leadersMost affected groups

    Role

    Take part in JEP hearings, demand truth and reparation, and lead local organisations.

    Power and its sources

    Moral authority and testimony; highly exposed to violence.

  • Dissidents, the ELN and criminal groupsViolent non-state actors

    Role

    Continue armed activity and control illicit economies in parts of the country.

    Power and its sources

    Coercion and money from coca, mining and extortion.

  • Guarantors and the UN Verification MissionThird parties

    Role

    Cuba and Norway guaranteed the talks; a UN mission verifies implementation.

    Power and its sources

    Monitoring and legitimacy, without enforcement.

Through the key concepts

legitimacy

The referendum defeat exposed weak popular legitimacy; approval by Congress supplied legal legitimacy that opponents still contest. The JEP's legitimacy depends on victims' acceptance: critics call restorative sanctions impunity, supporters argue that truth and repair serve victims better than prison terms that would never have been agreed.

sovereignty

The state's monopoly of force remains incomplete, since armed groups govern parts of the territory. Peacebuilding here means extending state presence, and the state consented to external verification to make its commitments credible.

power

The terms of justice reflected the balance of power at the table: a negotiated exit produced restorative rather than retributive justice. The 2026 turn towards a harder security policy reflects shifts in public opinion and in the balance between the state and the remaining armed groups.

Perspectives

Supporters of the agreement

Restorative justice was the price of an agreement that ended the war with the FARC; truth and reparation are more valuable to victims than prison terms that would never have been negotiated.

Critics on the right

The deal rewarded violence with leniency and political seats, and voters rejected it; security, not negotiation, protects citizens.

Victims' organisations

Divided: some value acknowledgement and the search for the disappeared; others see sanctions as too lenient and too slow.

Peacebuilding scholars

Rural reform and security guarantees lagged, so violence moved to other groups in the places the FARC left; negative peace with the FARC has not yet become positive peace.

Evaluation

Judged against the war it ended, the agreement succeeded: the largest insurgency in the Americas disarmed, became a party and has not returned to arms as an organisation. Judged as peacebuilding, the record is mixed, because rural reform and security guarantees lag and violence persists where the state did not replace the FARC. The JEP is the most ambitious restorative experiment in contemporary transitional justice. Its first sentences in 2025 showed that it can hold senior commanders to account, though critics on all sides doubt that restorative sanctions satisfy victims.

As of November 2026 the decisive variable is political. A government elected on opposition to negotiation must decide how far to implement an agreement that a 2017 constitutional reform requires successive governments to honour. See peace and conflict.

Questions to take further

  • Is restorative justice a form of justice or a price paid for peace?
  • Does the 2016 referendum defeat weaken the agreement's legitimacy?
  • Can peace hold where the state cannot replace the armed group that disarmed?
  • How far can a new government depart from a peace agreement signed by its predecessor?

Sources

  1. 01Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace (Colombia, November 2016)
  2. 02Al Jazeera, 'Landmark ruling convicts seven FARC ex-leaders of wartime crimes' (16 September 2025) (opens in a new tab). Al Jazeera, 16 September 2025
  3. 03UN Verification Mission in Colombia, reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council. United Nations